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Abstract
This thesis is about the link between international trade (and the eco­
nomic fundamentals tha t determine it) and a country’s economic power. In 
Chapter 1 and 2, I define economic power as the capacity to  impose - at 
little enough cost - harmful trade sanctions on other countries. I study how 
a “strong” country can use its economic power to influence policy and insti­
tutional change in a “weak” country. This foreign influence interacts heavily 
with domestic politics in Chapter 1 . Here, I study how an incumbent elite 
tha t has a disproportionate stake in gains from trade may use foreign influ­
ence to entrench itself in power. I argue that this can help explain the pattern 
of democratization in Latin America during the Cold War. In Chapter 2, I 
focus instead on how changes in economic power may lead to institutional 
change in international relations. I study how a weak country that is under 
the de jure domination of a strong country may find it easier to re-establish its 
sovereignty when the economic power of the strong country decreases. This 
allows me to explain various decolonization episodes in terms of changes 
in the economic fundamentals (mainly factor endowments) that determine 
trade, and thus economic power. A different approach to economic power is 
adopted in Chapter 3. This chapter is about the allocation of oil contracts 
to multinational companies in developing countries, and how is this deter­
mined by inter-governmental lobbying just as well as by economic factors. In 
this context, the economic power of an oil-importing country is defined as its 
\ . capacity to lobby an oil-exporting government into a clientelistic allocation 
of contracts. I construct a model where this capacity is endogenously deter­
mined by the structure of the oil trade, by technology, and by the political 
myopia of the oil-exporting government.
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Chapter 1
Foreign Influence and the Cold 
War H istory of Dem ocracy in 
Latin America
The recent political economy literature on regime change and non-democratic 
politics has not paid enough attention to the role of foreign influence. I look 
at the Cold War history of democracy in Latin America and construct a the­
ory of power allocation in the presence of foreign influence. In this theory, 
the outcome of a distributional conflict between an incumbent group and 
a challenger is altered by the capacity of the incumbent to obtain external 
support from a key trading partner. This capacity is grounded in the incum­
bent larger exposure to the international economy, which makes him easier 
to control from the exterior, using the threat of trade sanctions. I also allow 
for the possibility that there is international competition for the geopolitical 
alignment of the incumbent’s country, and study how this choice of alignment
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is determined by economic or political self-interest. I argue that this theory 
can help understand the Cold War history of democracy in Latin America, 
but that it is useful in a number of other contexts as well.
1.1 Introduction
In recent years, the political economy literature has put considerable effort 
in studying the economic determinants of regime change and non-democratic 
politics. For example, a series of papers have studied the transition to democ­
racy in Western Europe and other parts of the World (e.g. Lizzeri and 
Persico, 2004; Llevador and Hoxoby, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). 
Other work has focused on the allocation of power within weakly institution­
alized polities (e.g. Heilman and Wantchekon, 2000; Padro-i-Miquel, 2007). 
While some of these papers do consider the effect of changing international 
economic conditions on regime change and non-democratic politics (see, for 
example, Chapter 10 in Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), these are normally 
seen as shaped by the interaction of domestic players only.1
There is, however, considerable evidence that regime change and non- 
democratic politics are influenced by foreign interventions as well. Looking 
at democratization, for instance, one finds many examples of how the US 
supported coups against democracy during the Cold War: to cite but a few, 
the coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Chile (1973). That Cold 
War interventions were largely detrimental to democratization is established 
empirically by Easterly, Satyanath, and Berger (2008), who use recently de­
1A notable exception to this is Aidt and Albornoz (2009), which I discuss below.
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classified material to show that covert CIA and KGB interventions resulted 
in a decline in democracy both in the short and in the long run. On the 
other hand, recent interventions such as the war on Iraq or Afghanistan have 
been decisive to the current democratization attem pt in these countries. Nor 
do foreign interventions only seem to arbitrate between democracy and au­
tocracy: for example, the history of post-colonial Africa is full of instances 
in which former colonial powers supported one group or another at the lead 
of non-democratic regimes.2 Finally, foreign intervention is not only limited 
to full-fledged military operations. For example, Mobutu’s long permanence 
in power was facilitated by the timely release of economic aid in periods of 
economic distress; in today’s Zimbabwe and Sudan, the entrenchment of the 
ruling elite is made easier by the diplomatic support that these countries 
receive from China.
In this paper, I look at the history of US interventions in Latin America 
to construct a theory of power allocation in the context of foreign influence. 
This theory helps understand the Cold War history of democracy in Latin 
America. At the same time, it shed lights on the reasons why, by hindering 
the democratization process, the US went against its long-standing foreign 
policy goal of supporting democracy abroad. Finally, while the theory is 
based on what were the key determinants of foreign interventions in Latin 
America - the wish to protect and promote foreign investors, and the need 
to secure the geopolitical alliance of intervened countries - I argue that it is 
general enough to be useful in other contexts as well.
2See Waisse (1998, Ch. 10), for a study of French interventions meant to prevent the 
spread of American influence to French Africa, or extend French influence to parts of 
British Africa.
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The model builds on the distributional conflict between two groups, a po­
litical incumbent and a challenger, in the context of a small open economy. 
Part of the value of this economy relies on a peaceful trade relation with a 
large foreign country, and I assume that members of the incumbent group 
have a higher per capita stake in this part of the economy than members of 
the challenging group. International economic relations are shaped by repu­
tation: in particular, a large foreign investment position may force the large 
country to impose costly sanctions against a government who expropriates. 
I construct a simple reputation game, and derive conditions under which the 
threat of sanctions becomes credible: when these conditions are met, the 
incumbent is blessed with a greater capacity to commit to protecting foreign 
rents, relative to the challenger. I add to this picture the international compe­
tition between two large countries (the one already mentioned, plus another 
one) who both care about the small country’s geopolitical alignment. This is 
a choice over which the two groups do not have an intrinsic preference, but 
that can be used to secure economic support from the second large country. 
Thus, a key cost of sanction for the first large country lies in the risk that 
the sanctioned government ends up in the opponent’s camp.
In this environment, if the large country has the capacity to intervene in 
the political life of the small country, the incumbent may want to use foreign 
rents strategically, so as to secure some external support. Such support is mo­
tivated by the perspective of a conflictual relation between the large country 
and a successful challenger: crucially, this conflict is fueled by both economic 
nationalism and geopolitical adversity, but this second element is entirely 
driven by economic motivations. I solve for the equilibrium of the model and
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derive several predictions on the link between the small country’s economic 
and political conditions and the capacity of the incumbent to entrench itself 
with external support. I argue that the theory can help understand why US 
foreign policy was largely detrimental to democracy during the Cold War, 
in sharp contrast with one of its most long-standing goals. I illustrate this 
using a few case studies. I conclude by suggesting that the model provides 
a good starting point for analyzing these issues in a broader context, as it 
lends itself to several simple extensions.
The paper adds to the political economy literature on democratization. 
This can be organized into two main strands, one that focuses on redistri­
bution as a driver for democratization (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006), 
another that postulates that it is economically profitable for the ruling group 
to share power with a broader sets of citizens, (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico, 
2004).3 I borrow the basic structure of the model from papers in the first 
group, but innovates on these by specifically looking at the case of foreign 
influence. To the best of my knowledge, the only paper to have done this 
before is Aidt and Albornoz (2009), who adapt the Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) model to account for foreign interventions. My paper shares one key 
element with this paper, namely the incumbent’s advantage in committing 
to a better treatment for foreign investors. It is however quite different in at 
least two important respects. First, I present an alternative mechanism for 
why the elite cares about foreign investors, one that puts trade and reputa­
tion at centre stage. Second, while Aidt and Albornoz (2009) only look at
3For a detailed discussion of the literature on democratization, the interested reader is 
referred to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). A very concise review of the literature using 
formal modeling can instead be found in Ticchi and Vindigni (2009).
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the protection of foreign investors as a motivation for foreign intervention, I 
suggest a mechanism that relates protection to a broader set of geopolitical 
issues. Because of these different modeling choices, the two papers offer sets 
of results that are largely complementary to each other.
The paper is also related to two very recent strands of literature on foreign 
influence. The first is an empirical literature based on declassified CIA and 
KGB materials. Beside the above mentioned Easterly et A l  (2008) paper, 
the two other papers in this literature are Dube, Kaplan, and Naidu (2008) 
- who look at the effect of covert CIA interventions on the stock market 
performance of companies involved in the intervened country - and Easterly, 
Nunn, Satyanath, and Berger (2009), who look at the consequences of CIA 
interventions for the intervened country’s trade relations. The second (to 
which the paper is more loosely related) is a theoretical literature who studies 
the efficiency implications of cross-border lobbying (Endoh, 2005; Aidt and 
Hwang, 2008a, 2008b; Antras and Padro, 2009; Bonfatti, 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an historical overview 
of the case of Latin America and sets out the key questions that I want to 
address. Section 3 develops the theory. Section 4 uses the theory to provide 
a general interpretation of the Latin American case, and to answer the key 
questions. Section 5 uses country studies to further illustrate this interpre­
tation. Section 6  summarizes, discusses possible extensions and concludes.
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1.2 Stylized facts and key questions
I begin by providing some background info on the pre-1945 history of rep­
resentative institutions in Latin America, and on the strengthening of US 
influence over this period. I then describe how democracy evolved during 
the Cold War, and how US influence played a role in this. I conclude by 
setting out the key questions that my model wants to address.
1.2.1 H istorical background
Most Latin American countries established representative institutions during 
the course of 19th century. These, however, remained firmly in the hands 
of a small elite of landowners and businessmen until the middle of the 2 0 th  
century. In fact, a series of electoral restrictions prevented the masses from 
participating in election (see Hartlyn, 1994). Furthermore, with a few ex­
ceptions (such as Chile and Uruguay), these institutions remained very weak 
relative to the army, and could therefore be overthrown when they did not 
provide sufficient guarantees of social stability.
In the first half of the 20th century, however, the pressure for social 
and political change became increasingly strong. On one hand, since the 
1890s, labour demonstrations and strikes became widespread. These were 
normally put down by the army, leading to violent clashes and bloodshed. 
On the other, from the 1920s onwards a large number of new radical parties 
were founded (see Angell, 1994), which set out to conquer power through 
the elite’s representative institutions. These parties were very diverse in 
nature (they were communist, socialist, radical, populist, etc) but shared
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two common goals: the implementation of domestic redistributive reforms, 
and the adoption of a nationalistic stance towards foreign investors, which 
they saw as agents of foreign imperialism.
The first half of the 2 0 th  century was also the period in which the US 
became extremely influential in Latin American affairs. This had roots in 
the expansion of the US as the leading political and economic power of the 
Western hemisphere. On the political side, US supremacy was embedded in 
the two key principles leading its foreign policy. The first, established by the 
Monroe Doctrine of 1823, stated that any attem pt by a European power to 
colonize or otherwise interfere with states in the Americas would be taken as 
act of hostility by the US government. While challenged a few times in 19th 
century, the Monroe doctrine became largely inviolable by the first half of the 
20th century (Brzezinski, 1992, p. 39). The second principle was established 
by the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (1904), and attributed 
to the US the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of a Latin American 
country where its investments would come under threat.
On the economic side, US influence was first of all the result of its increas­
ingly important role as Latin America’s trade partner. Since the 1860s, the 
Latin American economies relied heavily on the export of agricultural and 
mineral commodities or, where industrialization had already taken place, on 
imported intermediates and machinery.4 In the first half of the 20th century, 
the US displaced Europe as Latin America’s main trading partner, getting
4 The key export commodities were temperate agricultural commodities in Argentina 
and Uruguay, tropical commodities such as sugar, tobacco, coffee and cocoa and bananas 
in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Central America and the Caribbean, parts of Venezuela and 
Mexico. The key exporters of minerals where Mexico, Chile, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela. 
Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Colombia were the early industrializes.
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to absorb more than 50% of the trade of many countries by the early 1950s.5 
This made it very influential with the local elite, who controlled a large share 
of the land farmed for export agriculture and looked to foreign markets for 
its consumption patterns (see, for example, Feinberg, 1974, p. 31). The US 
also became the region’s leading supplier of private capital: following to two 
periods of buoyant growth (1914-1929 and 1945-1960) the stock of US FDI 
grew to US$ 8 .8 bn by 1960, or almost 40% of all US direct investments out­
side North America.6 In many countries, US investments came to dominate 
the local economy, expanding not only in agriculture and mining but also 
in manufacturing and utilities. Finally, the US became a leading source of 
intergovernmental loans and aid.
In the first three decades of the century, the US intervened militarily 
in a number of Central American and Caribbean countries, to protect its 
investments along the lines of the Roosevelt Corollary7. Sometimes, these 
interventions were simply directed at physically protecting American invest­
ments during political turmoil. More often, however, the US participated 
actively in putting down rebellions, helping the local elite to maintain polit­
ical stability. This pattern of interventionism came to a halt with the onset 
of the Great Depression, as the inflow of American investments virtually 
stopped and the Roosevelt Corollary was substituted by (Franklin D.) Roo­
5For example, the average share of the US in total exports and imports in 1950-1954 
was 61% and 76% in Cuba, 66% and 45% in Ecuador, 26% and 56% in Venezuela, and 
50% and 55% in Chile (Mitchell, 1989.)
6This share is much lower today (around 20%). Source: Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Millennial Edition on line.
7For example, the US sent troops to Cuba (1906-1909, 1912, 1917-1933), Dominican 
Republic (1903-1904, 1914, 1916-1924), Guatemala (1920), and more than five times in 
Honduras and Guatemala.
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sevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy” . This was just a temporary interruption, 
though.
1.2.2 U S influence and th e  Cold-W ar h istory o f dem oc­
racy in Latin Am erica
After 1945, two key political developments took place. On one hand, the new 
reformist parties managed to push through electoral reforms that greatly in­
creased voter turnout in most Latin American countries (Hartlyn, 1994, pp. 
130-131), and political mobilization increased dramatically. In several coun­
tries, the reformists were able to go to power after obtaining an electoral vic­
tory: this was for example the case of Guatemala (1945), Venezuela (1944), 
Costa Rica (1948) and Bolivia (1952). Because of the economic national­
ism of the reformist parties, this increased electoral competition brought 
fresh uncertainty for American investors, and renewed tension with the US 
government. In Guatemala, for example, American land holdings were ex­
propriated with little compensation. In Venezuela, the government took a 
series of landmark measures that reduced the privileges of the American oil 
companies.
On the other hand, the Cold War created a second key tension between 
the reformist parties and the US government. Initially, the Cold War touched 
Latin America only marginally, as the key front was Europe and the death 
of Stalin (1953) put the USSR on the defensive for a few years. With the 
advent of Khrushchev (1958), however, a distinctively new phase started, one 
in which “Eurasia was still the central stake but no longer the central front” , 
as the Soviet leadership had decided that “Containment was to be defeated
19
by encirclement” , (Brzezinski, 1992, p. 38). In this crucial phase - which 
lasted until about 1979, when the USSR shifted its attention to  Afghanistan 
and Eastern Europe, as well as to internal problems - superpower competition 
had a significant impact on political evolutions in Latin America.
As part of its plan to “encircle” the West, the USSR launched a large- 
scale effort to secure alliances in the region. This included the strengthening 
of ties with communist parties and guerrilla groups, as well as the provision 
of economic support to governments that rejected American influence. Just 
how dangerous this could be for US geopolitical interests became soon clear: 
within three years from the Cuban Revolution (1959) - and one year since 
Castro had completely nationalized American investments in the island - 
Soviet ballistic missiles were installed at a short distance from US territory, 
sparking one of the most dangerous crises of the entire Cold War. Crucially, 
Soviet activism increased the American diffidence for many reformist leaders 
with radical views. Whether they were communist or not, these came to 
be seen as not only a threat to American investors, but also a geopolitical 
threat.
As its economic and geopolitical interests came under threat, the US 
intervened a large number of times to tilt the local political balance in fa­
vor of conservative/centrist governments. This pattern of interventionism 
intensified markedly in the 1960s and 1970s, when Cold War competition 
was at its highest. Among the intervention tools used were aid paid to con­
servative/centrist governments, trade or aid sanctions against radical gov­
ernments, and covert CIA interventions to influence the results of elections, 
support or organize military coups, fight guerrillas, etc. Because many of the
20
This interrupted a positive democratization trend started immediately after 
World War 2. This finding is consistent with the finding, by Easterly et A l 
(2008), that CIA interventions around the world had a negative impact on 
democracy, both in the short run and in the long run.
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Figure 1.1: CIA interventions and democracy in Latin America, 1945-1989 
Sources: Polity IV (democracy), Berger et Al. (2010) (CIA interventions).
1.2.3 Three key questions
At least since Wilson (1913-1921), a recurrent principle of US foreign policy 
has been that exporting democracy is good, because it stabilizes international 
relations and increases business opportunities (see Smith, 1994). We would 
then expect that, on average, US foreign policy should be supportive of 
democratization attempts throughout the world. While this has been true 
in a number of occasions during the 20th century, the fact described above
22
radical reformist parties were electorally quite successful, these interventions 
went systematically against the consolidation of democracy. The most strik­
ing examples of this are the coups in Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973). On 
the wake of American interventionism, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a broad 
reversal of the pattern of democratization that had started after the war. The 
only three marked exceptions8 to this were Costa Rica, where democracy was 
in place since 1946, and Colombia and Venezuela, which became relatively 
democratic in the early 1960s and remained steadily so through the rest of 
the Cold War.
The pattern of US interventionism in Latin America is illustrated in the 
following figure, which reports the CIA intervention measure constructed by 
Easterly et Al. (2010). The authors use recently declassified CIA material 
to construct an indicator variable that equals one in all country-year obser­
vations where the CIA either installed or supported the leader of a foreign 
country in office.9 In the figure, I report the number of Latin American 
countries where this variable is one in any given year. The series clearly 
shows tha t the number of interventions jumped up after 1960, to fall sig­
nificantly only towards the end of the 1970s. The figure also reports the 
average Polity IV democracy score for all Latin American countries. This 
is a variable tha t takes value between 0  and 1 0 , where 0  is least democratic 
and 10 is most democratic. Particularly for the case of South America, the 
series confirms that the intensification of US interventionism in the 1960s 
and 1970s was matched by a sharp decline in the average level of democracy.
8Excluding Jamaica, who remained a British colony until 1962.
9They also have a more narrow measure that only looks at cases in which the CIA 
installed a leader. This follows a pattern similar to that of the broader measure.
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1.2.3 Three key questions
At least since Wilson (1913-1921), a recurrent principle of US foreign policy 
has been that exporting democracy is good, because it stabilizes international 
relations and increases business opportunities (see Smith, 1994). We would 
then expect that, on average, US foreign policy should be supportive of 
democratization attempts throughout the world. While this has been true 
in a number of occasions during the 20th century, the fact described above
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suggest tha t the US went systematically against the democratization of Latin 
America in the 1960s and 1970s. The basic question that we need to address 
is then why was this so? In other words, why was democracy a threat to US 
interests in those specific circumstances?
At some level, it is clear from our previous discussion that economic 
nationalism had a key role. Because this happened to be very strong with 
the radical parties that were likely to dominate elections, democracy was 
a direct threat to American investments in Latin America. But this takes 
us to our first key question: was it just accidental that the radicals were 
so more nationalistic than the elite, or was this related to the underlying 
democratization process? And more in general, under what conditions can we 
expect democracy to lead to nationalistic policies against foreign investors?
Our previous discussion also highlighted the role of the Cold War. Namely, 
the radical parties were seen as more likely to switch side to the Soviet Union, 
implying a large geopolitical cost for the US. This explanation is consistent 
with the fact that American interventionism was most intense - and the fate 
of democracy bleakest - when Cold War competition was strongest (Figure 
1). But then a second key question is: why were the radical parties less 
willing to (or able) to sign up for a geopolitical alliance with the US? After 
all, both proximity and for economic complementarity seemed to make this a 
natural alliance. Notice that ideology is all but a satisfactory answer: many 
of the most successful reformist parties where not communist, nor did they 
entertain close ties with Moscow (Angell, 1994). In fact, many of them were 
opposed to communism in the 1960s and 1970s.
While American interventions in the 1960s and 1970s were mostly detri-
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suggest tha t the US went systematically against the democratization of Latin 
America in the 1960s and 1970s. The basic question that we need to address 
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implying a large geopolitical cost for the US. This explanation is consistent 
with the fact that American interventionism was most intense - and the fate 
of democracy bleakest - when Cold War competition was strongest (Figure 
1). But then a second key question is: why were the radical parties less 
willing to (or able) to sign up for a geopolitical alliance with the US? After 
all, both proximity and for economic complementarity seemed to make this a 
natural alliance. Notice that ideology is all but a satisfactory answer: many 
of the most successful reformist parties where not communist, nor did they 
entertain close ties with Moscow (Angell, 1994). In fact, many of them were 
opposed to communism in the 1960s and 1970s.
While American interventions in the 1960s and 1970s were mostly detri­
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mental to democracy, we have mentioned a few exceptions. In Colombia, 
Venezuela and Costa Rica, US foreign policy actively supported the consoli­
dation of democracy. In the case of Venezuela, this was despite the nation­
alism of the key reformist party (Alianza Democratica) which led in 1976 
to the nationalization (with little compensation) of the American oil com­
panies. My final question is then: what explains the different experience of 
these countries?
In the next question, I set up a model that will help us interpret the facts 
described in this section, and provide an answer to these questions.
1.3 M odel
The section is organized as follows. I begin by modeling a distributional 
conflict between an incumbent group and a challenger in a small open econ­
omy (3.1). I then introduce the possibility that the incumbent may exchange 
rents to foreign investors for protection from the government of a large trad­
ing partner, who may also be competing with a second large country for 
geo-political predominance in the area (3.2). Crucially, the actions of the 
trading partner are constrained by the need to preserve a reputation of in­
transigence towards expropriation (3.3). After summarizing the timing of the 
model (3.4), I solve for the equilibrium (3.5), and conduct some comparative 
statics (3.6). I conclude the section by looking at the welfare consequences 
of foreign influence (3.7).
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1.3.1 D om estic econom y and politics
There is a small country, Home (H), which is populated by a continuum of 
citizens with mass 1. The economy of this country is such that it generates 
aggregate (transferable) utility Y  +  Y* for its citizens. While Y  is not af­
fected by the country’s external relations ( “autarchy utility”), Y* relies on 
a peaceful relations with two large trade partners, A  and B  ( “gains from 
trade”). I normalize Y* to 1.
Citizens are split into two groups, called a and b. The two groups have 
mass 5 and 1 — 5 respectively. Within each group, citizens are identical. 
In the aggregate, the two groups initially own Ya and Yb of autarchy utility 
(thus, Ya +  Yb = Y ), while trade utility is entirely owned by group a. Thus, 
group a is more ’’outward-oriented” than group b.10
Initially, group a is in power. However group b can overthrow a at a 
stochastic, aggregate cost /i. The cost /i  is distributed as a uniform over 
the interval [0, M], with M  high enough (so that there is always a positive 
probability that a is overthrown). This cost does not depend on any other 
parameter in the model (but notice that I always keep the size of the economy 
constant at Y +1). If 6 goes to power, it can change policy in such a way that 
a looses X  < Y a of its autarchy utility, and its entire trade utility .11 This 
results in a gain +  1 ) for b, where 7  E (0 , 1 ) captures the distortions 
associated with redistribution. Notice that even for 7  very close to 1, there 
is an amount Ya — X  of a ’s autarchy utility that is non appropriable by b.
10To assume that group b owns a share of Y* does not change qualitatively the results 
of the model.
11 To assume that only X* <  1 is lost by a would complicate the analysis without 
undermining the main results of the model.
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This could reflect, for example, the existence of non-excludable public goods.
Before the cost of revolution is realized and b decides whether to overthrow 
a or not, a may decide to award rents R  to investors from A. These have an 
equal cost for all citizens. For example, mineral concessions may be granted 
to companies from A  at excessively favorable terms, therefore decreasing the 
public funds available for financing various public goods. Alternatively, com­
panies from A  may be favored in the allocation of various public contracts, 
from the management of utilities to the procurement of various government 
purchases. More in general, the government may discriminate in favor of A’s 
companies or goods, therefore creating a loss from reduced competition that 
is widely spread across the economy.
After rents have been allocated, the cost of revolution realizes. Before b 
makes a decision on whether to overthrow a or not, A  may decide to intervene 
to hinder 6 ’s ascent or consolidation into power. The most intuitive way to 
think about this is direct military help to the ruling government. However 
A’s intervention may also take the form of economic assistance, for example 
a loans in the middle of a crisis. I assume that if A  invests c to this purpose, 
the cost of revolution increases to fi +  c.
After a revolution decision has been made, whoever is in power may decide 
to expropriate A  by imposing a tax r  on R. For simplicity, I assume that r  
is non distortionary, and that it can only take value 0  (no expropriation) or 
1 (expropriation).
Assume that citizens within each group are identical. Then, if rents R  
have been granted, the per capita utility of the two groups in the two political 
regimes is:
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Va(a) =  Y “^  1 -  -R[l -  T(a)]
Vb(a) = T37 ~ ^I1 _ r(“)l
Va(b) =  Y° s  X  -  fl[l -  t(6)]
yb(b) =  y*+7(-y+ij-/*-c _ B[1 _ t(6)]
Where yi(j) denotes the per capita utility of a citizen from group i when 
group j  is in power, and r ( j)  is the expropriation level chosen by group j  
when in power.
The ex-ante (per capita) welfare of the two groups is:
=  (1 -  IT) -  R[r(b) -  r (a )] )  +  ya(b) (1.1)
w h = *  ( t - V  ~~ ~  +  y«(a ) (L2)
where ir is the (endogenous) probability that b overthrows a. Before 
proceeding, I make the following key assumption:
Assumption 1
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S > 1 - 5
Assumption 1 requires that a successful challenger group has a lower per 
capita trade utility than the incumbent group had when in power. This could 
be the case for two reasons: first, group a may be much smaller than group b 
(8 low), so that the importance of trade utility gets diluted upon bJs advent 
to power, despite the fact tha t trade utility is fully re-distributed. Second, 
trade utility could be very inefficient to redistribute, so that not much is left 
for b to care about ( 7  low). Both reasons may be valid in the case of Latin 
America in the 1950s and 1960s. There, on one hand, the value of export 
crops was largely captured by a handful of landed elite, as was the gain from 
consumption of luxury import goods; on the other hand, the new industrial 
sector - that relied on imported intermediates - was probably quite hard to 
expropriate.
1.3.2 International econom y and politics
The world outside H  is made up of two large countries (A  and B). As 
mentioned above, a can affect A’s payoff by awarding it rents R. After the 
revolution decision is made, however, whoever is in power may decide to re- 
appropriate A’s rents. At the same time, however, A  can impose economic 
sanctions against H, therefore destroying its trade utility. Thus, sanctions 
have a cost 1 for H. They also have a cost (3 > 0 for A.
Besides allocating rents to A  (and possibly expropriate them later on)
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H  can affect the two large countries’ payoffs by choosing its geopolitical 
alignment a. This is chosen after the expropriation and sanctions decision, 
and can be set to a = A  (when H  allies itself to A), or to cr =  if  (when it 
allies with B). The payoffs to A (B) in the two cases are S  and 0 (0 and S) 
where S  is the strategic value of if . I assume that the alignment decision 
has no impact on i f ’s payoff.
When A  imposes sanctions against if, B  can alleviate their cost by 1 — (f), 
where <j> £ [0,1]. Thus, by resorting to B , i f  can reduce the cost of sanctions 
to (f). For simplicity, I assume that B  can alleviate sanctions at no benefit nor 
cost. I also assume that for B  to be willing to alleviate the cost of sanctions, 
i f  must set a  =  B. When sanctions are not imposed, on the contrary, the 
choice of a  has no effect on i f ’s payoff. There are at least two ways in 
which this assumption could be justified. First, it could be that i f  auctions 
off its geopolitical alignment to the highest bidder. In such an auction, no 
bidder could outbid the other when sanctions are not imposed, but B  would 
certainly outbid A  when sanctions are imposed. This is because B  would 
be in the position of alleviating sanctions at no cost. Alternatively, it could 
be that the threat of sanction itself is what induces H  to aligns itself with 
A , in that this latter country has a higher capacity than B  to create trade 
disruption in H. Once this capacity has been used, however, B  would always 
have the upper hand, by using the threat of not mitigating sanctions.
To summarize, the payoffs of A  and B  are:
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WA = I  (a = A )S  + (1 -  t )R  -  I(T  =  1 ) ( 3 - c  
WB = I(<j =  B )S  ■
(1.3)
(1.4)
Where T takes value 1 if sanctions are imposed, 0 otherwise.
1.3.3 Expropriation and sanctions: a reputation  gam e
While A  can threaten sanctions against an expropriating H, the fact that 
(3 > 0 makes sure that these are never ex-post optimal. In the case of Latin 
American countries like Cuba or Chile, however (as in many other real world 
cases), US sanctions were indeed enforced because of a need by the US to 
build a reputation as a punisher of expropriating countries. This need was 
motivated by the ramification of US interests in the American continent, 
and the risk that other countries could follow suit had the expropriation by 
these countries not been punished. In this subsection, I enrich the model 
with a simple reputation game where the threat of sanctions may become 
credible. The role of this is to uncover a link between the functioning of 
foreign influence and the parameter /?, through the credibility of sanctions.
Suppose that agents estimate that with some small probability p A  is 
’’ideological” . An ideological A  is identical to a ’’normal” A, except for 
the fact that it receives a high exogenous benefit g > S  from imposing 
sanctions against an expropriating H. Next, suppose that there are other n 
small countries, that are identical to H  except for the fact that a is firmly
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entrenched in power, A’s rents have been set to some value R  everywhere, 
and the cost to A  from imposing sanctions is fixed at some low value j3 < 
g —S. This captures well the case of Latin America, where US interests were 
dispersed in a series of small, elite-controlled countries, often in competition 
among each other to sell agricultural products on the US market.
After H  has decided whether to expropriate A  or not, A  has decided on 
sanctions against H, and H  has possibly secured £?’s commercial support by 
setting a = B, the ”reputation game” takes place. This may extend over up 
to n periods, and unfolds as follows:12
•  In period 1, if none of the n  countries wants to expropriate, nothing 
happens, and the game ends. Otherwise, one of the others may ex­
propriate, A  may impose sanctions against it, and this may obtain B ’s 
help after setting a = B.
•  In period s =  2, ...,n , nothing happens if the game has ended at some 
earlier period. Otherwise, the same events as in period 1 take place.
1.3.4 T im ing
The timing of the overall game is as follows:
1. a awards rents R  to A;
12I could have alternatively modeled this as a infinite horizon game, where the events 
that regards H  take place at period t and at all subsequent periods one of the countries 
who has not yet expropriated may do so. This, however, would have complicated the 
structure of payoffs for no additional insight.
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2 . Nature picks the cost of revolution //; A  observes this, and invests c to 
increase the cost to fi +  c;
3. b decides whether to overthrow a or not;
4. Whoever is in power decides whether to expropriate A (r = 1 ) or not 
( r  =  0 );
5. A  decides whether to impose sanctions against H , and H  sets a. In the 
presence of sanctions, H  must set a = B  to obtain f?’s help. Otherwise, 
the choice of a  has no consequences on H ’s payoff.
6 . The reputation game takes place.
7. All payoffs realize.
1.3.5 Equilibrium
I solve for the equilibrium using backward induction.
P e rio d  6 . The role of the reputation game is to derive conditions under 
which it is optimal for A  to impose sanctions against an expropriating H. 
Because this part of the model has nothing innovative (being largely based 
on Kreps and Wilson, 1982, and Milgrom and Roberts, 1982) and its techni­
calities are largely extraneous to the main argument of the paper, I keep the 
details in the Appendix. Here, I limit myself to describing the main result of 
the model, and its intuition.
The key assumption of the model is the existence of an ideological version 
of A, which receives a high enough benefit from punishing expropriation (g >
S). As long as the economic cost of imposing sanctions is low (and we are 
assuming (3 < g — S), the ideological A  can be expected to impose sanctions 
no matter what. Given this, A  may want to impose sanctions in order to 
build a reputation as ideological, and therefore discourage expropriation in 
other countries. Thus, reputation considerations increase the probability of 
sanctions above p; and because the value of reputation is increasing in the 
number of observing countries, the probability of sanctions is highest in the 
case of the country who expropriates first. But when this probability is 
high enough - because the overall number of countries is large enough - no 
country ever want to be first, therefore creating an equilibrium where no one 
expropriates. If n is large enough, such an equilibrium exists no m atter how 
small is p. This result is reported in Lemma 1 :
L em m a 1  For any arbitrarily small p, there exists a finite n such that if 
n > n and no info on the type of A  can be extracted from previous rounds, 
the reputation game ends immediately (none of the countries expropriates). 
In this case:
•  I fP  + S  < g, the unique equilibrium is one where A  imposes sanctions 
against an expropriating H;
•  I fP  + S  > g, two equilibria exists, one where A  imposes sanctions 
against an expropriating H, one where it does not.
The second part of Lemma 1 considers how reputation affect the attitude 
of A  towards expropriation in H. As in the case of all countries where its 
actions are under scrutiny, A  does not want be recognized as non ideolog­
ical in its response to H. Indeed, because H  comes very first in the chain
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of potential expropriations, A  is always willing to impose sanctions in this 
country, provided that these are needed to mask its non-ideological status. 
Here comes the key point, as sanctions turn out to not always be needed in 
the case of H. Remember that the cost of sanctions is allowed to take on 
different values in this country. When the cost is high ((3 > g — S), H  is 
strong enough tha t the ideological type itself would not enjoy punishing it: 
this generates an equilibrium where A  is able to not impose sanctions, and 
still defend the anonymity of its status.
Thus, the main result of the reputation game is that when enough many 
countries are watching, the threat of sanctions is always credible when their 
cost is low. When their cost is high, the threat can or cannot be credible, 
depending on the equilibrium we are in. In the rest of the paper, I show that 
the credibility of sanctions may have quite important consequences for the 
political economy of H. Before moving on, however, I restrict the model to 
focusing on the case where reputation is very important:
A ssu m p tio n  2 : n >  n.
This fits rather well the case of the US, whose investors had ramified rents 
in Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. That reputation was a key element 
driving US policy in those years is evident from a number of facts, including 
the reaction to expropriation in Cuba and Chile and the passing of legisla­
tion tha t forced the President to  cutoff aid to countries who expropriated US 
investments.13
13 This was the famous Hickenlooper Amendment of 1962.
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P erio d  5. Whenever sanctions are imposed, it is strictly optimal for 
whoever is in power to set a = B. On the contrary, when there are no sanc­
tions the government of H  is perfectly indifferent on its choice of alignment: 
in this case, I assume that all governments set a = A .14
P erio d  4. When we are in an equilibrium with no sanctions, it is clearly 
optimal for whoever is in power to set r  =  1. When we are in an equilibrium 
with sanctions, instead, the government sets r  = 1 if and only if the benefits 
from expropriation are higher than the cost from sanctions. If a is still in 
power, this requires that:
Notice that, under Assumption 1 , R  < R. This implies that the two 
groups have a similar attitude towards expropriation for R  < R  and R >  R  
- neither of them expropriates in the first case, they both do in the second
R > ^  = R  o
(1.5)
If, instead, b has replaced a , the requirement is:
(1.6)
case - while they differ for R  < R  < R, with b being pro-expropriation and
14This can be rationalized by arguing that the ideological A could also receive a benefit 
from punishing a country that, while not expropriating, aligns itself with B.
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a pro-foreigners.
P e rio d  3. At this stage, b decides whether to overthrow a or not by 
comparing the benefit and cost of this. In an equilibrium with no sanctions, 
the condition for revolution to take place is:
j ( X  +  1) > / i  +  c (1.7)
Condition (1.7) says that b overthrows a if and only if the aggregate 
gain from domestic redistribution is higher than the aggregate cost from 
revolution. Notice that the gain from revolution does not depend on R, as 
revolution brings no policy gain in the domain of expropriation.
Consider now an equilibrium with sanctions. If R  < R  (as will be the 
case in equilibrium), the revolution condition becomes:
7 (X +  1) +  max[0, (1 — 5)R — ^ 7 ] > /z +  c (1.8)
The gain from revolution is now the sum of domestic redistribution and a 
potential gain from expropriation. Looking at (1.5), it is easy to see that the 
latter is strictly positive if and only R  6  [#, R ]. This reflects the fact that, 
for these intermediate values of rents, revolution becomes a way to impose 
domestic redistribution and a change in policy towards foreign investors.
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When the level of rents is low, on the contrary (R  < R), the two groups agree 
on a pro-foreigners stance, and revolution returns to be a purely domestic 
m atter (as it would do when R  > R, as the two parties would then agree on 
full expropriation).
Thus, while in an equilibrium with no sanctions revolution is only mo­
tivated by redistributive considerations, in an equilibrium with sanctions it 
may be motivated by a conflict over policy towards foreign investors. This 
resonates well with the case of Latin America in the 1950s, when the key re­
distributive issue that motivated the opposition to the ruling elite was often 
intertwined with a conflicting view over economic nationalism. There, the 
ruling group was blamed for being, out of self-interest, too lenient towards 
US investors. However beside animating the opposition to the ruling elite, 
economic nationalism was a key source of tension between the Latin America 
opposition groups and the government of the United States, whose political 
influence played a key role in the region. To the study of this tension I now 
turn.
P e rio d  2 . When fi is low enough to result in a revolution, A  may choose 
to intervene to try  and keep a in power. For this to be attractive to A, 
however, it must have a reason to prefer the rule of a to the rule of b. Clearly, 
in an equilibrium without sanctions, A  has no reason to do so, as both parties 
can be expected to  expropriate. Similarly, in an equilibrium with sanctions 
A  has no strict preference for a when R  < R  or R > R. Thus, in all these 
cases A  sets c =  0. Plugging this in (1.7) and rearranging, the condition for 
revolution to take place becomes:
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/i <  -y(X + 1 ) (1.9)
Clearly, the probability that b overthrows a does not depend on R  in this 
case, as rents neither affect the incentives of b to revolt nor induce A  to take 
a’s side in domestic politics.
When we are in an equilibrium with sanctions and R  G [#, i2], on the 
contrary, A  has two good reasons to strictly prefer a to b: first, it can be 
expected that A’s rents are safe under a, while they would be expropriated 
under 6 ’s rule. Second, because reputation obliges A  to react to expropriation 
with sanctions, it can also be expected that b will turn its foreign policy 
alignment to 6 . The overall loss to A  from a change in regime is then R+ P+ S, 
and this is also the maximum that A  is willing to spend to keep a in power. 
Plugging c =  R  + p + S  in (1.8), we find the maximum fi for which revolution 
takes place, /I:
H < 7 (X +  1) -  SR -  <fo -  P -  S  =  JX(R) (1.10)
Because JI is decreasing in R, the probability that b overthrows a is now 
decreasing in the amount of rents granted to A. This result may be unex­
pected, considered that, as we saw above, rents may have an inflammatory 
impact on revolutionary activity. However two opposite effects are now at 
play. On one hand, rents do increase the prize from revolution, therefore
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making revolution more attractive. On the other hand, rents increase the 
effort put by A  in keeping a in power, making revolution harder to accom­
plish. Because the benefit of expropriation are not fully appropriated by 6 , 
however (they are equally spread across the population) an increase in rents 
increases the prize from revolution by less than it increases A’s willingness to 
invest in counterinsurgent activities, ensuring that the second effect always 
dominates.15 This result suggests that the concessions of rents to American 
investors could represent a tool of entrenchment for the Latin American elite, 
despite the fact that it created further discontent among the people.
It is useful to summarize the these results in a proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  1  A  helps a remain in power i f  and only i f  we are in an 
equilibrium with sanctions, and R  E [5, i?]. In this case, the probability that 
b overthrows a is decreasing in R.
Proposition 1 implies that the incumbent group may want to strategi­
cally set R E [R, when we are in the equilibrium with sanctions, so as to 
induce A  to take its side in the domestic struggle for political power. This is 
possible because, under Assumption 1 , a has a commitment advantage over 
6 , in that it is more sensitive to the conditions of the international economy 
than b while in government. Having established the relation between R  and 
the probability tha t a remains in power, I close the model by studying the 
optimal choice of R  in period 1.
15Notice that, even if b was able to fully appropriate the benefit from expropriation, a’s 
security in power could still be higher when some rents are granted. To see this, notice that 
when R =  R  expropriation has value zero, but A is still willing to spend up to R +  (3 +  S  
to defend a.
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P erio d  1. I begin this section by introducing a final assumption:
A ssu m p tio n  3
7 (X +  1) > 0(1 +  7 ) +  P +  S  (1.11)
The assumption asks that the redistributive considerations pushing for 
regime change ( 7  (A +  1)) are strong enough relative to the international 
determinants of the maximum size of A’s intervention (j3 +  S). This seems 
plausible in the context of 20th century Latin America, where wealth inequal­
ity was huge and redistribution the key goal of the radical opposition parties. 
As I will clarify shortly, the role of Assumption 3 is to rule out an equilibrium 
where foreign influence leads to a zero probability that a is overthrown.
In what follows, I will show that there are two types of equilibrium path 
one of which has foreign influence. I begin by laying out the properties of 
each path and will then discuss when each of them comes about.
The first equilibrium path has no foreign influence. It has the following 
properties:
E qu ilib riu m  p a th  w ith  no foreign influence:
• a sets R  = 0;
•  A  does not support a in power;
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• b goes to power when /z < /z(0), which happens with probability 7r =
M  »
•  Whoever is eventually in power aligns itself with A.
The second equilibrium path has foreign influence, and has the following 
properties:
Equilibrium path with foreign influence
•  a sets R  = R*, where:
R if R < R
f l * = <  =  R  if R € ( R t R)  (1.12)
R if R >  R
•  A  supports a in power whenever there is need, and up to a maximum 
expenditure R* +  (3 +  S;
• b goes to power when /z <  Ji(R*), which happens with probability
7T <  7f:
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' if r - < r
w = <  w -  *y+s +0+(1+jXx +1) -M if  R ‘ e ( R , R )  (1.13)
■w _iQ+±±i±s if R, > R
•  If a remains in power, it does not expropriate and aligns itself with A; 
if b goes to power it expropriates and aligns itself with B .
The two paths have very different properties. On the path without foreign 
influence, the incumbent does not seek foreign support, and regime change 
is not affected by external interventions. In this case, the challenger stages 
a revolution when the gain from domestic redistribution is larger than the 
cost of confronting the incumbent. This maps into a probability W of regime. 
Along this path, the international relations between H  and A  are always 
good: this is because sanctions are never an issue (there are no rents to be 
expropriated), and no group has any reason not to align itself with A. On 
the path with foreign influence, on the contrary, the incumbent awards an 
amount of rents (R *) to A. This amount is such tha t the incumbent, but 
not the challenger, can commit not to expropriate rents in the future. This 
induces A  to intervene in support of the incumbent. In this case, revolution 
takes place when the prize from redistribution and expropriation is larger 
than the cost of confronting the joint forces of the incumbent and A. As 
we might expect from Proposition 1, this reduces the probability of regime
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change to 7r. Along this path, the international relations between H  and A  
are good if the incumbent remains in power. If the incumbent is overthrown, 
on the contrary, relations with A  are conflictual, as the challenger is hit by 
trade sanctions and aligns itself with B.
Plugging Assumption 3 in the expression for 7r when R* = R  reveals that 
the role of this assumption is to avoid 7r going to zero, a case that I want to 
avoid because of its scarce realism. An obvious substitute of Assumption 3 
would have been to model the return to foreign interventions as sufficiently 
decreasing in the size of the intervention. This, however, would have required 
giving up the linear structure of the model, a complication that would bring 
no additional insights. I thus prefer to stick to Assumption 3 in what follows.
The key results of the paper are presented in Proposition 2:
P ro p o sitio n  2 Define the following condition:
5M -  (X  +  1)(1 +  57) +  £ §
P + S > ( h  (i -S ) ( x  + i ) - 6 4 h (1'14)
Then, under Assumption 1-3:
1. I f  condition (1-14) is not satisfied, the unique equilibrium path is with­
out foreign influence.
2 . I f  condition (1-14) is satisfied, the unique equilibrium path is with for­
eign influence i f  j3 + S  < g; it may be with or without foreign influence 
if  (5 + S  > g.
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Proof. Prom Lemma 1, we know that equilibria can be of two types: one 
where A  adopts a strategy of reacting to expropriation with sanctions, and 
one where it adopts a strategy of not reacting (notice that expropriation can 
remain an off-equilibrium event in both cases). Begin by considering the first 
type. Prom Lemma 1, at least one such equilibrium always exists. The first 
step is to show that, if the optimal choice of R  is 0 or R*, the equilibrium 
path look exactly like in our two cases. This follows immediately from our 
backward induction, and from the fact that by plugging R* and JL{.) in:
Pr{a is overthrown} =  P r{fi < m ) }
V(R)=  i  -
M
one derives 7r as in equation (1.13).16 The next step is to show that, in 
this type of equilibrium, 0 and R* are, indeed, the only two possible optima. 
Furthermore, we need to show and that R * is the optimum when condition
(1.14) is satisfied,0 is the optimum when i t ’s not. The maximand of a is:
A Wfj{R) =  <
” (f - 1 ? )  -  R) + y°(b) =  HR)  if R € OS, R)
K (f - 2ij p 1) (^i1 -R)+ya{b)  =  m )  if R £ ( R ,R )
I will now separately derive the maximum of $(R ) and &(R) and compare
16 All calculations for this proof are in the Appendix.
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them. Because R ) is strictly decreasing in R, its unique maximum is 
R  =  0. As for $ (# ) , its strict concavity17 ensures that it also admits a 
unique maximum. Its unconstrained maximum is found by plugging in /Z(.) 
and maximizing with respect to R. This yields:
Having found the two maxima, I now derive a sufficient and necessary 
condition for Wjj(R*) > W #(0), or $(R*) > ^(0). Clearly, $(R ) > ^(0) is 
sufficient. But this condition is also necessary: this is immediately evident 
for the case R* =  R ; but when R* > R , it is always $ (# )  > ^(0), as 
$(R*) >  $(0) (by concavity) and $(0) >  ^(0) (because /I(0) < y(X  +  1 )). 
We can write the condition &(R) > &(0) as:
The constrained maximum is then:
R  if R  < R  
R *=  R  if R e  [£ ,# ] (1.15)
R  if R >  R
17This is also shown in the Appendix.
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Plugging in //(.) and R , this becomes:
P + S  > (f> 7
5 M - ( X + l ) ( l  +  57) +  g  
(1 -  6){X + l ) - 5 < h
which is the same as condition (1.14). Thus, we have shown that an 
equilibrium of the first type - where A  adopts a strategy of reacting to ex­
propriation with sanctions - always exists, and this generates our equilibrium 
path with foreign influence if condition (1.14) is satisfied, without foreign in­
fluence otherwise.
Prom Lemma 1, an equilibrium of the second type - where A  adopts a 
strategy of not retaliating - exists iff (3 + S  > g. Clearly, in any such equilib­
rium the equilibrium path must be identical to our equilibrium path without 
foreign influence. Thus, even if condition (1.14) is satisfied the equilibrium 
path without foreign influence may realize, if j3 4 - S  > g. This completes the 
proof. ■
Proposition 2  admits an intuitive explanation. The key decision for the 
incumbent is whether to seek foreign protection, or not. Prom our previous 
discussion, we know that foreign protection can be obtained if and only if A  
has a strategy of retaliating to expropriation, and rents have been set in the 
interval R  G [R, i?]. While an equilibrium where A  retaliates to expropriation 
always exists (Lemma 1), a may or may not want to seek foreign protection
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depending on its cost. In turns out that the optimal way of securing foreign 
protection is to  set R = R*, and that this leaves the incumbent better off 
than without foreign protection if and only if condition (1.14) is verified. In 
other words, there always exists an equilibrium where a may obtain foreign 
protection, and this puts the country under foreign influence if and only if a 
wants foreign protection. Such an equilibrium is not unique, however: from 
Lemma 1 we know that, if (3 + S  > g, there also exists an equilibrium where 
A  does not retaliate to expropriation. In this case, foreign protection cannot 
be obtained, and the equilibrium path must be without foreign influence. 
In other words, the incumbent is unable to put the country under foreign 
influence even if it would like to do so.
Many Latin American countries during the Cold War fit rather well the 
conditions for a country to fall under foreign influence. On one hand, the con­
ditions for the ruling elite to seek foreign protection (as outlined in conditions
(1.14)) were largely in place. First, the elite could rely on a large strategic 
importance of their countries, at a time when protection of the Americas 
from a Soviet penetration was a key geopolitical goal for the US. Second, 
the elite was increasingly under the siege of a rising leftist opposition, had 
immense fortunes to be lost in a political transition, and was almost always 
very small. On the other hand, the weak relative economic positions of most 
Latin American countries - as well as the actual experiences of few of them 
- suggest tha t US-Latin America relations were characterized by the need 
for the US to impose sanctions against expropriation. Thus, if this model 
is correct, we would expect the Cold War experience of democratization in 
Latin America to be described by the equilibrium path with foreign influence.
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Indeed, this seems to fit rather well the stylized facts described in section 2. 
In the next section, I will bring further evidence in favor of this theory, by 
looking at the specific experience of a few countries. Before going to  the case 
studies, however, I try to learn more about the equilibrium path with foreign 
influence by performing some comparative statics.
1.3.6 Predictions
In the previous section, I have shown that there exist two types of equilibrium 
path for a country like H, one of which has foreign influence. I have then 
derived the conditions under which each of these paths comes about or, 
equivalently, the country falls under foreign influence. In this section, I look 
at these conditions more closely, as well as at what determines the shape of 
foreign influence.
The incumbent group is strictly better off by putting the country under 
foreign influence when condition (1.14) is satisfied. This is the case when the 
amplification effect, (3 +  S  - the extra support that a can expect to receive, 
on top any value of rents - is high enough. The critical threshold for the 
amplification effect is increasing in the size of the incumbent group and in 
the expected cost of revolution for the challenger (M), and increasing in the 
prize from domestic redistribution (X  +  1). Notice that the threshold can 
be negative, in which case the incumbents asks for foreign support even if 
the amplification effect is zero. Because the country never falls under foreign 
influence when condition (1.14) is not satisfied, we can then write our first 
prediction:
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P red ic tio n  1 - A country like H  is more likely to fall under foreign 
influence when the size of the incumbent group is small, the challenger has a 
low expected cost from revolution, and the prize from domestic redistribution 
is high.
When condition (1.14) is satisfied, the country may still not fall under 
foreign influence if the cost of imposing sanctions against it is too enough 
(/? -f S  > g). This yields our second prediction:
P red ic tio n  2  - A country that would otherwise fall under foreign influ­
ence may not do so i f  the economic cost of imposing sanctions against it 
increases.
The shape of foreign influence is defined by the amount of rents paid to 
foreign investors (R *), the probability of foreign interventions ( — +^ S-), and 
the probability that the challenger goes to power and puts the country on a 
different geopolitical alliance (7r). Using equations (1.12) and (1.13), we can 
now easily work out how this shape depends on the key parameters of the 
model (S, M , X  and </>).
An increase in S  always increases the probability of foreign interventions 
and decreases the probability that the challenger goes to power. It also 
decreases the optimal rent if R* G [i£, R]. Thus, our third prediction is:
P red ic tio n  3 - When a country is under foreign influence, a higher 
strategic value of the country implies a higher probability of foreign inter­
ventions, and a higher entrenchment of the incumbent group. Furthermore, 
it may imply lower rents for foreign investors.
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A lower expected cost of revolution (M ) and the higher prize from do­
mestic redistribution (X  +  1) have the quite standard effect of making the 
incumbent less entrenched if R* £ (R , R). The opposite holds if R * £ (R , R ), 
however. This can be seen by working out the first derivatives of 7r in this 
case:
dn  , _  1 — 7  ^ n
d (X  +  1 ) ”  ”  2 M  <
d z  | _  (1 — j ) ( X  + I) + (fry + ft + S  ^ n
qM \ H e M  2M 2
This result is due to the role of rents in altering the political equilibrium 
in H. An incumbent that faces a higher revolutionary threat (because of a 
higher X  +  1 or lower M ) and has more too loose from revolution (higher 
X  +  1 ), is more willing to buy external support for two reasons. First, it 
has a higher expected benefit; second, it also has a lower expected cost, as 
the probability that a remains in power - therefore bearing the cost of rents 
- is, initially, lower. Because higher rents map into higher external support, 
the incumbent ends up being more entrenched in equilibrium. Crucially, the 
benefit of this entrenchment are partly shared with A’s investors, as witnessed 
by the increase in rents. We can summarize this in our fourth prediction:
P red ic tio n  4 - When a country is under foreign influence, a lower ex­
pected cost of revolution and a higher prize from domestic redistribution make
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the incumbent more entrenched if they also result in higher rents to foreign 
investors, less entrenched otherwise.
The parameter <f> measures the capacity of A  to impose effective sanctions 
on A: when this parameter is low, B ’s intervention can largely outweigh any 
trade disruption that A  is able to inflict. A look at equation (1.13) reveals 
that a higher <f> always result in a higher entrenchment of a. Intuitively, a 
higher <f> puts a nationalistic opposition in a more difficult position, in that it 
increases the cost of expropriating A  - therefore decreasing the attractiveness 
of revolution. Thus, an increase in A’s economic power (relative to B) makes 
the effect of foreign influence larger. This leads to our final prediction:
Prediction 5 - When a country is under foreign influence, a lower rel­
ative importance of the foreign country as a trade partner implies a lower 
entrenchment of the incumbent.
1.3.7 W elfare
In this section, I want to analyze the welfare consequence of foreign influence. 
My approach is to  compare the equilibrium of the game described above to 
the equilibrium of a different game, where A  does not have the capacity to 
intervene in H. This is a relevant exercise, because it can provide at least 
some indication on the welfare consequences of explicitly adopting a policy of 
interventionism, such as that announced by Teddy Roosevelt in 1904. At the 
same time, it can shed some light on the role of international organizations 
such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States, which 
put some constraints on the foreign military activity of their members.
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If A  does not have the capacity to intervene in H, a is overthrown with 
probability W independently on any rent awarded; thus, the equilibrium 
amount of rent must be zero, and because expropriation is not an issue, 
the group who rules H  must always align itself with A. Define AW }  as the 
expected welfare gain to group i in country J  from A  being endowed with 
the capacity to intervene. Because this capacity can only affect payoffs if it 
results in positive rents, or if it is actually used, welfare must be unchanged 
when the game ends on the equilibrium path with no foreign influence. Thus, 
A W} = 0 for all J  and i in this case. When instead the game ends on the 
equilibrium path with foreign influence, we can write:
AW% = [ir -  “ I1 - (1.16)
AW bH =  - [ if  -  -  [1 -  7r(iT)]ir -  z { R m)<h (1.17)
A WA =  ~ z ( R W  +  S) +  [1 -  z i R ' W  -  [1 -  E(fi*)]A -  J  dc
(1.18)
A WB = z (R " )S  (1.19)
where A =  max[7 (X +  1) +  (1 — 6)R* — 07 — M, 0]. A’s capacity bene­
fits a by giving it a higher change to remain in power. This however comes 
at a cost, as A’s support can only be obtained by granting positive rents 
to A’s investors. For b, both of these elements are a cost; in addition, this 
group suffers from A’s capacity as this disrupts the relations that it has with
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this country when it goes to power. A  benefits from its capacity to intervene 
because this awards it positive rents when a remains in power (second term 
on the RHS of (1.18)). However this comes at the cost of greater geopolit­
ical uncertainty (first term) and at a positive expected cost of intervention 
(last two terms). In fact, when A is positive this latter cost is strictly pos­
itive whenever a remains in power. Finally, for B , foreign influence implies 
a higher probability of securing H ’s geopolitical alliance, in that when A  
cannot intervene no group has ever a reason not to align itself with A.
A  closer look at the signs of (1.16)-(1.19) allow us to summarize the 
welfare consequences of foreign influence as follows:
P ro p o sitio n  3 Endowing A  with the capacity to intervene in H  has no 
impact on welfare when the country does not fall under foreign influence. 
When it does, on the contrary, the welfare effect is the following:
•  a and B  always gain;
• b always looses;
• A  always gains i f  fl -1- S  = 0; may gain or loose i f  ft + S  > 0.
P roof. The first sentence is proved by the fact that equilibrium path 
with no foreign influence is identical to the equilibrium path in the case 
where A  cannot intervene. Next, let’s consider the equilibrium path with 
foreign influence. That AW fj must be positive follows from the fact that a 
can always obtain the same payoff as with no foreign protection. The RHS of 
equations (1.19) and (1.17) contain, respectively, only positive and negative 
terms: thus, A Wb must be positive, and A Wfj negative. That A W  a must
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be positive when condition (3 + S  = 0 holds can be seen from plugging this 
in (1.18) and rearranging:
where the latter inequality comes from the fact that A <  R* whenever 
M  > y (X  -j- 1). This finding, together with the continuity of A W  a in 
j3 +  S  > 0, also proves that AWa can be positive for some /3 +  S  > 0. 
Finally, to see that A W a can also be negative in this case, suppose that
X  +  1 <  M  large enough that R* = R  = |  and n > But for these val­
ues, the sum of the first two terms in (1.18) is negative, proving the result. ■
Thus, the fact that a large country has the capacity to intervene abroad 
does not necessarily affect welfare, as this capacity may simply remain un­
used. From Proposition 2, this is likely to be the case when the elite is 
sufficiently entrenched, or geopolitical competition is low. Alternatively, it 
may also be the case for those countries where the cost of sanctions is very 
high.
R * - A
> (1 — e )(R* — A) — — A)
=  (1 — 7r )(R* — A) — min[l — 7r, R*](R* — A) 
> 0
(3 +  S  = | .  From (1.12) and (1.13), it is clear tha t we can always find
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Consider now the welfare effect when the capacity to intervene is actually 
used, and country H  falls under foreign influence. A very intuitive result is 
tha t the incumbent always gains from disposing of this additional political 
tool, while the challenger always looses. More surprising may be the fact 
that B  always gain from A  being able to intervene in H. This is due to the 
fact that A ’s intervention capacity is used strategically by the incumbent, 
which intentionally creates a potential geopolitical conflict between A  and 
the challenger. This must go to the benefit of B , who would otherwise have 
no change of extending its geopolitical influence to H. The consequences of 
this geopolitical loss are also evident in the impact on the welfare of A. On 
one hand, if (3+S is zero (or very small), this impact must be positive: this is 
because A  only bears a cost from protecting rents, and this can at maximum 
be as high as the value of rents themselves. On the other hand, when f3 +  S  
is large, A  must also intervene to protect its geopolitical alliance with H , 
and this is actually lost whenever the challenger goes to power. When the 
strategic value of H  is high and the incumbent is very fragile, these additional 
costs may make the overall effect on A  negative.
Thus, a policy of interventionism that puts H  under foreign influence has 
the clear effect of favoring the incumbent and damaging the challenger. At 
the same time, it may well fire back on A, particularly when H  is strategically 
important and the incumbent fragile. This casts a doubts about whether US 
interventionism in Latin America - as laid out by the Roosevelt Corollary 
of 1907 and resumed by Truman and Eisenhower after World War II - was 
ultimately beneficial to US goals, particularly at times of high political geopo­
litical competition as the Cold War. To the extent that it allowed the local
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elite to boast the anti-Americanism of the Latin American left, it certainly 
contributed to inflating the US military budget, entailing at times a large 
geopolitical risk (as the case of Cuba well illustrates). This is, of course, 
on top of any human right cost generated by favoring the entrenchment of 
autocratic regimes.
1.4 An interpretation
I now use the results of the model to provide an interpretation of the Latin 
American case, and answer the questions that I posed in section 2 . Because 
of its involvement in trade, the Latin American elite could be trusted to 
respect investments from the US, a vital trade partner and a country that 
could credibly threaten to retaliate to expropriation. When the US became 
openly interventionist in early 2 0 th  century, the elite sought to entrench 
itself by putting their countries under US influence. Prediction 1 suggests 
that the small size of the elite, the increasing pressure for social change, and 
a huge wealth inequality all contributed to making this the optimal choice. 
This may contribute to explain the large inflow of US investments in 1914- 
1929 and 1945-1960. Furthermore, in this interpretation the large economic 
nationalism of the masses and the US attachment to the status quo can be 
explained as a result of the elite’s political maneuvering.
As the Cold War opened up the Western Hemisphere for superpower com­
petition in 1959-1979, the geopolitical value of the Latin American countries 
(S  in the model) increased. As in Prediction 3, this increased the frequency 
of US interventions, and made it harder for the reformist parties to achieve
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power. Because the reformists, who enjoyed vast popularity, aimed for achiev­
ing power through democratic means, this led to the reversal of democracy in 
many countries. Thus, Prediction 3 is consistent with the pattern described 
in Figure 1 . At the same time, it is broadly consistent with the fact that 
many elite-controlled governments (such as Peru’) scaled down the amount 
of US rents through compensated nationalizations in the 1960s and 1970s.
In this interpretation, the fact that the reformists were penalized by 
geopolitical competition is the result of two elements. First, being account­
able to the masses, the reformists had the expropriation of US rents as a top 
priority. Second, because of a large investment position in Latin America, 
the US was in no position to accommodate on nationalistic policies. But 
because sanctions created the need for alternative external support, the re­
formists could be expected to seek a Soviet alliance out of sheer economic 
need. Paradoxically, by making it harder for the US government to accom­
modate, US economic power strengthened this mechanism.
If this interpretation is correct, the initial distribution of gains from trade 
and US interventionism in early 2 0 th  century are the two fundamental rea­
sons why the US ended up opposing political change and democracy in Latin 
America. This became particularly bad during the Cold War, when geopo­
litical competition magnified the interests at stake. Notice that, in this in­
terpretation, the accumulation of US rents in Latin America had costs as 
well as benefits. Beside the cost from violating a long-cherished principle 
(and the human rights violations attached to this), it contributed to foster 
the anti-Americanism of the masses, making Latin America more open to 
Soviet penetration in the 1960s and 1970s. This carried both a considerable
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geopolitical risk (as the case of Cuba well illustrates) and a large military 
cost.
In the next section, I look at a few country studies tha t illustrate how 
some of the other predictions of the model may be useful. To address my 
third key question, I look specifically at the case of Venezuela.
1.5 Case Studies
I begin by describing the case of Cuba, which perfectly illustrates the huge 
potential costs of a transition to popular rule at the time of the Cold War. 
I then study the case of Chile and Venezuela, whose opposite experiences 
clearly illustrate both the importance of US influence, and its determinants.
1.5.1 Cuba
The island of Cuba became independent from Spain after a bloody revolution 
(1895) and a short war between Spain and the United States (1898-1899). 
Over the next half a century, the economic ties between Cuba and the United 
States became very strong. On one hand, the US steadily absorbed around 
75% of Cuban exports in 1910-195018. Key to this result was the preferential 
tariff (later, a quota) accorded to Cuban sugar on the US market. Because 
of the high price commanded by sugar in the US, this was a very important 
prize for competing sugar exporting countries in this area. On the other 
hand, a series of pro-American conservative governments (such as tha t of 
Gerardo Machado, 1925-1933, and Fulgencio Batista, 1934-1959) welcomed
18This percentage dropped to around 60% in 1945-1960, see Mitchell, 2003.
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American investors to control, among other things, a third of the island’s 
sugar economy, all of the country’s utilities, a major railroad system, the 
import, refining and distribution of oil and the country’s nickel reserves, most 
hotels and gambling and various banks. The utilities companies in particular 
operated in an atmosphere of general public hostility (Bonsai, 1967, p. 265). 
Overall, US investments stood at about US$ 2 bn in 1959 (Sigmund, 1980, p. 
43).
Turning to political developments, after a period of military occupation 
that ended in 1903, the US granted Cuba its independence but retained 
the constitutional right to intervene to guarantee political stability and the 
respect of property. The existence of already large American investments 
in Cuba made the perspective of a radical government in the island very 
unattractive from a US point of view. In fact, one interpretation of the 
American-Spanish war is that the US intervened precisely to avoid that the 
insurgency ended up damaging its investments (Smith, 1960). While sev­
eral elections took place in the first three decades of the century, opposition 
parties normally denounced frauds. At the same time, when the opposition 
outburst into strikes and open rebellion, the US military intervened to avoid 
a revolution or to protect American investments: this happened in 1906- 
9 (when the island was again occupied), 1912, 1917, 1919, and in various 
other occasions during the 1920s. For 20 years after Batista gained power 
(1934), the political situation became more stable. In the 1950s, however, 
widespread discontent among the population created a fertile ground for var­
ious opposition movements. In 1958, a group of armed revolutionaries led by 
Fidel Castro managed to stage a full-scale revolution and overthrow Batista
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on January 1, 1959.
Initially, the relations between the US and Cuba remained good. Eisen­
hower promptly recognized the new regime, and Castro was cordially received 
for an unofficial visit in Washington in April 1959. This soft line was strongly 
supported by the American ambassador to Cuba, Philippe Bonsai. Bonsai 
was convinced that Castro was not a communist, and that the Cuban society 
would force him to install a constitutional system respectful of US interests 
(Bonsai, 1967). Soon, however, it appeared clear how hard would the issue 
of US investments make cooperation between the two countries. As Bonsai 
puts it, “Through all Castro’s gyrations, the only constant has been his de­
termination to free Cuba from American influence (which he equates with 
domination), even at the eventual cost of submitting his country to the Soviet 
Union” (Ibid., p. 267). This determination resonated well with large sections 
of the Cuban society, but most crucially it cemented Castro’s support by a 
15-20% of unemployed, underemployed, subsistence farmers, intellectuals and 
students from which he drew his strength (Ibid., p. 266).
Despite a May 1959 land reform that led to the confiscation of some 
American holdings, the US maintained an amicable approach to revolution­
ary Cuba until the first months of 1960. The hope for continued cooperation 
was rapidly fading away, however. Castro itself later declared that: ’’the 
American reaction to the agrarian reform of May 1959 made me realize tha t 
there was no chance of reaching an accommodation with the United States.” 
(ibid., p. 268). Months of escalating tension led to crisis in May 1960, when 
Castro nationalized the American and British oil refineries in the island. 
In July, going against Bonsai’s advice, the US government suspended the
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Cuban sugar quota: this led to the expropriation of all remaining American 
investments, and the formal interruption of Cuban-American relations. In 
February 1962, US sanctions to Cuba were scaled up to the full-scale embargo 
that lasts to these days.
Faced with the impossibility to sell its sugar to the US (and with a se­
vere oil shortage), Cuba turned to the Soviet Union for commercial support. 
This was promptly supplied: in the words of the American ambassador, ’’the 
Soviets accomplished the task in such a manner that the Cuban consumers 
were hardly aware of any change in the source of supply” {ibid., p. 272), and 
’’Cuban planters, cane-cutters, sugar-mill hands, dock workers - all those 
involved in the industry - went to work for the Russian instead of the Amer­
ican consumer” {Ibid., p. 273). In return for economic assistance, the USSR 
won an important victory in a region that had become crucial for its broader 
geopolitical strategy (see section 2 ; in terms of the model, S  had increased). 
In the summer of 1962, Castro authorized the installation of Soviet missiles 
bases in the island. These greatly increased the Soviet first-strike capacity, 
rapidly leading to a major international crisis (October 1962). When the 
missiles were eventually withdrawn (1963), the US had essentially accepted 
the establishment of a Soviet stronghold in the region {Brzezinski, p. 39) . 19 
In terms of the model, it had lost S  to the USSR.
The theory developed in the previous section suggests the following inter­
pretation of the Cuban experience. Being largely dependent on the American 
sugar quota for its well being, the Cuban conservative elite could be expected 
to sympathize with even large American rents in the island. This was in con­
19This represented the most serious violation of the Monroe Doctrine since its formula­
tion in 1823.
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trast with the various opposition groups, whose lesser involvement in trade 
made less willing to accept any excessive American rent. To take advantage 
of this, the elite deliberately favored the expansion of American rents in the 
island. By fomenting the economic nationalism of the masses, this tied the 
US government to the defense of the status quo. In terms of the model, the 
elite chose to entrench itself in power by strengthening US influence over the 
island. Notice that, in this interpretation, the large flow of American invest­
ments to Cuba in 1925-1959 may in part be explained with the preference 
of the local elite for the country that had established itself as the region’s 
political leader. While this preference may have had a cost for the elite itself, 
the fragility of its tenure in power - as suggested by the political instability 
of the early 2 0 th  century - may have warranted this on a strictly political 
ground, as of Prediction 1.
When revolution finally swept the elite away from power, the US had 
strong reasons to maintain friendly relations with Cuba. On one hand, en­
hanced Soviet assertiveness made of any Latin American country a potential 
Cold War battleground. On the other, the new Cuban government displayed 
no strong bias in favor of a geopolitical alignment with the USSR. Unfor­
tunately, two key factors made the deterioration of US-Cuban relations un­
avoidable. First, the Cuban government had become accountable to new 
social groups, ones whose involvement in trade was much smaller. For these 
groups, the elimination of American privileges was more important than any 
cost of incurring into American sanctions. Second, the US could not afford 
not to retaliate against a small country like Cuba, as this would have given 
a signal of extreme weakness to other countries in the region. In terms of
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the model, (3 was very small. As American investments got expropriated 
and Cuba lost access to the American sugar market, the economic relations 
between the two countries ground to a halt. Political relations broke down 
as a consequence of that, as Cuba’s left unserved trade gave to the Soviet 
Union a competitive hedge in exchanging economic support for the country’s 
geopolitical alliance.
The case of Cuba provided a clear illustration of the risks associated with 
a leftist shift in Latin America, in a period of intense Cold War competition. 
These risks induced to US to intervene in a variety of ways to prevent the left 
from going to power elsewhere, as we shall see for the case of Chile. Various 
attempts were also made to revert the political evolution in Cuba: beside the 
continuation of economic sanctions, the US supported an invasion attem pt by 
anti-revolutionary Cuban groups, and various attempts to assassinate Castro. 
The fact that the new Cuban regime remained firmly in power had much to 
do with the large economic support that it received from the USSR. To the 
extent tha t this reflected a good degree of compatibility between the Cuban 
trade and the Soviet economy (in terms of the model, a low (f>), the success 
of the Cuban revolution is broadly consistent with Prediction 5.
1.5.2 Chile
Differently from most other Latin American countries, Chile had a long his­
tory of constitutional democracy at the onset of the Cold War. With the 
exception of a turbulent period in 1924-1934, regular election had been held 
since the 1870s, and different parties had alternated in power. Neverthe­
less, power had generally been in the hands of the Conservative and Liberal
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Parties, which represented the elite of a wheat-exporting latifundista agricul­
ture, a banking/commercial sector and, later, a burgeoning industrial sector. 
These groups looked overseas for their markets (first for exported agricul­
tural goods, then for the imported intermediate and capital goods needed in 
the industrial sector) and consumption patterns (Feinberg, 1974, pp. 31-32). 
After 1930, the rise of the middle class gave strength to a third party (the 
reformist Radical Party), who formed two governments in the 1940s without 
however posing a serious threat to the elite’s control of power (Pike, 1963).
The US became Chile’s dominant trade partner after World War I. By the 
early 1950s, 55% of Chilean exports went to the United States, which was also 
the source of 50% of its imports (Mitchell, 1998). The end of World War I also 
marked the end of the Chilean nitrates industry, which had been dominated 
by British interests for the previous half a century. As copper became the 
key mineral activity - and the key source of foreign exchange - in the 1920s, 
America displaced Britain as the key source of capital. Total American 
investments increased from US$ 15 million in 1912 to US$ 451 million in 
1929, to US$ 623 million in 1950 (United Nations, 1955, p. 159). Most of 
these investments went into the copper industry, which resulted extremely 
profitable to American investors: between 1910 and 1960, it generated an 
estimated US$ 4 billion in remitted profits, out of an overall investments of 
about US$ 1 billion (Cockcroft, 1996, p. 537).
Left wing agitations and strikes had been common in Chile since the 
1890s, and had led to violent repression in the first two decades of the century. 
In 1919 and 1932, the Communist and Socialist parties were formed. Often 
persecuted and too small to separately stand a chance of electoral success,
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these parties would often form coalition in the following decades, together 
with other small parties of the left and, occasionally, with the Radical party. 
While ideologically differentiated, the left was kept together by the desire 
to implement radical reforms and by a strong economic nationalism. These 
themes gave the left a large appeal with the masses20. Thus, as a series of 
electoral reforms increased voter’s turnout and improved the quality of the 
Chilean democracy in the second half of the 1950s (see Harlyn, 1994, p. ISO- 
131, and Figure 2), the candidate of the left (Salvador Allende) got very close 
to winning the 1958 election.
Faced with the risk of expropriation its copper investments, the US sided 
clearly with the traditional forces of Chilean politics in the 1950s. Most im­
portantly, US loans helped the rightist government of Ibanez (1952-1958) to 
tackle a balance of payment crisis whose economic consequences were exacer­
bating popular unrest. Balance of payments problems were very recurrent in 
Chile at tha t time. Because of the long-term decline in agricultural export, 
the country relied on copper exports to pay for the import of intermediate 
goods used in the industrial sector. This made the country very vulnerable 
to volatile copper prices.
As Cold-War competition intensified after 1960 (in terms of the model, 
S  increased), the US effort to avoid the victory of the left in Chile (as in the 
rest of Latin America) was scaled up. As a result of Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress, US aid to Chile increased from a total of US$ 9.2 million in 1951- 
1960 to US$ 41.4 million in 1961-1962 only. Despite its status of relatively
20 Together with Ecuador and Peru (which also had substantial American investments) 
Chile was one of the Latin American countries where economic nationalism was strongest 
(Taffet, 2007)
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developed country, Chile was the third largest recipient of US aid in the 
1960s, after Brazil and Colombia. As highlighted by Jeffrey Taffet in its 
recent (2007) study of the Alliance for Progress, the role of this aid was 
essentially to keep the Chilean left out of power. Initially, the US attempted 
to induce the rightist government of Alessandri (1958-1964) to implement 
domestic reforms. Faced with a substantial refusal, it shifted its support to 
Eduardo Frei, the head of a new moderately reformist Christian Democratic 
party. In the 1964 election, Frei defeated Allende also thanks to explicit and 
covert US support (see Taffet, 2007, p. 76-77; and Easterly et AL, 2010, p. 
5).
The hope that Frei would conquer the “votes, hearts and minds of the 
poor” (Taffet, 2007) went largely unfulfilled, however. While implementing 
a series of moderate reforms - among which, a land reform - Frei’s popular­
ity declined rapidly. On one hand, harsh policy measures to stabilize the 
economy reduced the impact of Frei’s reforms. On the other, because of 
widespread economic nationalism, any attem pt by Frei to really capture the 
hearts of the masses was fundamentally in contrast with the interests of its 
American sponsors. 21 Despite a partial nationalization (with compensation) 
of the copper mines in 1966 and various attempts by Frei to symbolically flirt 
with domestic nationalism, the support for the left increased as the 1970 elec­
tion approached. As Frei’s failure appeared clear, the American focus shifted 
from paying aid to strengthening relations with the military (Ibid.).
Allende won the 1970 election with just slightly above 30 per cent of
21 For example, the pre-condition for further US aid that the price of copper should be 
kept low in 1965-1966 (when the war in Vietnam had rapidly increased US consumption 
of this metal) had an incalculable political cost for Frei (Taffet, 2007, p. 83-84).
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Figure 1.2: Democracy in Chile, 1945-1989
Source: Polity IV.
votes, but was then swept into power with the support of the Radical Party. 
This marked the first serious loss of power of the elite in the history of the 
country. In keeping with his electoral promises, the left implemented radical 
redistributive reforms and expropriated the American copper companies with 
very little compensation. In reaction the expropriation of American invest­
ments, the US government interrupted any aid payment, and orchestrated 
a credit blockade - involving bilateral and multilateral credit - that hit at 
the heart of Chile’s chronic balance of payment problems. This was a major 
cause of economic distress in the first few years of the Allende government.
As trade between the US and Chile rapidly plummeted, Allende sought 
commercial support from various European countries and from countries in 
the Soviet block. While the amount of economic support that he received
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from the USSR was significative, this was modest compared to the support 
awarded to Cuba one decade earlier (see Evanson, 1985, pp. 1 1 0 -1 1 2 ). Still, 
Allende’s foreign policy was one of friendship towards the USSR and its allies. 
For example, he resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba, breaking the cordon 
sanitaire erected by the US against this country. By 1973, however, economic 
distress created sharp tensions within Chile. In September, a CIA-supported 
coup (see, for example, Easterly et A l,  2010) overthrew Allende, leading to 
a 15-years period of military dictatorship (see Figure 2). During this period, 
much of the privileges of the elite were restored, and so were the expropriated 
properties of the American copper companies.
Using the model to interpret these facts provides a simple explanation 
for the link between the Cold War and the collapse of the Chilean democ­
racy. This link had its roots in the accumulation of US direct investments in 
the first half of the 20th century. Being largely dependent on international 
markets for its well being,, the incumbent elite could commit not to expro­
priate large domestic rents awarded to the country’s most important trade 
partner. This was in contrast with the left (the challenger) whose support 
groups, particularly in the countryside, had a more autarchic production 
and consumption pattern. This difference in commitment capacity created 
an incentive for the elite to redistribute part of the state-owned copper rents 
to American investors, thus fostering the economic nationalism of the left. 
While this could be expected to exacerbate popular discontent with the in­
cumbent group, it would also tie the US government to the defense of the 
status quo. Given the growing importance of the US as a source of external 
economic and military help, the latter effect was strong enough to prevail.
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In this interpretation, the generous copper concessions granted to American 
investors since the 1920s can be explained as an attem pt by the incumbent 
elite to entrench itself in power, by putting the country under foreign influ­
ence. This can explain the very close alliance between the US government 
and a series of elite-controlled governments until the 1950s.
As Latin America became an active Cold War battleground after 1960 (in 
terms of the model, as the S  of a typical Latin American country increased), 
the US effort to keep the left out of power (c in the model) was scaled up 
(prediction 3). Intuitively, the Cold War increased the cost from having 
the left in power. Even without assuming any ideological penchant of the 
left for the USSR, it could be expected that the issue of the US copper 
mines would make relations between the two countries inherently conflictual. 
On one hand, elite maneuvering had turned the expropriation of the US 
rents into a top priority for the groups who supported the left. On the 
other hand, large Latin American investments and a high economic standing 
would prevent the US from being able to accommodate to expropriation in 
a country like Chile. The perspective of conflictual relations with the US 
made the left very likely to side with the USSR. But this, after 1960, had 
a very high geopolitical cost for the US. Thus, while the alliance with the 
incumbent elite was signed in a period of relative quiet international relations 
(in the Western Hemisphere) renewed international competition strengthened 
the position of the elite in this alliance. Unfortunately for the fate of the 
Chilean democracy, this happened at a time when the challenging group was 
working its way to power thanks to the improvement and consolidation of 
the country’s democratic institutions.
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Initially, US effort came mostly in the form of aid, and was concentrated 
on trying to affect the result of elections. To this purpose, the US used aid 
to induce Alessandri to domestic reforms and, failing that, to support the 
victory of the reformist Frei in 1964. These attempts were bound to fail, 
however. This was for two reasons: on one hand, the elite effectively blocked 
domestic reforms, possibly relying on the fact tha t a higher geopolitical stake 
would help them stay in power (with US support) in any case. Interestingly, 
one reform that the elite did not block was the partial nationalization of the 
copper mines: this is very much in the spirit of the model, which predicts 
that, under foreign influence, the incumbent will be less lenient towards for­
eign investors when its entrenchment is guaranteed by strong geopolitical 
competition (Prediction 3). On the other hand, no democratically elected 
government could be successful without really bowing to domestic nation­
alism, but this was not something that a US-sponsored government could 
do.
As the left went to power and relations between the two country took a 
“Cuban” path, the only option left for the US was to side with the Chilean 
military and support the overthrowing of democracy. While the strength of 
the military was a key difference between Cuba and Chile, one may wonder 
whether the capacity of Allende to withstand a coup would have been dif­
ferent had the USSR provided the same amount of economic support that 
it had provided to Cuba. To the extent tha t a lower economic support was 
imputable to a lesser compatibility of Chilean trade with the Soviet economy, 
the different success of regime change in Cuba and Chile are broadly in line 
with the results of the model (Prediction 5).
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The case of Chile offers a good example of how many Latin American 
countries fell under US influence in the first half of the 2 0 th  century, and 
where US interventions went strongly against democracy during the Cold 
War. In the next section, I look at a country whose early history was compa­
rable to that of Chile, but had then a very different experience with democ­
racy at the time of the Cold War.
1.5.3 V enezuela
Venezuela was one of the few Latin American countries (together with Colom­
bia and Costa Rica) where democracy - installed at the end of the 1950s - 
remained substantially stable during the Cold War (see Figure 3).
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Figure 1.3: Democracy in Venezuela, 1945-1989
Source: Polity IV
The Venezuelan economy had been historically dominated by the export
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of tropical agricultural commodities. In the first decades of the 20th century, 
however, oil became the dominant economic sector. Initially, all oil con­
cessions went to European companies. After World War I, however, things 
changed, as American companies began to  compete aggressively to  secure 
overseas supplies. Their effort was strongly supported by the US govern­
ment, who was increasingly worried that a growing domestic demand for this 
strategic commodity could not be met with domestic supplies (Venn, 1986). 
Differently than in other parts of the world - such as the Middle East22 - the 
American companies received a very warm welcome in Latin America. In 
Venezuela, the dictator Vicente Gomez - who ruled the country from 1908 
until his death in 1935 - quickly switched its favors to American companies. 
Between 1925 and 1935, the dictator gave concessions to American companies 
even when these paid less then their competitors (Rabe, 1982, p. 34). As a 
results, US companies came to dominate the Venezuelan oil industry by the 
1930s, paying royalties that were extremely low for international standards 
(Ibid., p. 35).
In return for this benevolent treatment of its oil companies, the US helped 
support the regime of Vicente Gomez. For example, when rumor spread of 
an imminent revolution in 1923, the US Navy was dispatched to the port of 
Caracas. This turned out to be the first of a long a series of Navy visits, 
through which the US signaled its continuous support for the dictator. As a 
result, the 1920s were - except for a series of student riots in 1928 - a peaceful 
period, and the dictator remained in power until his death in 1935.
In 1937, a group of left wingers who had participated in the 1928 ri­
22In the Middle East, the penetration of American companies was much complicated by 
British influence (see Venn, 1986).
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ots founded a party, Action Democratica (AD), that would become a key 
player in the establishment and consolidation of the Venezuelan democracy, 
as well as a source of inspiration for reformists in other countries. Like all 
Latin American radical movements, AD stood for domestic reform and a 
nationalistic approach to foreign investors. However differently from similar 
movements23 AD proved to be very successful, possibly because of its re­
markable ideological flexibility. For example, many of its founders (including 
Romulo Betancourt, “the father of the Venezuelan democracy”) moved from 
leftist origins, but later became fiercely anti-Marxist.
In 1945, AD had a first opportunity after a revolution staged by junior 
military officer and a subsequent election swept it into power. In the three 
years that followed (often called el trienio), AD extended the franchise to 
universal suffrage and passed an agrarian reform. It also attacked the privi­
leges of the oil companies, by imposing an innovative 50-50 sharing rule for 
profits (this spread to the Middle East in subsequent years), discontinuing 
the system of concessions, and taxing the companies in kind. In 1948, how­
ever, the AD government was overthrown by a military coup supported by 
the elite and by the US government (see Cockcroft, 1996), and a new military 
dictatorship was established.
In 1948-1958, general Perez Jimenez restored many of the privileges of 
the oil companies and adopted a liberal policy towards foreign investors. So 
happy were American investors with the new administration that Eisenhower 
decorated Perez Jimenez with the Legion of Merit for its “contribution to the 
free enterprise system”. In 1958, however, a popular revolution in Caracas
23 A good example of this was Peru’s APRA. While similar to AD, APRA was less 
ideologically flexible, and received much less support from the US.
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overthrew Perez Jimenez and elections were held. Returned from a decade 
in exile, Betancourt won by a large majority. This marked the beginning of 
a period of constitutional rule that survived undisturbed through the Cold 
War. With governments in 1959-1964, 1964-1969 and 1974-1979, AD domi­
nated the political life of this period. At the same time, power was handed 
over to the centrist Christian Democratic Party in 1969-1974 in the first 
democratic transition of power in the country’s history.
Differently than in the trienio, the US provided strong support to the 
AD governments after 1959. In the early 1960s, AD became a darling of 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, the aid program launched in response to 
the Cuban Revolution and the increased Cold War competition for influence 
in Latin America (in terms of the model, an increase in S). In return for 
this amicable US attitude, AD adopted a strongly pro-US foreign policy, for 
example lending its support to the expulsion of Cuba from the Organiza­
tion of American States. Interestingly, relations between the two countries 
remained good despite AD’s strong economic nationalism. This led to in­
creasingly harsh conditions being imposed on the American companies in 
the 1960s, and to AD fully nationalizing the American oil companies in 1975, 
granting only compensation at book value.24 This level of compensation had 
been rejected in a number of occasions by the US government. Still, in the 
case of Venezuela protests were very mild, and were eventually put on a side, 
for “given the interest of the companies in continuing to do business with 
Petroven and of the United States government in a continuing and reliable 
source of oil, the general perception was that a stronger response was neither
24This amounted to just about 20% of actual investment, and only 10% of its replacement 
value (Sigmund, 1980, p. 243.)
74
desirable nor necessary” (Ibid., p. 244).
Importantly, the capacity of Venezuela to re-appropriate its oil conces­
sions was strongly linked to the establishment and consolidation of OPEC in 
the 1960s. Until the 1950s, Third World oil supplies had remained firmly in 
a the hands of American, British and Dutch oil companies, who were able to 
defy expropriation by exploiting their control of processing channels and the 
capacity to increase production elsewhere.25 W ith the formation of OPEC, 
however, the bargaining power began to shift. In fact, a key achievement of 
OPEC in the 1960s was to agree that, in case of sanctions against one of its 
members, the organization would forbid the oil companies from increasing 
production elsewhere (Venn, 2 0 0 2 ). This made sanctions against any OPEC 
members much more expensive than before, paving the way for the nation­
alizations of the 1970s. Understanding this, AD became a founding member 
of OPEC, and one of its strongest supporters.
Prediction 2 suggests that when the cost of imposing trade sanctions 
against H  becomes high, this country may be able to escape the condition 
of foreign influence. The intuition for this is simple. If the cost of sanc­
tions is high, there exist an equilibrium where A  cannot credibly threaten 
to retaliate to expropriation. In this context, rents are at risk no matter 
who is in power in H; and - what may be even more important in periods 
of high geopolitical competition - a nationalistic government does not need 
to become a geopolitical enemy. Thus, in the model’s interpretation, AD’s 
success in consolidating the Venezuelan democracy was, at least in part, a 
consequence of its success in strengthening OPEC. As the cost of sanctions
25For example, this was the response to nationalization in Mexico (1938) and Iran (1951- 
1953) (see Venn, 2002).
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against Venezuela increased, the question of economic nationalism became 
less important in the US approach to Venezuelan politics. This was for two 
reasons: first, nationalization was now a concrete threat independently on 
who ruled the country. Second, the expectation that sanctions against this 
country could be waived guaranteed that even a strongly nationalistic party 
would remain a geopolitical friend. W ith the hurdle of nationalism out of 
the way, relations between AD (or the Venezuelan democracy) and the US 
became much easier to sustain.
This interpretation fits nicely in the different experiences of Venezuela and 
Chile. Differently from oil, copper-producing countries had not created an 
international organization that could soften the impact of sanctions against 
some of its members. Thus, a drop in import from Chile could be safely sub­
stituted with imports from a variety of sources, both in developing countries 
(Peru, Zaire, Zambia) and in developed countries (Canada, Australia, the US 
itself). More in general, copper was not as important a commodity as oil, 
and was not so much the focus of public attention in the early 1970s. To the 
extent that these factors contributed to making accommodation impossible 
in Chile (differently from Venezuela), this may explain why the US adopted 
a very different approach to democracy in these two countries. Of course, 
the different ideological positions of Allende’s UP and Betancourt’s AD may 
also have mattered. The key point of this section, however, is that eco­
nomic frictions may determine ideological frictions in the first place. Thus, 
AD’s unique ideological flexibility - a key determinant of its success - may 
have been the consequence of Venezuela’s unique economic position in Latin 
America.
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1.6 Conclusions
After looking at the role of US influence on democratization in Latin Amer­
ica during the Cold War, I have constructed a theory of power allocation 
in the presence of foreign influence. In this theory, the outcome of a dis­
tributional conflict between an incumbent group and a challenger is altered 
by the capacity of the incumbent to exchange rents to foreign investors for 
external support from a key trading partner. This capacity is grounded in 
the incumbent larger exposure to the international economy, which makes 
him easier to control from the exterior, using the threat of trade sanctions.
My main results are as follows. First, rents have two key effects on the 
political equilibrium. On one hand, while fueling the economic nationalism 
of the challenger, they increase what the trade partner is ready to spend 
to protect its investors by keeping the incumbent in power. I show that 
the latter effect must dominate if rents are hard enough to expropriate. On 
the other hand, they create the basis for a geopolitical conflict between the 
challenger and the trading partner: thus, the higher the country’s geopolitical 
importance, the higher the protection that the incumbent receives, and the 
lower the price it has to pay for it. Second, in a country where an incumbent 
does rely on external support, an increase in the country’s economic standing 
- measured as the cost for the trading partner to impose sanctions - may make 
domestic regime change more likely. Third, in the presence of an external 
support an incumbent with more to loose and facing a larger revolutionary 
threat may end up being more entrenched, rather than less. This, however, 
comes at the cost of a larger portion of the domestic economy being awarded 
to foreigners. At the same time, the larger the importance of the country
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providing external support as a trading partner, the smaller the probability 
of regime change. Finally, the theory predicts that the capacity to intervene 
in other countries’ affairs may make a country worse off: this is the case when 
the maneuvering of the incumbent increases its geopolitical risk to a great 
extent.
These results can explain the generalized reversion of democratization 
in the 1960s and 1970s, a period where Cold War competition over Latin 
America was exceptionally strong. At the same time, they suggest the reason 
why the US interest in exporting democracy had to be put oh a side during 
the Cold War. Because of her long-standing involvement in international 
trade, the Latin American elite could credibly share parts of her rents with 
American investors. As the US became markedly interventionist in early 
2 0 th  century, the elite welcome American investors as a way to foster the 
nationalism of the masses, and tying the American government to the defense 
of the status quo. By the 1950s, economic nationalism was a key obstacle 
in the relation between the US and the Latin American reformists. The 
Cold War complicated this relation even further. Because of its large Latin 
American investments and the strength of its economic status, the US was 
in no position to accommodate over expropriation of US property. The risk 
that a sanctioned government would then turn for economic support to the 
Soviet Union amplified the diffidence of the US towards the Latin American 
reformists. In this interpretation, not ideology separated the US from the 
Latin American left, but the expectation that the left, more than the right, 
would need economic support from the USSR.
I have shown that the peculiar experience of Venezuela - which, differently
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from most other Latin American countries, had a stable democracy in the 
1960s and 1970s - can be explained with the economic standing of all oil 
producers in tha t period, which made it easier for the US to accommodate 
expropriation.
The two determinants of foreign influence in this model are the wish 
to protect foreign investors, and the need, to secure a country’s geopolitical 
alignment in the face of international competition. While typical of Latin 
America, these two elements were relevant in many other parts of the world 
at the time of the Cold War. Also, they may be relevant in the case of several 
former-Soviet republics, where the protection of large resource investments 
may be an issue and political sentiments are still marked by a clear pro-West 
or pro-Russia dichotomy. Finally, there is the perception tha t global geopo­
litical competition could become important again over the next decades, as 
China develops into a new superpower. In that is the case, many countries in 
Africa - where Chinese trade and investments are rapidly expanding - could 
also fit the assumptions of the model rather well. Thus, I believe the story 
I have presented in this paper is broad enough in scope, and could be useful 
in a number of different contexts.
The model also lends itself to a number of simple extensions. For example, 
I could allow for the possibility that a challenger is more outward-oriented 
than the incumbent, and external interventions can also help him go to power. 
Or, by allowing for an independent geopolitical position of the incumbent’s 
country, I could explore the consequences of political nationalism. So ex­
tended, the model could be helpful to investigate the case of Iran: there, 
the big problem of the West seems to be that the ruling elite is too inward-
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looking to give up the political nationalism common of the Iranian society, 
while more outward-oriented business and consumer groups are kept out of 
power by the current political system. I keep these and other extensions for 
future research.
1.7 A ppendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The strategy for the proof is to show, first, that none of the other other 
small countries expropriates when n  is high enough, if no info on the type of 
A  can be extracted from H ’s experience; next, to show that the need not to 
signal itself as normal induces A  to react to expropriation in i f  as specified 
in Lemma l .26
Take any arbitrarily small p, and denote by n the first country who decides 
to expropriate after H , n — 1 the second, and so on. Also, denote by 7rn the 
probability that A  imposes sanctions against country n.
If n  =  1 and this country expropriates, A  has no reputation reason to 
behave differently from its short run optimum. Thus, because sanctions have 
a cost S  + (3 > 0  and we are working under the assumption that (3 < g — S, 
only the crazy type finds it optimal to impose sanctions. Because no info 
can be extracted from H 's  experience, 7ti =  p in this case. Then, country 1 
expropriates iff:
R - p ^  > 0 
0
26The proof is partly based on Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 369-374.
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or:
(1.20)
Suppose now n = 2 , and consider the choice by either country to expro­
priate first. The probability that A  imposes sanctions against 2  (7T2) may be 
higher than p , because the normal type may want to mimic the crazy type 
to increase 7Ti. Clearly, the best result tha t this may yield is to push l ’s 
decision from expropriation to no expropriation: this has a value R  to A. 
Thus, because the cost of imposing sanctions is S, a necessary condition for 
the normal type to be interested in mimicking the crazy type in 2  is:
(1.21)
Suppose that (1 .2 1 ) holds. We can then distinguish two cases. First, if 
p > p, a strategy by the normal type of always imposing sanctions (therefore 
giving no info on its type to 1 ) is optimal, as it would recognized as normal 
if it didn’t  do so.27 Second, if p < P, the only equilibrium is one where the 
normal type randomizes over whether to enact sanctions against 2  or not, and
27Throughout the proof, I am using the ’’intuitive criterion” proposed by Cho and Kreps 
(1987) to rule out ’’unreasonable” off-equilibrium beliefs. In this case, the criterion rules 
out that if A  does not impose sanctions, it is believed to be a the crazy type.
S  /3 *C R
6R
p <  —  = p
<P
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1 randomizes over whether to expropriate or not when sanctions are imposed. 
This latter fact is needed to make the normal type indifferent over whether 
to impose sanctions against 2 or not. For 1 to be willing to randomize, it 
must be the case that 7Ti =  p; this in turn is only possible if the normal type 
mimic the crazy type with probability ( 2 , where, using Bayesian updating:
( 1.22)
or:
V
P + ( l - p ) C 2  P
P( 1 - P )
(1  -  p)p
In turn, for A  to be willing to randomize, 1 must expropriate with prob­
ability 0 , where (f) is such that the normal type’s payoff from imposing sanc­
tions is equal to its payoff from not imposing them:
-<pR — (3 — S  = —R
4 > = r - ^ - S
R
The probability that A  imposes sanctions against 2 , 7T2 , is:
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7T2 =  P +  (1 -  P)  C
=  ?
V
Now suppose n = 3 and consider again the decision by any country to 
go first. Prom what we just said, with no info from 3’s round 2 decides to 
expropriate iff |  > p, or:
V >  (p) 2 (1.23)
If (1.23) is satisfied, 7r3 =  1. If (1.23) is not satisfied, the only equilib­
rium is again one where the normal type randomizes over whether to enact 
sanctions against 3 or not, and 2 randomizes over whether to expropriate or 
not when sanctions are imposed. Following the same procedure as above, we 
find:
It is now clear that, if (1.21) holds, 7rn is monotonically increasing in n, 
reaching its maximum value of 1 for n  high enough. Now suppose that (1.21)
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does not hold. Then, there can be no mimicking in period 2, and both 2 and 
1 expropriate as soon as p < p. There can, however, be mimicking in period 
3. Suppose that /? +  S  <  2 R.  Then, if p > p a strategy by the normal type 
of always imposing sanctions must be optimal, as it would be recognized as 
normal if it did so and both 2  and 1 would switch from expropriating to 
not expropriating. If, instead, p <p ,  the only equilibrium is one where the 
normal type randomizes, and so do 2 and 1. The condition for finding £3 
is the same as in (1.22). As for 2  and 1 , these countries must expropriate 
with such a probability that the normal type is made indifferent over whether 
to impose sanctions or not. Contrarily to before these probabilities are not 
uniquely defined; we can however restrict our attention to the case where 2 
and 1 randomize with equal probability 0. The relevant condition is then:
~(f)2R -  (1  -  (f>)(f)R — (3 — S  = - 2 R
(1 -  0 (2  -  0  =  ^  (1.24)
Clearly, there exist a (f> such that equation (1.24) is satisfied. We can 
now see what happens if S  + (3 > 2 R: while there is no mimicking in 3, 2 
and 1 , there can be mimicking in 4 if S  -f /? >  3R.  And so on. Thus, the 
reputation game that we described initially starts as soon as n is high enough 
that S  + (3 > n R , which must be the case for n high enough. Notice that 
for such an n, as 4> goes from 1 to 0  the gain from imposing sanctions go 
continuously from 0 to nR,  so the semi-separating equilibrium must exist.
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Denote by n1 the minimum n  needed for which 7rn =  1. Because 1 > p, it 
is established that, for n > n I , none of the other small countries expropriates 
when no info on A ’s type can be extracted from H 1s experience.
Let us now look at the optimal reaction by A  to expropriation in H.  
Assume that n > n ,  where n  =  maxfn1, n2] and:
n2 = arg{/3 + S  < nR}
We then distinguish two cases, l i p  < g—S  (as in all other small countries) 
the unique equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium where both types impose 
sanctions. To show that this equilibrium exists, notice that the normal type 
would loose n R  — S  — p  > 0 from deviating. To see that it is unique, notice, 
first, that there cannot exist a separating equilibrium where only the crazy 
type imposes sanctions, as the normal type would gain n R  — S  — P > 0 from 
deviating. Second, there cannot exist a pooling equilibrium where neither 
type expropriates, as the crazy type would gain (g—S —p  > 0) from deviating.
If P > g — S,  on the contrary, the previous equilibrium exists alongside 
a pooling equilibrium where neither type imposes sanctions. Furthermore, 
these are the unique equilibria. The proof of existence of the previous equi­
librium, as well as of non-existence of the separating equilibrium, is identical 
to the previous case. To show that the other pooling equilibrium also exists, 
notice that the crazy type now has a loss g — S  — p  < 0  from deviating.
Thus, it is shown that, if H  expropriates, A  always imposes sanctions 
when P < g — S,  while may or may not impose sanctions when P > g — S.
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D eriva tion  o f R
After plugging in (1.10), $(R)  becomes:
* ( * )
=  ^ _ 7 ( X  +  l ) - 6 R - < h - 0 - S ^  (x.25)
The first and second derivatives of (1.25) with respect to R  are:
dW% _  S { X  + l _  \  _  /  _ ' y ( X  + l ) - 6 R - < h - 0 - S
d R M  \  8 J \  M
J  5 — =  - 2 —
dfl2 M
Proving concavity. Setting the first derivative equal to zero we derive R.
D eriva tion  o f P ro p o sitio n  2
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wm) > wm
/  7 ( *  +  i ) - m - n - < h - s \  n c + i  \  > r  7 ( - r + i ) > 
6R + 0 + 4n + s x  + 1 _  r  y ( x  + i ) - S R - p - < h - s \ R ^ 0
M  S V M
5R + P + 4n + S X  + l
R +  7 (X  +  1) -  6R -  0  -  <h -  s  > M
52 ± h ? ..+ }  +  7 ( x  +  1 ) - S R - < h + ( 0  + ~  1) >  M
5^ <hX+s l  + ' l { X  + l ) - & ^ - s - < h + { 0  + S ) { ^ - \ ) > M
( l + i 2 )  (X  +  D _  ^ _ L _  +  (/3 +  -  1) >  M
5(frf
( l - 5 ) ( X  + l ) - 6 < h
5M  — {X  +  1)(1 + '^y) +
Af _ (jf + 1) | i + f l j  + ^ _ i _
(1 -  5 ) { X  +  1 ) - S < h
< 0  + S  
< 0  + S
t 5 M - ( X  +  I ) ( i  +  f r )  +  f f  
^  ( 1 - 5 ) ( X  +  1 ) - S < h
Derivation of 7r:
If i2* =  R:
X  + l  
8
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■y(X + 1) -  6R -  <h -  0  -  S  
~ ~  M
7 ( *  +  l  ) - & - P - S  
M
_ T%+ P + S
=   T7-M
If R* e  (R,R):
'y(X + l ) - 6 R - ( f n - P - S  
~ ~  M
_  7 ( X  + 1) -  I t t l + i K X  + 1) - 7cf> -  M  -  S  -  f3) -  ch  ~  P ~  S
M
_ (^ 7 +  5  +  /? +  (l +  7 ) (^  +  l ) - M
_7r 2 M
Finally, if R* = R:
7r = 7[X + \ ) - 5 R - < f o - P - S  
M
_ 7 ( X  +  l ) - f l l + 7 ) - / ? - S  
M
_  <f)(l +  7 ) +  /? + S
— ^  77M
Proof that > 0 when i? G ( # ,  .R)
When R  G (R, R):
_  07 +  S +  / ? + ( l  +  7)(X  +  l ) - M
7T =  7 T -------------------------------------- — - :-------------------------------~  2 M
2 j ( X  +  1 ) -  ( h  -  S  -  (3 -  (1  +  i ) { X  +  1) +  M  
2 M
M  — (fry — S  — (3 — (1 — y ) ( X  + 1)
2 M
1 (1 — 7 )(X  +  1) +  (jrf +  S  + (3
~  2 2 M
It is now clear that > 0.
Proof that > 0:
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If R e { R , R ) :
d A  Wjj 7r — 7r dn
d(X  +  l) 8 d{ X  + \) 
> 0
because > 0. If R* G (R , R):
8 A  W% IT —  7T I + 7 X + I  1 — 7  1 + 7
“ --------------- H-----77TT~------?--------------7TTT-R  +  7T-
7T 1 + 7  7T 1 
=  T- +  —-+-7T -  =  +5 28 ~  8 2M
> 0
i ( l  +  7 )(X  +  1) -  ((1 +  i ) ( X  +  1) -  pos. const.)
because the sum of the second and third term is positive, and so the sum 
of the terms within square parenthesis.®
P ro o f th a t  <  0 if R  G (R , R)
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d A  W iH dir
d{ X  +  1) d{ X  +  1) d ( X  +  1) 
1
<h
<  -
2  M
i ( l  +  7 )(X  +  1 ) -  ( (1  +  7 )(X  +  1 ) -  pos. const.) +
d’K
d ( X  + 1 ) 07 j
2 M i ( l  +  7 )(X  +  1) -  ((1 +  l ) { X  +  1) -  07(1 -  25) -  pos. const.)
<  0
(notice that the positive constant contains M,  so it is always >  1: thus, 
even without assuming * < §  the terms in brackets is always positive.) ■
P ro o f  th a t  >  0 if R e  (R, R)
d A  WA dir
d ( X  +  1) d ( X  +  1)
(1 +  R*) +  (1 -  tt) d R * 
d{X  + 1 )
R* + (3 + S
M
2 M  
1
“  2 M  
> 0
1 +  7
(1  -  7) (1 +  R*) -  2R* -  2p -  2S +  —^ ( M  -  7 (X +  1) +  SET +  07  +  (3 +  S
o
( 1 - 7 ) +  (f3 + S) + ± ± l { M  - - y ( X  + l) + <h)
Where the latter inequality comes from assuming 5 < \  and M  >
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7 (X  +  1).
Bibliography
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge (MA), Cambridge University 
Press.
[2 ] Aidt, Toke S. and Facundo Albornoz (2008). “An Economic Theory of 
Political Institutions: Foreign Intervention and Overseas Investments” , 
forthcoming in the Journal of Development Economics.
[3] Aidt, Toke, and U. Hwang (2008a). On the Internalization of Cross- 
National Externalities through Political Markets: The Case of Labour 
Standards, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164, 
pp. 509-533.
[4] Aidt, Toke, and U. Hwang (2008b). One Cheer for Foreign Lobbying 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, No. 0860.
[5] Angell, Alan (1994). The Left in Latin America since the 1920s, in 
Bethell, Leslie (Ed.), Cambride History of Latin America, Vol. 6 , No. 2. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
93
[6 ] Bonfatti, Roberto (2009). “Foreign Influence and the International 
Trade in Natural Resources” , mimeo, Oxford University.
[7] Bonsai, Philip W. (1967). “Cuba, Castro and the United States”, For­
eign Affairs, Vol. 45, No. 2 , pp. 260-276.
[8 ] Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (1987). The Political Economy of Central Amer­
ica since 1920, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[9] Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1992). “The Cold War and its Aftermath” , For­
eign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 31-49.
[10] Cho, Ing-Koo and David M. Kreps. (1987). “Signaling games and stable 
equilibria” , Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 102, No. 2, pp. 179- 
221 .
[11] Cockcroft, James D. (1996). Latin America: History, Politics and US 
Policy, Chicago, Nelson-Hall Publishers.
[12] Dube, Arindrajit, Ethan Kaplan, and Suresh Naidu (2008). ’’Coups, 
corporations, and classied information” , mimeo, University of California 
Berkeley.
[13] Easterly, William, Shanker Satyanath, and Daniel Berger (2008). ’’Su­
perpower interventions and their consequences for democracy: An em­
pirical inquiry” . NBER Working Papers, No. 13992.
[14] Endoh, Masahiro (2005). Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto- 
Effcient Tariffs, in Discussion Papers, No . 915, Yale Economic Growth 
Center.
94
[15] Evanson, Robert K. (1985). “Soviet Political Uses of Trade with Latin 
America” , Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 27, 
No. 2 , pp. 99-126.
[16] Feinberg, Richard E. (1974). “Dependency and the Defeat of Allende” , 
Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 30-43.
[17] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1994). Game Theory, Cambridge, 
MIT Press.
[18] Heilman, Matthew and Leonard Wantchekon (2000). ’’Electoral Com­
petition under the Threat of Political Unrest” , Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 115, No. 2, pp. 499-531.
[19] Hartlyn, Jonathan (1994). Democracy in Latin America since 1930, in 
Bethell, Leslie (Ed.), Cambride History of Latin America, Vol. 6 , No. 2. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
[20] Karl, Terry Lynn (1987). “Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Tran­
sition to Democracy in Venezuela” , Latin American Research Review, 
Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 63-94.
[21] Kreps, David M. and Robert Wilson (1982). “Sequential Equilibria” , 
Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 863-94.
[22] Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1982). “Predation, Reputation and 
Entry Deterrence” , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, pp. 280-312.
[23] itchell, B. R. (1998). International Historical Statistics the Americas, 
1750-1993, Basingstoke (UK), MacMillan Reference.
95
[24] Oneal, J. R. (1994): The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian 
Regimes, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 565588.
[25] Olson, Gary L. (1979). US Foreign Policy and the Third World Peasant -  
Land Reform in Asia and Latin America, New York, Praeger Publishers.
[26] Pike, Fredrik B. (1963). Chile and the United States, 1880-1962: The 
Emergence of Chiles Social Crisis and the Challenge to United States 
Diplomacy, Notre Dame (Indiana), Notre Dame University Press.
[27] Rabe, Stephen (1982). The Road to OPEC United States Relations with 
Venezuela, 1919-1976, Austin (USA), University of Texas Press.
[28] Sigmund, Paul E. (1980). Multinationals in Latin America - the Poli­
tics of Nationalization, A Twentieth Century Fund Study, University of 
Wisconsin Press.
[29] Smith, Robert F. (1960). The United States and Cuba Business and 
Diplomacy 1917-1960, New York, Bookman Associates.
[30] Smith, Tony (1994). Americas Mission: the United States and the 
Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the XXth Century, Princeton Uni­
versity Press.
[31] Taffet, Jeffrey (2007). Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy: the Alliance for 
Progress in Latin America, New York, Routledge.
[32] Ticchi, Davide and Andrea Vindigni (2008). “War and Endogenous 
Democracy” , IZA Discussion Papers, No. 3397, March 2008.
96
[33] United Nations (1955). Foreign Capital in Latin America, New York, 
1955.
[34] Venn, Fiona (1986). Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Bas­
ingstoke (UK), MacMillan.
[35] Venn, Fiona (2002). The Oil Crisis, London, Longman.
[36] Waisse, Maurice (1998). La Grandeur Politique Entrangere du General 
de Gaulle, Paris, Fayard.
97
98
Chapter 2 
Decolonization: the Role of 
Changing World Factor 
Endowments
European colonialism had two key economic aspects: the extraction of colo­
nial wealth by colonizers, and the relevance of trade for colonial economies. I 
build a simple model of colonialism which puts these two elements at centre 
stage. By controlling policy in the colony, the colonizer can appropriate part 
of her wealth; the colony, however, can stage a successful revolution at a 
stochastic cost. I assume there is some exogenous, non-contractible policy 
gain from independence, so tha t the colonizer is forced to concede it when 
the cost of revolution is low. I incorporate this mechanism in a three-country, 
Heckscher-Ohlin model where countries (the colonizer, the colony and a third 
independent country) can decide whether to trade with each other, and the 
colonizer can threaten to stop trading with the colony if she rebels. Thus, the
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attractiveness of revolution and the sustainability of colonial power come to 
depend on the capacity of the colony to access international markets against 
the will of the colonizer which, in turn, depends on the distribution of world 
factor endowments. I present historical evidence in support of my theory. My 
results have important implications for the debate on the economic legacy of 
colonialism.
2.1 Introduction
One of the striking political and economic changes of the twentieth century 
was the almost complete elimination of colonial power. This has naturally 
precipitated a large debate about the legacy of colonialism for contempo­
rary development experiences. This has been invigorated recently among 
economists by the empirical study by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2 0 0 1 ) linking settler mortality to current prosperity.
To understand the legacy of colonialism, it is important to understand 
the forces that led to its rise and decline. This paper studies one central 
aspect of this - the influence of trade. The paper begins from the observation 
that trade between colonial states and colonizer was at the centre of colonial 
relationships and a source of benefit to the colonial power. But this must be 
seen in the context of a global equilibrium that shapes alternative sources of 
trading opportunities open to the colony, which, in turn, shape the incentive 
to rebel and hence the sustainability of colonial power. The paper sets up 
a model to make these ideas precise and then relates it to the experience 
of decolonization in some parts of the world. It argues that the economic
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forces (mainly factor endowments) that shaped the pattern of trade are key 
to understanding the historical experience.
Colonialism took many institutional and economic forms. However, one 
characteristic that, with varying intensity, was common to all European em­
pires, was the importance of trade for colonial relationships. Soon after 
conquest, colonies were forced or encouraged to orientate their production 
towards tradable goods that could be consumed in the mother country, or 
sold on international markets. In some cases, these products had been pro­
duced by colonies for long time before; in others, a brand new production 
was implanted by colonizers, both under public and private initiative.1 Even 
though, sometimes, portions of colonial population were forced to partici­
pate in this production, there were normally colonial groups that benefited 
from it. Thus, production resulted in trade for the colony, that is it gener­
ated exports (mainly agricultural commodities and raw materials) that were 
exchanged in Europe for imports (mainly manufactured goods). The result 
of this process was that by the time of decolonization, important segments 
of colonial populations were dependent on international trade for their well 
being.
A second key feature of European colonialism was the extraction of colo­
nial wealth by colonizers. As I just mentioned, there existed institutions of 
forced labour that made sure that only a few groups, in the colonies, bene­
fited from trade. In general, however, institutions and tools were in place that 
redistributed part of the value of colonial trade from colonies to colonizers.
1An example of the first case is Peruvian and Mexican gold and silver, which the Incas 
and the Aztecs had produced for centuries before the arrival of the Spaniards. An example 
of the second case is sugar plantations, that the Portuguese imported in the Azores and 
Brazil.
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These tools can be grouped in four broad categories: beside the institutions 
of forced labour, taxes, monopolies on investment, production and trade, and 
the allocation of public revenues to appropriately selected public goods.
Moving from these observations, I build a model which concentrates on 
the redistributive issue which led to decolonization. On one hand, controlling 
de jure political power in the colony, the colonizer can extract and appro­
priate part of the colony’s wealth. On the other hand, the colonized have 
some de facto political power in that they are able to stage a successful 
revolution at some stochastic cost. When the de facto political power of 
the colonized is high, the colonizer can only avoid a revolution by reducing 
extraction or by conceding independence. I assume that there is some exoge­
nous, non-contractible policy gain from independence, so that the colonizer 
has to concede it when the de facto political power of the colonists is high 
enough. I incorporate this political economy model into a three-country, 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model where Countries (the colony, the colonizer and 
a third independent country) decide whether to trade with each other, and 
the colonizer is assumed to be able to credibly threaten not to trade with a 
colony if she rebels. Thus, the colony’s well being after revolution depends on 
her capacity to access international markets against the wish of the colonizer, 
and so does the sustainability of colonial power. In the model, both these 
elements come to depend on the distribution of world factor endowments.
I present a series of case studies to establish whether decolonization and 
the distribution of world factor endowments were connected in the way the 
model predicts. I begin by re-considering, in light of the model, the causal 
link between the Seven Years War (1756-1763) and the American Revolution
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of 1776. I then study the decadence of the colonial power of Spain in 1590- 
1750, its temporary revival in 1750-1810, and its final collapse after 1810. 
Finally, I study the process which led Britain to concede self-government to 
her settler colonies of Canada and Australia in mid 19th century. In all cases, 
I find substantial evidence in favour of my argument.
My paper differs from previous work on decolonization in that it addresses 
unanswered questions using an original, formal framework. A vast literature 
in history, political science and law can be distilled into three main views. 
First, some authors emphasize the role played by nationalist movements in 
inducing the colonizers to concede independence. According to these authors, 
the reason why nationalist movements gained strength was that colonial pow­
ers treated colonies too harshly (Lynch, 1973; McMinn, 1979; Grimal, 1978). 
Second, other authors argue that there were factors within colonizing coun­
tries that made colonialism unattractive to domestic interests groups and 
constituencies (Shuler, 1945; Holland, 1985). Finally, some authors empha­
sise international factors, such as the diplomatic activity of Britain and the 
United States in early 1800s or the rise of anti-imperial powers after World 
War II (Kaufmann, 1951; McIntyre, 1977). Most of this literature does not 
study economic incentives explicitly, and none describe them in a formal way. 
Furthermore, a few important questions seem to remain on the ground: why 
would colonizers be treating colonies “too harshly”? Why would this lead 
to decolonization at that specific point in time? And how exactly, if in any 
way, did international factors shape the incentives of colonies to fight for 
independence?
A few papers in economics have attempted to bridge this gap. Grossman
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and Iygun (1993) model optimal colonial investment by the colonizer as a 
function of the technology of production and rebellion, and derive a set of 
conditions under which it is optimal to abandon the colony. Grossman and 
Iygun (1997) argue that population growth increased the private returns to 
rebellion, thus leading to decolonization in Africa and South Eastern Asia 
after World War II. None of these papers, however, consider how economic 
incentives were shaped by current and perspective trade conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2  provides an overview of 
the economics of colonialism, and introduces my argument. Section 3 devel­
ops the model which makes my argument precise. Section 4 presents some 
historical evidence in support of my model. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Colonialism, trade and extraction
European colonialism kicked off in XV century with the Portuguese explo­
ration of the African coasts and the sea route to the East Indies, and strongly 
accelerated with the Spanish discovery of the Americas. In 17th century, 
the power of the early colonizers was eclipsed by the rising of France and, 
slightly later, the Netherlands and England. A long series of wars (1652- 
1763) left the latter as the most powerful colonial power, particularly after 
control over India was established in mid 1700s. After a period that could 
be said of anti-imperialism - it witnessed the American Revolution of 1776, 
the independence wars of Latin America in 1810-1830, and the concession of 
self-government to several British settler colonies in the second half of 19th
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century - the imperialist momentum slowly built up again ,2 to eventually 
accelerate with the ’’Scramble for Africa” and the division of China and the 
Middle East in areas of influence. By the 1930s, European colonialism had 
reached its largest expansion ever.
Despite its long and complex history, two economic characteristics of 
European colonialism remained remarkably constant over time. The first is 
the importance of trade between colonies, their colonizers and the rest of 
the world. In the case of many colonies, trade was the purpose of military 
action from the very beginning. For example, England first deployed troops 
in the Indian ocean to protect the monopoly and trade posts of the East India 
Company; and when administrative control over Indian states was established 
in mid 18th century, this was done at the hands of the Company itself. In 
other colonies, where there was an abundance of mineral wealth, the first 
military campaigns were targeted at exacting tribute, if not at stealing and 
plundering; but normally, this phase was over quite rapidly. This is the case 
of the Spanish Empire, where the conquistadores first fought and plundered, 
then became feudal lords who produced for European markets while paying 
tribute to the Crown.
In fact, colonization was normally followed by a major restructuring of 
colonial economies. Europeans were interested in exploiting the capacity of 
colonies to produce goods that could be consumed in Europe. Sometimes, 
this simply required boosting pre-existing industries: for example, in late 
16th century the Spaniards organized the Latin American economy around
2E.g., the ’’Great Game” between Britain and Russia for the control of Central Asia 
and the defence of India; the creation of a second French empire in North Africa and 
Indochina.
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the production of Peruvian and Mexican silver, which the Incas and the 
Aztecs had produced long before their arrival. In India, in the first part of 
18th century, the export of calicoes to Europe was strongly encouraged. In 
other cases, brand new productions were imported and established: this is 
the case of the sugar plantations implanted by the Portuguese in the Azores 
and Brazil in 16th century, or the merino sheep that the British settlers of 
Australia grazed after 1810. Throughout the history of colonialism, Euro­
peans became accustomed to consume or process many other commodities 
that were produced in colonies, and exchanged for manufacture goods in 
Europe: examples are coffee, tobacco, indigo, cotton, wool, timber, etc.
Of course, not all participants in this trade had freely chosen to be so. 
There were cases in which trade between colonies and colonizers was on 
an entirely voluntary basis, such as for the so-called British ’’pure” settler 
colonies of New England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. More fre­
quently, however, there was a share of colonial population who was forced 
to work at the production of export commodities and did not obtain any 
part of the value created. It was the case of the Indians who worked the 
mines and farms of the descendents of the Spanish conquistadores, or the 
black slaves who for centuries worked the plantations of North America, the 
Caribbeans and Brazil. In between these two extremes, lie the case of 19th 
and XX century colonies: by that time forced labour had been abolished, but 
the African and Asian working classes who produced for the export market 
were often faced with monopsonistic labour markets where they had no real 
choice but to accept the very little they received. If one abstracts from the 
specific institutional arrangements at the base of production, however, it is
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clear tha t an element of voluntary exchange was always in place: at least, 
the colonial elite was part of it.
Turning to some data, one can persuade himself of the importance of 
trade for the economy of colonies and colonial empires by looking at the 
structure of trade patterns for England in 1661-1774, the period in which 
the country ascended to the status of world’s leading colonial power. By 
the end of this period, there were two main colonial markets for England: 
the colonies of North American and the Caribbean to the West, and India 
to the East.3 For the former, one finds that the share of the American 
colonial market in English imports of foodstuff increased from an already 
significant 37% in 1663-1669 to 54% in 1722-1724 and 62% in 1772-1774. For 
raw materials, these data were 6 %, 15% and 19% respectively. At the same 
time, the share of America in English exports of manufactures rose from 9% 
in 1663-1669, to 18% in 1722-1724 and 47% in 1772-1774 (Davis, 1954 and 
1962).4 As for the Indian market, one finds that the share of English import 
of manufactures coming from India increased from 17% in 1663-1669 to 32% 
in 1722-1724 and 37% in 1772-1774. Much of this trade was entrepot trade: 
in 1772-1774, 72% of all imports of foodstuff from America were made up of 
sugar and tobacco: around 46% of the cost of these imports was recovered 
by re-exporting those commodities to continental Europe. Over the same
3During the period under consideration, British colonial power expanded in both mar­
kets. In North America and the Caribbean, a series of wars with the French yielded 
Canada and islands such as Martinique and Guadeloupe. In India, the first half of XVIII 
century was the period in which the East India Company established direct administrative 
rule over many Indian states.
4Data for 1661-1667 are for London only, but the same author shows that, for the 
period 1700-1702, 80% of all english imports and 62% of all english exports passed through 
London.
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period, calicoes represented 8 8 % of imports of manufactures from India: the 
value of re-export of calicoes amounted to as much as 1 0 0 % of the cost of 
imports.
The second key characteristic of the economy of colonialism was the ex­
traction of colonial wealth by colonizers. Because of the reforms described 
above, production in many colonies became extremely valuable to Europeans. 
Colonizers used their control of de jure political power in the colonies to re­
distribute this value to their own advantage. Redistribution, normally, had 
two distinct groups of beneficiaries. On one hand, the share of value that re­
mained in the colonies was redistributed in favour of a small local elite. This 
was either made up of European settlers, or was an indigenous allied elite 
that, in some cases, had existed before colonization.5 A notable exception 
to this pattern were the British pure settler colonies mentioned above, were 
the predominance of European settlers in the population favoured the estab­
lishment of a more meritocratic society, at least after some point. On the 
other hand, a consistent share of the value produced was redistributed from 
colonies to colonizers. The subjects who benefited from this redistribution 
were different in different colonizers, but included governments, investors, 
consumers and tax payers in general.6
The tools used to redistribute the wealth of the colonies were many, and 
can be classified into four broad categories. First, there existed the above
5In some cases, colonizers established their rule without toppling the leadership of the 
pre-existing polities. This is typically the case of the so-called protectorates.
6There were of course cases in which this second type of redistribution was negative, 
or the colonizer paid aid to the colonies: for example, this was the case of the Australian 
colonies before the pastoral boom of the 1820s. In the vast majority of cases, however, 
redistribution was non-negative.
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mentioned institutions of forced labour, tha t made sure that the colonial 
labour received the smallest possible share of the value created. Second, 
various types of taxes on production, consumption and trade were collected 
by colonial or imperial authorities. Third, monopolies over various segments 
of the trade lines were set up. Examples include the marketing boards of 
British West Africa, who acted as monopsonistic buyers of colonial produce, 
or the various ’’Companies of the Indies” to which European governments 
gave exclusive right of trade with the Indies. Also, independently on their 
internal structure, trade lines remained for centuries subject to ’’national 
monopolies” . These required all commodities coming from the colonies to be 
trans-shipped through the colonizer, whatever their destination. Similarly, all 
colonial imports had to pass through the colonizer, first.7 Finally, the public 
revenues that remained in the colonies were sometimes used to finance public 
goods that were mainly of interest to colonizers. For example, the Indian 
army gave a decisive contribution in many of the wars fought by the English 
in 19th century, and the Australians paid the bill of British jails for many 
years.
A more subtle form of exploitation, the existence of which has been the­
orized first by Dependency Theorists (see, for example, Dos Santos, 1970, 
or Frank, 1971) is the manipulation of factor endowments to the purpose 
of alimenting trade-related extraction. According to this view, the colonizer 
prevented her colonies from developing their economy in the ’’right” way by 
inducing them to produce foodstuff and raw materials for export. This max­
7Famous examples are the Spanish monopoly over Latin American (which lasted from 
late 1500s to early 1800s) and the British Navigation Laws (from 1651 to 1822), but each 
colonizer had its own arrangements.
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imised imperial trade flows, and the profit from manipulating the terms of 
trade in the way described above. While dependency theories are criticised 
by most contemporary scholars, there is much historical evidence that spon­
taneous forms of industrialization in the colonies were forcefully interrupted 
by the colonizer (see for example Frank, 1971).
Whether their factor accumulation went to the detriment of ’’right” eco­
nomic development or not, many colonies came to be dependent on trade 
with the colonizer for their prosperity. This dependency was particularly in­
tense for colonies who produced mainly for the market of the mother country, 
and consumed mainly goods who could be better supplied by producers of 
the mother country. In such colonies, an influential, if not vast, class of pro­
ducers, consumers and merchants came to see the maintenance of peaceful 
trade relations with the colonizer as a priority. Enjoying access to often huge 
imperial markets, the colonizer could exercise her de jure political power over 
individual colonies from a position of advantage. And when colonies rebelled 
(such as, in the British case, did the Thirteen Colonies in 1776 or North 
Rhodesia in 1960), the colonizer did not hesitate to retaliate by denying the 
rebel access to imperial markets (or, at least, the preferential access they 
previously enjoyed).
2.3 The m odel
This section is divided in three subsections: 3.1 and 3.2 present, respectively, 
the economic model and the political model; 3.3 puts the two building blocks 
together and studies the equilibrium.
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2.3.1 Econom ic m odel
The economic model is simple Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. There are 
three countries, H , F  and E. Country H  is a colony, country F  her colonizer, 
and country E  a third country external to the colonial relation .8
Environment
Each country is inhabited by agents with unit mass. Endowments of land 
(L) and capital (K ) are
LH = 1 K H = K  
LE = 1 K E = K ( l  + 8) 
LF = 1 K f  = K { \  + k)
where <5 >  0 and S < 2k : in words, I am assuming that F  and E  are
more capital intensive than H, and that E  is not too much capital intensive
relative to F. As will become clear below, the latter assumption rules out
that the colony and the colonizer are in competition for selling the same
land-intensive good to the rest of the world - a case that does not seem to be
historically relevant.9 All citizens own exactly one unit of land, and citizens
8One should think of F as representing the colonizer and the rest of her empire, and of 
E  as the rest of the world.
9I will comment below on how my results change when <5 > 2 k .
I l l
in each country own an equal share of capital.10
Two goods are produced and consumed, x  and y. Production technologies 
are equal across countries:
x = L  (2.1)
y = K
Similarly, preferences are equal across countries and are described by the 
utility function
uiJ = u (xiJ,y iJ) = (xiJ)* (yiJy  (2 .2 )
where i J  denotes citizen i in country J . Given that citizens within each 
country have homogeneous preferences and endowments, they will all have 
the same demand schedule: we can thus drop the upper script i from now 
on . 11
Uncompensated demand functions and indirect utility are easily found:
10Notice that I will assume k. and 5 to be exogenous on policy. For a discussion of 
the problems that this assumption may pose, see Section 4; for a brief description of the 
literature on colonialism and endogenous factor endowments, see Section 2.
11 This is equivalent to thinking that there is only one citizen in each country.
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where pJ =  Jj- is the price ratio faced by country J , given that good y
P y
is the numeraire. For ease of notation, I have expressed indirect utility as a 
function of prices only.
A u ta rch y  equ ilib rium
When country J  does not trade, his equilibrium price ratio (denoted by p 
is found by equating domestic demand to domestic supply:
1 RJ _
2 + M ~
Pa *<j
T  + i r  = *
Solving either of the two above equations yields:
Pa  =  K j (2.4)
Using equation (2.3), it is easy to check that any change (both upwards 
and downwards) in the price ratio away from pA increases welfare in country 
J , and this increase is larger the larger the change. This is consistent with 
standard theory of the gains from trade. More formally, v J(p) > vJ(pA) Vp ^  
pA, and vJ(p') > vJ(p) > vJ(pA) Vp, p' ^  pA such that either p' < p < pA 
or p' > p > pA. In what follows, I will denote autarchy indirect utility in 
country J  by vA, i.e.
vJA =  vJ (K J) (2.5)
Trade equilibrium
Consider the case in which countries can trade. Given that there are three 
countries in this model, different equilibrium prices may obtain depending 
on which are the countries involved in the trade. I will use the notation 
{H, F, •} to denote the case in which countries H  and F  trade with each other 
and country E  remains in autarchy. Analogously, the other two possible 
two-country cases will be denoted by { H ,-,F} and {-,F, F}; the notation 
{H, F, F}, instead, will represent different situations in which all countries
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trade with a t least one other country, but not necessarily with both. Note 
that, due to the absence of transport costs, the equilibrium price ratio will 
be the same in all the {H, F , E }  cases.
The assumption of linear production functions ensures that factor price 
equalization obtains (Dixit and Norman, 1980). This ensures tha t we can 
find the equilibrium prices by solving for the integrated trade equilibria, i.e. 
by finding the autarchy equilibrium prices a single country with endowments 
equal to the sum of the endowments of countries who trade. For example, 
equilibrium prices in the {H, F, •} case are found by equating demand and 
supply in the integrated setting (for example, for good x):
1 K H 1 K F
—  h — "t-   — 2
2 2 p  2 2p
Denote by p^H F ^  the price ratio faced by citizens in country J  when only 
H  and F  trade. Solving for either of the two above equations gives:
P { H , F ,  }  =  K  ( l  +  f )
P { H , F ,  }  —  &  ( l  +  § )  (2*®)
P{H,F,} =  Pa
Equilibrium prices in all other cases are found similarly:
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nH -  r>H P { - , F , E }  ~  P a
p £ , f , E }  =  K  ( 1  +  s £ )
Pf,F,E} = ^ ( l  +  ¥ )
P { H , F , E }  =  K  ( l  +
P { H , F , E }  =  ( l  +
P { H , F , E }  =  K  ( l  +  ^ 3^ )
Given the prices in 2.6 and 2.7, together with the fact that indirect utility 
is monotonically increasing in a change in the price ratio, it is easy to pin 
down the agents’ preferences over different trade outcomes. For H  and F , if 
<5 G (0, | )  we have:12
{.,F,F} -<H {H, - ,E}  -<H { H, F, E}  -<H
{ H r , E }  -<F {-,F,F} ^  {Hy F, •} ^  {H, F, E}
If, instead, S G
12Notice that To simplify the exposition, I am not considering
the case in which <5 =  f  and S =  k here.
P { H , - , E }  =  K  ( *  +  2 )
P { H , - , E }  =  P a  ( 2 -7 )
P { H , - , E }  =  K  ( l  +  2 )
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i ; F ,E }  ■<« { H ,; E }  - iH {H ,F , } <H {H ,F ,E }  
-<F {- ,F ,E } -<F {H ,F ,E }  -<F {H, F, •}
Finally, i f  S €  ( k , 2 k ) we have13:
{•, F, E } -<H {H, F , - } ^ h { H , - ,E } ^ h {H, F, E } 
{ H ,F ,E } ,{ - ,F ,E }  -<F {H ,F ,•}
Note tha t when E  is relatively land intensive (8 E  (0, | ) ) ,  I f  prefers to 
trade with F  alone than with F  and E  together, while F  prefers to trade 
with H  and E  together. When E  is relatively capital intensive (8 E  ( | ,  2 k ) ) ,  
the opposite is true.
For country E, there exist a 5* ( k )  such that, if 8 E (0 ,8* ( k ) ) :
{ H ,F ,E } ,{ H ,- ,E }  -<E {-,F ,E }
if instead 8 E (8* ( k )  , 2 k ):
{H ,F r } ,{ - ,F ,E }  {H ,-,E }
13The preferences of F for 8 in this range can be proved by analogy with the preferences 
of E, see below.
117
If E  is land intensive (5 G (0, <5* («))) her citizens prefers to have a 
capital intensive trade partner like F. If she is capital intensive, instead 
( 5  G ( 5*  ( k )  ,  2 k ) ) ,  they prefer to have a land intensive partner like H. In the 
Appendix, I show that 5* ( k )  G (0, | )  and 8Sq^  > 0 for any k . 14
2.3.2 P olitica l M odel
The political model is inspired by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006). 
Colonialism is modelled in a very simple way: while F  and E  set their own 
policy freely, policy in H  is set by F .15 In other words, F  has de jure political 
power in H.
Policy
There are two policy instruments: trade policy, which is set in all countries,
and a transfer from H  to F, which is specific to H.
Trade policy is a set of simple 0 or 1 decisions: it specifies whether a
country is closed or open to each of the other two countries. Trade between
two countries takes place if and only if both countries agree. Trade policy
can be described by the following matrix
14By analogy, it is possible to show that there exists 8** ( k )  >  2 k  such that P ’s first 
best is to trade with H  alone if <5 G [«,£** ( k ) ] .
15Throughout the paper, I will mostly talk about H, F  and E as if they were individual 
agents. This is equivalent to assuming that each country is governed by a citizen selected 
at random within the population.
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T g T g T g
T  = r£H rjiF r£E = Tj? T g T g
T g T g T g
where T j  =  1 if country I  is willing to trade with country J, T j = 0 
otherwise (of course, T j  = IVJ). Thus, trade between country I  and country 
J  takes place if and only if T j  =  T j  = 1. Mapping from T to the trade 
equilibrium, and using the equations in (2.6) and (2.7), we can express the 
equilibrium price ratios as functions of T, k  and 6 only, pJ (T|/c, <5). The gains 
from trade for country J , can then be written as:
n J (T |«,5) =  [PJ ( T M ) ]  - v JA
The transfer from H  to F  will be denoted by the letter A. For the fact 
that H  and F  have the same indirect utility function, and tha t this is linear 
in income, we can think of A  as a transfer of indirect utility from H  to F. 
Thus, we can add it linearly to all payoff functions. The transfer A  is meant 
to capture, in the simplest possible way, the redistributive issue between 
residents in the colonies and residents in the colonizer.
To capture the fact that it is not optimal for F  to reduce H  into starvation, 
I will assume that there is a minimum level of utility that H  must be left 
with. Denote this by u, and assume for simplicity that:
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U <  V A
T im ing
The political state of the model (S ) is initially colonialism: country F , the 
colonizer, is entitled to set policy for country H , the colony. In other words, 
F  controls de jure political power in H. Before choosing policy, F  decides 
whether to stick to colonialism or to concede independence, that is to sur­
render de jure political power. From iF s  point of view, the advantages of 
independence are two: first, they acquire de jure political power, and there­
fore control of policy; second, they obtain exogenous benefit B  > 0. If F  
does not grant independence, H  can stage a revolution. The capacity to 
stage a revolution represents the de facto political power of H. Through 
revolution (which is always successful) they acquire de jure political power 
and an exogenous benefit 6 , which is randomly distributed over (—0 0 , B). 
The higher is 6 , the higher is the de facto political power of H . If H  stage a 
revolution, Tp is automatically set at 0 in the next date. In words, F  must 
refuse to trade with H  any longer. 16 How harmful these sanctions are for 
H  is a measure of F ’s economic power: the more harmful the sanctions, the 
largest is F ’s economic power.
I will denote the three possible political states (colonialism, independence 
and revolution) by the notation S  = C, / ,  R. The timing of the game is the
16It would be an natural extension to model trade policy as a continuous decision - with 
import tariffs ranging from 0 (free trade) to 00 (no trade). In that case, punishment could 
simply be the loss of a preferential tariff (see the case study of Canada before) and the 
level of tariff itself could be endogenous to the political conditions. I keep this interesting 
extension for future work.
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following:
1. Nature choses 6 ;
2 . F  choses whether to stick to colonialism or to grant independence;
3. T  and A  are simultaneously set: under colonialism F  sets T F, T H and 
A\ under independence, instead, T H and A  are set by H\
4. If F  has granted independence, nothing happens at this s,tage. If the 
political state is still colonialism, H  decide whether to stage a revolution 
or not;
5. If F  has granted independence, or if H  have not staged a revolution, 
nothing happens at this stage. Otherwise, all policy is reset {Tp is 
automatically set at 0 );
6 . Production, trade and consumption take place; all payoffs are realized.
The assumption that F  sets Tp = 0 after a revolution is absolutely cru­
cial for the results of the model. While punishment is not ex-post optimal in 
this model, it could be easily rationalized by saying that F  has to defend a 
reputation as a punisher of rebel colonies, in the attem pt to preserve disci­
pline in the rest of the empire. In fact, there is evidence that sanctions are 
actually imposed in the real world.
121
2.3.3 Equilibrium
Let us proceed to find the equilibrium of the model by solving backwards:
Date 6
After production, trade and consumption take place, all payoffs are real­
ized. These depend on the policy choices made in dates 3 and 5 and on world 
factor endowments. Denote by V J (T, A|/c, 5) the final payoff of a citizen of 
country J :
VH (T,A\k ,S) =  v% +  n H( T\ K, S) - A + <t>B + eb (2.8)
Vf (T,A\k,6) =  <  +  n F(T|K,(5) +  yl (2.9)
f e ( t , . 4M )  = <  + n £ (T M )  (2.10)
Where (f> (9) is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the political
state is independence (revolution), and 0  otherwise.
Date 5
If F  have conceded independence in date 2 , or if i f  have not staged a 
revolution in date 4, nothing happens at this stage. Otherwise, policy is 
reset under the constraint Tp = 0 .
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The equilibrium concept for the trade equilibrium is that of coalition- 
proof Nash equilibrium. The trade equilibrium is a set of trade policies such 
that 1) no single country has an incentive to deviate to a different policy; 
and 2 ) no coalition of countries has an incentive to coordinate and deviate 
to a different policy. It can be shown17 that:
P ro p o sitio n  1  After the colony stages a revolution, the type of trade equi­
librium depends on the endowments parameters ( k  and S) in the following 
way:
• I f  5 G (0,5* ( k ) ) ,  that is i f  the rest of the world is very little capital 
intensive, the trade equilibrium is {•,F ,E }: thus, the colony fa lb  into 
autarchy;
• if  5 G (5* ( k ) , 2 k ) ,  that is i f  the capital intensity of the rest of the world 
is intermediate, the trade equilibrium is {H ,-,E }: thus, the colonizer 
falb into autarchy:
The threshold 5* ( k )  is defined in Section 3.1 above as the relative capital 
intensity of country E , for which its citizens are indifferent between trading 
with H  only and trading with F  only. As for extraction, it is straightforward 
that:
P ro p o sitio n  2  Denote by A  (S ) extraction under political state S: then, 
A (R ) = 0.
17Proofs of all proposition are in the Appendix. In the case where 5 > 2k ,  { H , E }  is 
always E ’s first best and the only trade equilibrium of the game.
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Proposition 1 and 2 above, and 3 and 4 below, create a complete mapping 
between political states and policy. It is then possible to express equilibrium 
price ratios, gains from trade and payoffs as functions of political states and 
endowments only. Thus, we will use the notation pJ(S , k, (5), IIJ (S , ac, 5) and 
V J (S ,k , 6) from now on.
Date 4
If F  has granted Independence in date 2 , nothing happens at this stage. If, 
instead, we are still under colonialism, H  decide whether to stage a revolution 
or not. Using 2.8, revolution is profitable if and only if:
n H ( R , K , S) +b> ' nH (C,k,5) — A (C) (2.11)
The above inequality has, on the left-hand side, the final payoff to H  
under revolution, while on the right-hand side it has their final payoff under 
colonialism . 18 Given that H  cannot be left with less than w, the maximum 
that can be extracted under colonialism is A = TlH (C, ac, 8) +  — u\ after
plugging this in 2 .1 1 , we will say that there is a revolutionary constraint if 
and only if:
b > - [ v % - u \ - I l H ( Rt K,S) = b (2.12)
18Autarchy utility drops from the inequality, as it appears on both sides.
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If b, the exogenous benefit from revolution, is lower than the threshold b, 
revolution never takes place - not even if F,  the colonizer, pushes extraction 
to its maximum. If, instead, b is higher than 6 , F  is constrained to keep 
extraction below its maximum if she wants to stave off a revolution. The 
formula for b has a simple intuition. When extraction is maximum, the gain 
from violently acquiring de jure political power is high; it is not, however, 
always as high as from simply resetting extraction to zero, for there may 
be some trade disruption following to revolution. Using the above notation, 
while maximum extraction is II^  (C, /c, S) +  — u the rebel colony is only
able to appropriate UH (R , /c, 6) +  — u, where UH (R, k, 5) < UH (C , ac, £).
The threshold b is the value for b that exactly offsets the gain from violently 
acquiring de jure political power when extraction is maximum, therefore 
making H  perfectly indifferent to revolution in this case.
Date 3
In date 3 there are two possibilities: either we are still under colonialism, 
in which case F  sets policy for H , or we are under independence, and H  sets 
policy autonomously. It is possible to show that: 19
Proposition 3 Both under colonialism and under independence, the trade 
equilibrium is of the type {H, F, E } independently on the endowment param­
eters. Thus, all countries trade, and pJ = K  +  and V ac, 5 such
that ac, S > 0  and S < 2 ac.
19If 8 > 2k , it may be the case that F ’s first best is { H , E }  (and this is also the trade 
equilibrium). This is because F  and H  are competing for selling the land intensive good 
in this case, and restricting supply may increase their joint welfare by giving one of the 
two better terms of trade vis-a-vis the rest of the world. One consequence of this is that 
colonialism may be welfare improving in this case.
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It is important to note that, while under revolution the trade equilibrium 
depends on 8 and k  (Proposition 1) under colonialism it does not. Thus, the 
disruption in trade following to a revolution will depend on 8 and k, as well.
As for extraction, this is obviously set at minimum (A (7) =  0) under 
independence. Under colonialism, there are two possibilities: if there is no 
revolutionary constraint (b < b) F  can impose maximum extraction (A  — 
UH (C , ac, 8) +  v% — u). If, instead, there is a revolutionary constraint (6  > b) 
F  seeks to maximise extraction subject to not triggering a revolution. This 
is done by choosing A  in such a way that 2 .1 1  holds as an equality:20
A = Uh (C, k, 8) -  UH (R, k , 8) — b
All this can be summarized in the following:
Proposition 4 Denote by A  (S ) extraction under political state S.  Then, 
A (I) = 0. As for A  (C), this is maximum (A (C) = J\H (C , /c, 8) +  — u)
if b < b, less than maximum and equal to 11^ (C , /c, 5) — 11^ (R , k ,8) — b if 
b> b (where b is defined in eq. 2.12.
Date 1 and 2
In date 1, Nature chooses b. This is a measure of i7 ’s de facto political 
power: the higher is 6 , the higher is de facto political power. The choice of
20I am using the tie-breaking assumption that revolution does not take place when it 
yields just the same payoff as colonialism.
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b determines F Js decision on whether to surrender or not de jure political 
power in date 2 .
Inspecting equation (2.9) in light of the results of Proposition 3 immedi­
ately suggests that F  finds it optimal to grant independence whenever A  (C) 
is negative. Using Proposition 4, it is easy to see tha t this happens if and 
only if:
6  >  I F  (C, k , S) -  n a  (R , K, 6) = b (2.13)
If b, the exogenous benefit from revolution, is lower than the threshold b, 
country F , the colonizer, can stave off a revolution by choosing the appro­
priate level of extraction, and this is always positive. If, instead, b is higher 
than b, the level of extraction that would be needed to stave off a revolution 
is negative. Given that this is not optimal, F  decides to concede indepen­
dence when b > b . Again, the formula for b has a simple intuition. When 
extraction is zero, the gain from violently acquiring de jure political power 
is always non-positive and exactly equal to the trade disruption following 
to revolution (captured by 11^ (R , ac, 5) — UH (C , k , 5 ) ) .  This is because the 
same policy is set in H , both under colonialism and under revolution. The 
threshold b is the value for b that exactly offsets the trade disruption fol­
lowing to revolution, therefore making H  perfectly indifferent to revolution 
when extraction is zero.
* * *
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Proposition 5 summarizes the characteristics of the equilibrium:
P ro p o sitio n  5 The political state of the model depends on the exogenous 
benefit from revolution, b, in the following way:
• I f  b < b there is no departure from colonialism and F , the colonizer, 
imposes maximum extraction;
• I f b < b < b ,  there is no departure from colonialism but F  imposes only 
partial extraction;
• I f b < b < B ,  the model predicts a switch from colonialism to indepen­
dence.
where b andb are defined in equation (2.12) and (2.13) respectively.
In what follow, I will make a distinction between colonialism when b < b 
(I call this ’’unconstrained colonialism”) and when b < b < b (’’constrained 
colonialism”). The key point is now to understand how b and b depend on 5 
and k , the endowment parameters.
M ain  re su lt
To make the exposition simpler, I define:
7 =  k  +  5
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Figure 2.1: b and b as functions of ^
unconstrained as long as b is smaller than — [v% — u]. As for independence, 
this is obtained when b is positive and greater than 11^  (C, k , 5) .
When ^ is above <5 (7 ), b and b are a step lower and decreasing monotoni- 
cally to reach — [n H (C, k , 6) +  — u] and 0 respectively. This is the case in
which the rest of the world is capital-intensive and competes with the mother 
country in selling capital-intensive goods to the colony (5* (/c) < 6 < 2k ) .  Ac­
cording to Proposition 1, sanctions would reduce i / ’s gains from trade but 
not drive the colony into autarchy (0 < UH (R , k , 5) < HH (C,k , 5)). Thus, 
compared to the previous case, sanctions are only partially effective, and F  
has a lower economic power (and decreasing in ^). As the revolutionnaires 
expect that UH (R, k , <5) of their gains from trade will be recovered after 
revolution, colonialism is unconstrained only as long as b is smaller than
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and study how b and b depend on keeping 7  constant The measure
which takes value in [0 , | ] , captures the attractiveness of the rest of the 
world (as opposed to the colonizer) for the colony’s trade. In other words, a 
value of ^ close to 0  means that the colony’s trade is much more attracted 
by the colonizer than by the rest of the world, while a value of ^ close to |  
means just the opposite. Here, I am fixing the total volume of the colony’s 
trade, and study how the probability with which each political state realizes 
is influenced by the trade pattern, or by the distribution of world factor 
endowments.
Figure 1 gives a qualitative representation of b and b as functions of The 
figure plots ^ on the horizontal axis and b on the vertical axis. The threshold 
6 (7 ) is defined so that ^ < 5 (7 ) if and only if 6 < 5* (k), where 5* (/c) was 
defined in Section 3.1. The solid, thick line represents b, whereas the dashed 
line starting a t — (yH (pjf) — u) represents b. According to Proposition 5, 
the equilibrium political state is unconstrained colonialism at points below 
the dotted line, constrained colonialism at points between the two lines, and 
independence at points above the dotted line.
When -  is below 6 (7 ), b and b are constant and valued at — [v% — u] and 
UH (C, 5, k) respectively. This is the case in which the rest of the world is rel­
atively land intensive, and competes with the colony in selling land-intensive 
goods to the mother country: Proposition 1 tells us tha t in this case, trade 
sanctions have the effect of driving H  into autarchy, reducing their gains 
from trade to 0 (11^ (R , k , 5) =  0). In other words, sanctions are fully effec­
tive, and F  has maximum economic power. As the citizens of H  expect that 
revolution would destroy (C, <5, k)  of their wealth, colonialism remains
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unconstrained as long as b is smaller than — [v% — u]. As for independence, 
this is obtained when b is positive and greater than 11^  (C, k , 5) .
When ^ is above <5 (7 ), b and b are a step lower and decreasing monotoni- 
cally to reach — [n H (C, k , 6) +  — u] and 0 respectively. This is the case in
which the rest of the world is capital-intensive and competes with the mother 
country in selling capital-intensive goods to the colony (5* (/c) < 6 < 2k ) .  Ac­
cording to Proposition 1, sanctions would reduce i / ’s gains from trade but 
not drive the colony into autarchy (0 < UH (R , k , 5) < HH (C,k , 5)). Thus, 
compared to the previous case, sanctions are only partially effective, and F  
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expect that UH (R, k , <5) of their gains from trade will be recovered after 
revolution, colonialism is unconstrained only as long as b is smaller than
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n *  (R,  ac, S) + v% — u, while independence comes as soon as b is bigger than 
II* ( C , ac, 5) — HH (R , /c, 5). Notice that, as ^ increases and E  becomes more 
and more important as a trading partner, the amount of trade disruption 
faced by the colony following to revolution decreases. In fact, as ^ goes to 
| ,  trade disruption goes down to zero.
Proposition 6  summarizes the central result of the paper:
P ro p o sitio n  6  Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of decolonization is constant 
or increasing in that is in the attractiveness of the rest of the world (as 
opposed to the colonizer) for the colony’s trade. A t the same time, the likeli­
hood of colonialism with maximum extraction (as opposed to colonialism with 
partial extraction, and decolonization) is constant or decreasing in Fur­
thermore, the expected share of colonial wealth that the colony can retain for 
herself under colonialism is constant or increasing in
Proposition 6  can be easily illustrated by comparing the case of colonies 
Hi and H2 in Figure 1. The two colonies have the same volume of trade 
and are equal in all other respects except that i f i ’s trade is much more 
attracted by the colonizer than H2 s. It is easy to see that the likelihood of 
decolonization (the probability that b > b) is lower for Hi than for H2, and 
that the likelihood of unconstrained colonialism (the probability that b < b) 
is higher for Hi than for H2. As for the expected share of wealth tha t cannot 
be extracted, this is higher for H2 than for Hi at all values of b.21
21 We cannot make any prediction for the ceteris paribus effect of  ^ on the likelihood of 
constrained colonialism, as that depends on the distribution of b.
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Thus, the key result of the model is that, ceteris paribus, the amount of 
wealth that a colonizer is able to extract from her colony is decreasing in 
the attractiveness of the rest of the world (as opposed to the colonizer) for 
the colony’s trade, and so is the sustainability of colonial power. In the next 
section, I look at a few historical cases which illustrate this point.
2.4 Historical Evidence
The key result of my model is that, ceteris paribus, the amount of wealth 
that a colonizer is able to extract from her colony is decreasing in the attrac­
tiveness of the rest of the world (as opposed to the colonizer) for the colony’s 
trade, and so is the sustainability of colonial power. In this section, I look at 
a few historical cases which illustrate this point.
Apart from the more isolated cases of the United States (1776) and Haiti 
(1804), one could view decolonization’s happening in three main waves. First, 
the Latin American colonies of Spain and Portugal unilaterally declared their 
independence in 1810-1830. Then, in the second half of the same century, a 
few important British settler colonies22 peacefully obtained the right to gov­
ern themselves within the British Empire. Finally, most remaining Middle 
Eastern, Asian and African colonies obtained their independence in a 40-year 
period beginning around 1930. After considering the case of the American 
Revolution (Section 4.1), I concentrate on the first two waves, and in par­
ticular on the case the Spanish Empire (Section 4.2) and of Canada and 
Australia (Section 4.3).
22 Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa; slightly later came South Rhodesia 
and Malta.
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In the case of the American Revolution, I find that the long-discussed role 
of the treaty of Paris (which concluded the Seven Years War between Prance 
and England, 1756-1763) can be better understood by seeing this as a massive 
re-allocation of factor endowments, making the French Empire a better trade 
partner for the American colonies. In the case of the Spanish Empire, I first 
show how the tribute the colonies paid decreased as European manufacturing 
capital relocated outside the Spanish Empire during 1600-1750, and rose 
again with Spain’s modest economic development in the second half of 18th 
century. I then argue that the deposition of the Spanish king by Napoleon 
(1808) was particularly likely to result in the independence of Latin America, 
because of the concentration of manufacturing capital in Britain due to the 
industrial revolution. Finally, in the cases of Canada and Australia, I show 
how Britain conceded self-government only after their raw materials began 
to be exported extensively to regions outside of the British Empire - the US 
for Canadian timber, continental Europe for Australian wool.
2.4.1 T he Am erican R evolution  and the Seven Y ears’ 
War: the Link R econsidered
Economic historians have long debated about the economic origins of the 
American Revolution. While the attem pt to estimate the economic gains 
from independence has led to mixed conclusions, there is a broad agreement 
that the economic incentives to revolution were improved by the Seven Years 
War, a major conflict between France and Britain (1756-1763) which led to 
the British annexation of French North America (Canada and the Mid-West)
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in 1763.23 My model suggests a new possible channel for the economic link 
between the Seven Years War and the American Revolution. By transferring 
a large chunk of factor endowments (mainly land and sea) from France to 
Britain, the war made the French Empire a better trading partner for the 
Middle and New England colonies. This decreased the economic power of 
Britain relative to these colonies, who thus joined Virginia and Maryland 
(whose trade had long been attracted by the world outside the British Em­
pire) to form a coalition that was large enough to challenge imperial rule. 
Failure by Britain to appreciate the new conditions led to dissatisfaction with 
imperial taxation in the 1760s, and, eventually, revolution.
The commerce of pre-revolutionary America was subject to the many 
restrictions that regulated trade within the British Empire. From a trade 
perspective, the thirteen colonies could be classified into four groups. In the 
South, key exports were indigo and rice in the Lower South (Georgia and 
the Carolinas) and tobacco in the Upper South (Virginia and Maryland). 
These were all “enumerated goods” , which imperial regulations required to 
be shipped to Britain independently on their final destination. In the North, 
the Middle Colonies (Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania) and 
New England (Connecticutt, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island) 
exported mainly wheat, salt meat (Middle Colonies), and fish, whale oil, ships 
and shipping services (New England). For these non-enumerated commodi­
ties, the British and foreign West Indies were a key export market (McCusker,
23Three main channels have been proposed. First, the elimination of a French military 
threat from North America reduced the value of British protection (Schlesinger, 1919). 
Second, high war expenditures induced Britain to overtax the American colonies (Gipson, 
1950). Finally, the incorporation of the Mid-West into the British Empire increased the 
potential prize from a successful revolution (Baak, 2004).
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1970, p. 246; Ostrander, 1956, p. 77). From the West Indies, the colonies 
obtained specie, bills of exchange, and various intermediate products ,24 the 
most important of which were the molasses used in the New England rum 
industry .25 Overall, the thirteen colonies had exports worth £3.17 million 
in 1770 26, which they exchanged mostly with European manufactures. This 
made them largely dependent on overseas markets for their growth and pros­
perity (Jensen, 1969, p. 108).
But how dependent were the colonies on imperial markets? In the South, 
the Seven Years War did not significantly alter a pattern that had existed for 
decades, and that put the two groups of colonies in a very different position. 
On one hand, indigo was mostly consumed in Britain, where it even benefited 
from a preferential subsidy. At the same time, while rice sent to Britain27 was 
largely re-exported, there was a clear upward trend in retained imports in 
the 1760s and 1770s (Nash, p. 691). This made the trade of the Lower South 
significantly dependent on the British market. On the contrary, tobacco was 
largely re-exported from Britain (on average more than 80% of the total 
in 1770-1774; see Schumpeter, 1960, Table 18). This reflected the large 
popularity of tobacco in 18th century Europe, and the fact that Virginia and 
Maryland had come to dominate this industry since the mid 17th century
24 Differently from manufactures, intermediates were not required to be imported from 
Britain.
25This was a key New England industry at that time. See Me Cusker (1970) and 
Ostrander (1956).
260 f these, 50% went to Britain and Ireland, 30% to the West Indies, and 17% to South 
Europe and the Wine Islands. About 76% of the exports to Britain were ’’enumerated” 
goods, 85.4% of which were re-exported to continental Europe.
27Despite its enumerated good status, rice could be exported directly to Southern Europe 
since 1730. Thus, only 78% of all colonial export went to Britain in 1772-1774, (Nash, 
1992, p. 688), 75% of which was re-exported.
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(Davis, 1954, p. 152). Thus, the Upper South was only very marginally 
dependent on the British market for its main export industry.
In the north, the pattern of dependence on imperial markets was signif­
icantly affected by the consequences of the Seven Years War. Before 1756, 
the Middle and New England colonies had traded a lot with the French 
West Indies, which were the most important sugar-producing islands in the 
Caribbean region and the heart of a rapidly growing commercial empire (Ec- 
cles, 1972, p. 172). This trade, however, had been discouraged not only by 
Britain (whose tax on foreign molasses diverted much trade with the foreign 
West Indies into smuggling, see Bjorn, 1956, and Ostrander, 1956) but also 
by France, who owned large chunks of land and sea in Canada and was devel­
oping her own food and fish productions in this colony (Gould, 1939, p. 489). 
W ith the loss of Canada after the Seven Years War, the project of creating a 
self-sufficient French Empire in America was gone (Gould, 1939, p. 490), and 
the French were left with the problem of obtaining much needed provisions 
for their West Indies islands. This arguably increased the importance of the 
French West Indies as an export market for the Middle Colonies and New 
England, therefore decreasing their dependence on imperial markets. While 
the importance of smuggling makes it very hard to track this evolution in 
the data, much anecdotal evidence hints at a sharp increase in the volume of 
smuggling in the 1760s (see for example Greene, 1980, p. 89).
Thus, the model constructed in Section 3 suggests the following inter­
pretation of the consequences of the Seven Years War. Before the War, the 
Lower South and the North could expect large trade costs from revolution. 
Had Britain imposed sanctions on her rebel colonies, little support could be
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expected from third countries in the indigo trade, which was not valuable 
outside the British market. At the same time, the Middle Colonies and New 
England could expect to loose access to the British West Indies markets, at 
a time when the main other West Indies power (France) would not provide 
much commercial support in the interest of her own food-producing colonies 
of North America. This stood in contrast with the isolated case of Virginia 
and Maryland, whose commercial interests were aligned with those of the 
various European countries who consumed American tobacco. In terms of 
the model, before the war the economic power of Britain was high (5 was 
low) relative to a majority of the American colonies. By giving French North 
America to the British, the war made the French Empire less land-intensive, 
thus removing some of the internal forces tha t pushed against providing 
commercial support to the US. This made revolution more attractive for the 
Middle Colonies and New England, in that these colonies could now expect 
that the loss of the British West Indies market would be replaced by a more 
open access to the French West Indies. Thus, paradoxically the war - which 
left Britain as the world’s leading imperial power - decreased the economic 
power of Britain vis-a-vis her Middle and New England colonies of America. 
Together with Virginia and Maryland, these colonies created a colonies that 
was willing to fight against British taxation, even at the cost of staging a 
revolution.
This description of the economic incentives to revolution squares well with 
the pattern of political radicalism in reaction to increased British taxation 
in the late 1760s and early 1770s. For example, the standard historical inter­
pretation of the politics of 1774-1776 is that New England radical representar
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exports to Britain dropped to virtually zero in 1776-1780, and did not recover 
to 65% of their pre-war value until 1791-1795 (Figure l ) .31 As for the trade 
with the British West Indies, this was at half the pre-war level in 1785-1787, 
and even lower in 1793.
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Figure 2 .2 : US exports, 1771-1795
The three figures for exports to the British West Indies are for 1771-1773, 1785-1787 and 
1793. Source: Schumpeter (1960) and Bjork (1965).
Among the thirteen colonies, the Carolinas and Georgia were hit the
hardest by this decline in trade. British imports from the Carolinas fell from
a combined £579,000 in 1775 to £75,000 in 1783 and £282,000 in 1788. For
Georgia, these figures were £103,477 in 1775 and £25,057 in 1788 (Bjork, p.
557). As Bjork points out, “undoubtedly there was some expansion of trade
with the other European countries in rice, indigo, naval stores, and tobacco;
and the preferential tariff on rice and wheat on the British market.
31 These figures are particularly significant if one considers that the American population 
was growing fast in that period. I do not consider the figure for 1796-1800 (which stands 
at £1.7m) as this was largely influenced by new international conditions (the French 
revolution and the outbreak of war between England and France).
1771-1775 1776-1780 1781-1785 1786-1790 1791-1795 
■ US exports to  Britain (£ m}
*  US exports to  the British West Indies ($ m)
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tives, seconded by a group of Southern representative led by representatives 
from Virginia first pushed a reluctant Congress into active resistance, then 
forced an open declaration of independence (Jillson and Wilson, 1994, p. 
177).28 This compares with the prudent attitude of the lower south and, to a 
lesser extent, the middle colonies.29 Also, that an increased and more secure 
trade with the foreign West Indies was one factor driving the radicalization 
of New England in the 1760s is consistent with the pattern of radicalism 
observed within the community of Boston merchants. As first pointed out 
by Schlesinger (1919), this group was a key promoter of American indepen­
dence. Using data on insurance contracts to identify the smugglers, Tayler 
(1986) shows that these were relatively more likely to be patriot than loy­
alist, and that their influence raised to a very high level in the 1760s. This 
suggests that the arguments of those involved in the foreign trade became 
more convincing in this period, possibly because of more favorable economic 
conditions in the French West Indies.
That perspective trade relations were a key priority for the revolutionaries 
is clear from the analysis of the diplomatic exchange with foreign nations 
before and after the declaration of independence (see Eccles, 1972). In the 
words of John Adams (FIND). But what actually happened to American 
trade after the revolution? As a result of war and sanctions30, American
28In fact, Virginia declared her own independence months before the joint declaration 
of July 4th.
29While Georgia was last in sending her representatives to Congress, South Carolina and 
Pennsylvania were the only two who initially voted against the declaration of independence; 
in this same vote, Delaware and New York abstained.
30Trade between any part of the British Empire and the thirteen colonies was totally 
prohibited in 1776-1783. After that, a number of restrictions remained in place, among 
which the prohibition to export salt meat and fish to the British West Indies, the prohibi­
tion for any American vessels to trade with the islands, the loss of the subsidy on indigo
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but the amount was certainly far from large enough to make up for the decline 
in exports to Britain. The difficulties faced by the plantation economy of the 
lower south were nowhere better seen than in the population statistics of South 
Carolina, where there was an absolute decline in the slave population between 
1775 and 1790” (p. 556). This is in sharp contrast with the experience of 
Virginia, where tobacco exports increased from 55,000 hogsheads prior to the 
war to an average 57,125 in 1783-1789 (Bjork, p. 540).32 Thanks also to an 
increase in price (due to the break of the British monopoly)33, the years up 
to 1790 were a time of real prosperity for the tobacco planters of the upper 
South. As for the middle and New England colonies, these were severely hit 
by trade restrictions in the British West Indies. For example, exports of fish 
to the British West Indies fell from $226,000 in 1771-1773 to almost zero 
in the 1780s and early 1790s. (Bjork, p. 552). Still, total fish exports to 
the West Indies stood at $684,000 in 1790. Of these, $610,000 were exports 
to the French West Indies (Pitkin, 1835, Table VII).34 Also, estimating the 
total value of exports to the West Indies in 1790, Jefferson comes up with 
a figure of $2.2m going to the British West Indies, and $3.2m going to the 
French West Indies (Bjork, 1965, p. 553). Trade with the French Empire was 
facilitated by the crucial Treaty of Amity and Commerce, that the American 
diplomats signed with France in 1778 (see Eccles, 1972).
These facts are consistent with the idea that the American revolution-
32Total tobacco exports increased from 102,000 hogsheads to 110,000 in 1790-1792 
(Bjork, p. 540). This confirms that Maryland’s exports must have also done well.
33Bjork, p. 554-555. From the British account (Schumpeter, 1960, table XVIII) we 
see that the imports of tobacco from the US fell from an annual average of 55.2 m lb in 
1771-1775 to 35.1 m lb in 1783-1789
34While smuggling makes it impossible to compare this trade to pre-war levels, it seems 
safe to conclude that the French trade gave substantial relief to the American fish industry
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aries cared about the trade consequences of revolution, and acted when the 
economic conditions were right in this sense. This establishes a new link be­
tween the consequences of the Seven Years War and the American revolution. 
Of course, this link is not incompatible with other links previously suggested 
in the literature, but does seem to have considerable explanatory power in 
light of the importance of trade for the American colonies.
2.4.2 The Spanish Empire: D ecadence, R evival and 
Fall, 1590-1810
The Spanish colonies of Latin America became independent after a series 
of successful rebellions in 1810-1827. Many argue that the French invasion 
of Spain in 1808 triggered them. I argue that the invasion was particularly 
likely to result in revolution because of the change in economic incentives 
tha t the industrial revolution in Britain had brought. The economy of Span­
ish America relied on the exchange of silver and agricultural commodities for 
European manufactured goods. By 1810, the accumulation of manufactur­
ing capital in Britain was making her the natural trading partner of Latin 
America: in terms of the model, S was growing much higher than k . Thus, 
the invasion of Spain decreased the cost of rebellion (b) when the cost of 
rebellion in terms of trade disruption was already very low (6 close to zero). 
Furthermore, the tribute that Spain asked from the colonies (A) was very 
high, reflecting perhaps the trade conditions of the period 1750-1790 more 
than the current ones. I extend this logic to analyse the fortunes of Spanish 
imperialism since its golden age in 16th century, and argue that the pat­
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tern of extraction adapted over the centuries to reflect the concentration of 
manufacturing capital within or without the Spanish Empire.
Background and Political Developments
Conquistadores in the first half of 16th century established the Spanish 
Empire, and it rapidly extended to cover almost half of the American con­
tinent. After plundering the riches of the natives, the Spaniards set out to 
organise the extraction of the mineral and agricultural wealth of the colonies. 
The social structure that they created had at its bottom a mass of people 
(mainly native Indians, but also imported Negroes) tha t was forced to work 
at very little or no salary in the plantations and mines. Above them were 
the creoles, the descendents of Spanish immigrants. These were the legal 
owners of the assets of the colonies, and the people to whom the working 
class owed their labour obligations. On top were the peninsular Spaniards 
with whom the Crown shared the benefits of political power. For centuries, 
the imperial economy was centred on two large silver mining centres (Upper 
Peru and Mexico) that the other colonies supplied with foodstuffs and basic 
manufactures. In the early 18th century, after the Upper Peruvian silver 
economy declined sharply, various South American regions that had served 
as suppliers for it began to export their production (e.g. Venezuela, Chile). 
All colonial needs besides food and basic manufactures were satisfied with 
imports from Europe.
From the late 16th century to 1776, the ports of Seville, first, and later 
Cadiz, monopolized official trade between Europe and Spanish America.35
35Trade was done by two large, military-excorted fleets, which sailed yearly (or less fre­
quently) from Cadiz to Veracruz (Mexico) and Cartegena/Portobello (Colombia/Panama).
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This fact may seem to contradict the result in Proposition 3 - that colonizers 
should allow their colonies to integrate with the rest of the world - but it 
does not. Colonizers were the fiercest promoters of colonial exports, and 
when they assumed for themselves the role of entrepot they did so with a 
view to promote, rather than hinder, such trade. W ith all the distortions 
that it entailed, the Cadiz monopoly did not prevent Latin American silver 
from being exchanged outside Spain for non-Spanish manufactures. In the 
model, all distortions to production and consumption are assumed away for 
simplicity, and the redistributive effect of the trade monopoly is captured 
by the lump sum transfer A. In fact, the trade monopoly was not the only 
tool through which the Spanish redistributed the wealth of the colonies to 
themselves. While the Indians and Negroes were forced to work for the 
creoles, a series of taxes and regulations (for example, the reservation of top 
colonial jobs for peninsular Spaniards) made sure tha t a portion of colonial 
wealth ended up in Spanish pockets.
Yet extracting resources from the creoles proved increasingly difficult 
over time: in other words, A  seems to have declined steadily in 1600-1750. 
TePaske and Klein (1981) show that the share of Mexican public revenues 
remitted to Spain or to other parts of the empire36 decreased from 57 per 
cent in the 1610s to 23 per cent in the 1690s. Similarly, only 10 per cent 
of Peruvian public revenues was remitted in the 1660s as opposed to 64 per 
cent in the 1590s (TePaske, 1983). Contrary to a traditional view of Spanish 
colonialism, remittances did not decline because of a fall in silver produc­
36Some share of the richest treasuries (those of Mexico and Lima) was transferred to 
the poorer regions of the empire. In XVII, the Philippines were the largest recipient of 
such transfers (TePaske and Klein, 1981).
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tion - colonial public revenues were roughly constant over these periods - but 
rather because of an increasing incapacity of Spain to extract wealth from 
her colonies (TePaske and Klein, 1981). As argued by Lynch (1965-1969, p. 
195), over time the creoles ’’...appropriated more of their own production, 
and employed their capital in. their own administration, defence and invest­
ment” . A similar pattern is observable in the appointment of top colonial 
officials: for example, while in 1600-1678 none of the judges in the colonial 
Audiencias (the highest colonial courts) was of Creole origin, in 1678-1750 
the creoles had 44 per cent of the seats (Lynch, 1992, p. 77). As for the 
redistributive effect of the Cadiz monopoly, this was modified by a series of 
laws that increased the bargaining power of colonial versus peninsular mer­
chants.37 Thus, Spanish colonialism was relatively constrained in early 18th 
century, and the colonists were capable of retaining their wealth for them­
selves. As argued by Lynch (1973), this was one fundamental reasons why 
the colonists did not take advantage of the War of Spanish Succession (1702) 
to revolt.
After 1750, however, the situation changed. The Bourbon dynasty, which 
had ruled Spain since 1702, set out to re-establish Spanish imperial authority 
in what has been described as the ’’second conquest of America” (Lynch, 
1973, p. 7). The pattern of concessions made over the preceding 150 years 
was suddenly reversed. Taxation was increased, tax administration made 
more efficient, and a higher share or revenues began to be remitted to Spain
37For example, in 1714 the Spanish merchants were forbidden direct access to the inland 
markets of the Americas; in 1749 the American merchants were granted the right to ship 
money to Spain and purchase directly goods in Cadiz (Walker, 1979 p. 213 and 218). 
By 1750 the colonial merchants were ”... within a stone’s throw of victory and virtual 
economic self-determination” (Walker, 1979, p. 15).
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(Lynch, 1973, p. 11). New and old administrative institutions were put 
under the influence of peninsular Spaniards - in the Audiencias, the share of 
creoles in 1751-1808 dropped to 23 per cent. Instruments of Creole power 
(such as the order of the Jesuits) were dismantled, and the rising power of 
colonial chambers of commerce put under control.38 In terms of the model, 
A  increased steadily after 1750.
By the early 19th century, this new imperialism had created an alarming 
level of frustration in the colonies (Lynch, 1973). The atmosphere in Latin 
America in 1810 when Napoleon deposed the king was markedly different 
than in 1702. In both situations, the political turmoil decreased the expected 
cost of a rebellion; in the language of the model, b increased. Only in 1810, 
however, did this increase result in rebellion. Creole rebellion came in two 
waves, one ” ... advancing from the Rio de la P lata [Argentina], across the 
Andes to the Pacific” , the other veering from Venezuela to New Granada 
[Colombia] and back to its birthplace” (Lynch, 1973, p. 35). In less than 20 
years, and despite the fact that the Spanish monarchy was restored in 1815, 
all colonies became independent from Spain.39
Analysis
We have seen how the level of extraction tha t Spain imposed on her
38After 1750, the confrontation between Spanish and colonial merchants, which had 
seen the latter having the upper hand for more than 50 years, reached a sort of impasse 
(Walker, 1979, p. 14).
39This result is in contrast with the result of the model that revolution never takes place. 
This is, of course, because of the assumption that the colonizers can always instantaneously 
adapt the level of extraction to the current attractiveness of revolution. To remove this 
assumption and generate equilibrium revolution, it would be sufficient to modify the model 
to the case in which the policy is set before b is realized, and cannot be adapted afterwards. 
This extension would not change any of the results of the model, and I therefore stick to 
the version presented in Section 3.
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American empire (A in the model) was very high in 16th century, declined 
steadily in 17th and the first half of 18th century, and partially recovered 
in the second half of 18th century. But was this pattern matched by the 
evolution of world factor endowments that the model suggests? Given the 
structure of Latin American trade, we would expect tha t the capacity of 
Spain to extract wealth from her American colonies would be high or low 
depending on whether the manufacturing capital that is complementary to 
the colonies’ trade is mainly concentrated within or without the Spanish 
empire (in the model, an increase in 6 relative to k).
In fact, while the Spanish empire in the time of Charles V and Phillip II 
(1519-1598) included some of the most important manufacturing regions in 
Europe (such as the Duchy of Milan and Flanders) the era of the Hapsburg 
kings after Philip (1598-1702) witnessed an inexorable decline in the man­
ufacturing capacity of the Empire relative to other European powers’ (see 
Hamilton, 1937, pp. 170-171). For example in the textile sector - which rep­
resented the bulk of Latin American imports - Milan and Flanders lost their 
leadership to England, Holland and, slightly later, France (Wilson, 1960, p. 
219). As many authors argue (Kamen, 1978; Flynn, 1982; and Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2005), this decline was due to the predatory be­
haviour of the Spanish oligarchy, which squandered the American treasure in 
luxurious consumption and costly wars across Europe (see also Flynn, 1982, 
p. 143-145). As a result, the import needs of the Latin Americans were 
increasingly served by producers outside of the Spanish Empire: by the end 
of 17th century, just about 5% of the goods leaving Cadiz were of Spanish 
origins (Walker, 1979, p. 13) and the Andalusian merchants ” ... had been
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turned into nothing more than the agents of foreign manufacturers and busi­
nessmen” (Walker, 1979, p. 11). At the same time, smuggling from the 
Dutch, English and French trading posts in the Caribbean and Africa grew 
faster than ever before.40
After the Bourbon dynasty took over in Spain (1702), however, this pat­
tern slowly changed. The new dynasty started an ambitious programme of 
economic reforms that included promoting the inflow of skilled textile artisans 
from France and England (La Force, 1964) and opening new royal factories 
endowed with cutting-edge manufacturing technology. Initially, the reforms 
were not very successful because vested interests resisted them fiercely. But 
by the second half of the century, Spanish industry appeared to be seriously 
catching up with the rest of Europe’s. Fisher (1998, p. 460) argues that the 
1780s and early 1790s were periods of unparalleled prosperity and economic 
growth for Spain. For example in the textile sector, Barcelona became a 
leading centre of calico production in Europe (La Force, 1964).
The effect of the Bourbon reforms on trade with Latin America is evident: 
already in 1748-1765, the share of Spanish imports in total Latin American 
imports had grown to 15 per cent (Garcia-Baquero Gonzales, 1976). By 
1778, this share was 38 per cent. In the same year, the Crown introduced 
discriminatory tariffs on non Spanish imports to favour the industrial devel­
opment of Spain, and as a result, the Spanish share rose to 52 per cent in
40Of course, an alternative explanation for the weakening of Spanish authority could be 
that the military power of Spain decline vis-a-vis her colonies. This explanation cannot be 
ruled out, but as long as military power is proportional to national product, it seems at 
odd with the fact that overall, both the Spanish and Latin American economies seem to 
have stagnated in 17th century, rather than diverged (for Spain, see Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2005; for Latin America, see TePaske and Klein, 1981)
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1782-1796 (Fisher, 1981, p. 27). This increase was not because of a fall in 
exports to Latin America due to protectionism, as total exports amounted 
to 3.8 million pesos in 1778 and 14.1 million in 1795 (Ibid).
But if Spain was really an important trading partner for Spanish America, 
why were the creoles so quick to declare their independence when Napoleon 
arrived? One possible interpretation is that by the turn of the century the 
industrial development of Spain was completely overshadowed by Britain’s. 
In fact, while in Spain the period of highest growth was over in the 1790s, 
growth in Britain would continue undisturbed for several decades, making 
it the most capital-intensive country in the world for most of 19th century. 
By the beginning of the century, Britain was already producing excess man­
ufactured goods, and her merchants, faced with the loss of markets brought 
about by the American revolution and prolonged wars in Europe, began 
looking at Latin America as a market potentially as rich as those of India 
or the United States (Kaufmann, 1951, p. 6-7). There is plenty of anec­
dotal evidence that, on the American side, the creoles who rebelled against 
Spain cared about maintaining their trade with Britain as much as their po­
litical independence (see both Kaufmann, 1951, and Lynch, 1973). There 
is also anecdotal evidence that British diplomatic activities favoured Latin 
American independence (Kaufmann, 1951). Thus, one possible interpreta­
tion of the Latin American revolutions is that the French invasion of Spain 
did nothing but bring the inevitable for a political situation tha t was per se 
unsustainable: while the industrial growth of Britain was making the trade 
disruption stemming from a revolution against Spain increasingly irrelevant 
(in the model, while 5 was increasing rapidly), Spanish policy was not ad­
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justing to take this into account {A remained very high).
2.4.3 Self-G overning Colonies: the case o f Canada and  
A ustralia
Unlike the Spanish Empire, where colonial administration formally remained 
in the hands of the Crown until independence, various forms of power shar­
ing existed within the British Empire. Before 1849, there were two types of 
British colonies.41 In the crown colonies, the British retained all legislative, 
executive and judiciary power;42 in all other colonies, some type of repre­
sentative institution was in place.43 The extent to  which these institutions 
represented colonial societies depended on the share of seats reserved for 
locals, and on whether locals were selected by the governor or elected by 
the population (voting was normally only a privilege of those with wealth). 
These institutions did not substantially undermine control of de jure politi­
cal power by the British, as the governor retained the power to appoint and 
dismiss top officials, and to veto all local legislation.
With the concession of self-government to Canada in 1849, a substantially 
new type of representative institution emerged. The key innovation was 
that top officials were appointed and dismissed only on the indication of
41 Protectorates are not included in this categorisation.
42 British officials in charge of government decisions were periodically turned over, and 
major decisions were taken in London.
43Typically, these institutions consisted of an executive council, a legislative council and 
an assembly (but the assembly was often missing). The executive council was a sort of 
government who assisted the governor with the administration of the colony, while the 
legislative council and the assembly had some legislative and advisory power.
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the popularly elected part of the legislation (be it the legislative council or 
the assembly)44. This was a major surrendering of de jure political power, 
one tha t substantially anticipated formal independence. Between 1849 and 
1923, five more British colonies were granted this privilege: Australia, New 
Zealand, South Africa, South Rhodesia and Malta. Most of them obtained 
formal independence with the treaty of Westminster in 1931.
There seems to be a positive correlation between the degree of admin­
istrative autonomy that a colony could hope to achieve within the British 
Empire and the share of settlers of British or European origins in her pop­
ulation. Most colonies with no European settlers were crown colonies, while 
the others were normally given representative institutions at an early stage 
of their political history. Furthermore, all ’’pure” settler colonies45 (with the 
exception of the US) obtained self-government at a later stage. To reconcile 
this fact with the model would require assuming that settlers have a higher 
capacity to revolt than natives, something that could be justified in a num­
ber of ways.46 Empirically, this poses important limitations. It seems in 
particular that any cross-section analysis that relies on the assumption that 
the exogenous cost of revolution (b) is distributed equally across colonies
44 The Crown remained responsible for administering foreign and trade policy, and re­
tained formal veto power on local legislation. The latter, however, was rarely used during 
the life of this institutional arrangement.
45By this it is meant all colonies where the economic importance of the indigenous 
population was negligible: basically, the various colonies of Canada and Australia (see 
Mosley, 1983).
46 For example, settlers could be less willing to be ruled despotically because of the 
institutions they brought with them from Europe (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 
2001b). Also, it could be argued that smaller groups of settlers were in greater need of 
assistance by the colonizer to keep control of the natives. On the belief that it deserves a 
fuller theoretical treatment, I keep this issue for future research.
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should be refined to control for settlers.47 In what follows, I limit myself to  
studying whether the time series of two ’’pure” settler colonies who obtained 
self-government can be explained with a change in economic incentives as 
suggested by my model.
Canada
The British colonies of Canada obtained self-government at the end the 1840s, 
a decade during which the British attitude towards Canadian independence 
suddenly became more conciliatory (Conrad, Finkel and Jaenen, 1993, p. 
427). Just one decade before, policy disagreements between Britain and 
Canada over the issue led to riots, repression and the defence of the status 
quo. In the first half of the 19th century, the Canadian economy relied on 
exports of timber and trans-shipped US wheat for her prosperity. I argue tha t 
one key reason why Britain adopted a new attitude towards Canadian self- 
government was that the structure of Canadian trade fundamentally changed 
around 1840. On one hand, rapid urbanization and growth in the US created 
strong North American demand for timber. On the other, the dismantling of 
the tariff system that had granted colonies preferential access to the British 
market had left Canadian timber uncompetitive in Europe. Because of both 
factors, the timber-processing capital tha t was relevant to Canadian trade 
relocated from Britain to North America: in terms of the model, 6 increased
47This is because of the colonies who received self-government, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand are unique for their level of settlers and received self-government at very 
close points in time; South Africa came somewhat later, but it also represent a special 
case in terms of settlers. Very interesting, instead, will be to study why North Rhodesia 
received self-government while South Rhodesia didn’t. I keep this issue for future research.
151
relative to k . Soon, it appeared clear that the cost of concessions needed to 
keep political power in Canada was too large, and responsible government 
was granted (in terms of the model, A  became negative).
Background and political developments
Both Quebec and Ontario48 were annexed to the British Empire in 1763. 
While Quebec was a French ’’pure” settlers colony (about 60 thousands in­
habitants in 1763), Ontario was part of a scarcely populated region of the 
American Midwest that had long been disputed between the British and the 
French. There, large European settlement began only after 1783, with the 
inflow of British Loyalists from the US. In both provinces population grew 
fast in the following 50 years, reaching 550 thousands in Quebec and 231 
thousands in Ontario by 1831.49 Most immigrants were English speaking in 
this period, resulting in the French share of Quebec population decreasing 
to about a third by 1850.
Before 1800, the economy was split between subsistence agriculture and 
the fur import-export industry.50 This dualistic economic structure con­
tributed to create a very polarized society, where the interests of settlers- 
farmers and of merchants often diverged. This will have important conse­
quences for Canadian politics, as we shall see. In the first two decades of 
1800s, the fur trade disappeared and the two industries tha t would dominate 
the economy for the next 50 years emerged: the import-export of US food­
48Before 1870, British Canada was made up of several independent colonies. I will focus 
on Quebec and Ontario for their high relative population density and economic importance.
49In both provinces, the size of the indigenous population was insignificant.
50The fur trade was the backbone of the Canadian economy since XVII century. Fur 
was purchased in a vast area surrounding the Great Lakes and the American Midwest, 
and shipped to Europe through the St. Lawrence river.
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stuff, and the production and export of timber. The first was the natural 
successor of the fur trade, and was mainly a mercantile enterprise. But where 
did the timber trade originate from, and whom did it benefit?
Ever since the 16th century, Britain had based her military and economic 
power on the strength of her commercial and military navy. This factor, 
together with urbanization levels with no equivalent in Europe, contributed 
to making Britain the largest timber consumer in the world at the end of 
18th century. Due to scarce domestic supply, most timber was imported 
from the Baltics; during the Napoleonic wars, however, a series of major 
supply break-ups showed how vulnerable tha t source of supply could be, 
and how this could threaten the military supremacy of Britain in Europe.51 
Canadian timber was abundant and of high quality, but the timber industry 
had failed to develop for the high cost of shipping this bulky commodity 
to Europe. In 1802, however, the British introduced a discriminatory tariff 
against non-imperial timber, which more than compensated for Canada’s 
disadvantage. As a result, by 1820 more than 80 per cent of British imports 
were of Canadian origins (Marr and Paterson, 1980).
For the Canadians, this was a primary source of prosperity: a large share 
of the population was involved in timber production and trading52, and be­
tween 1829 and 1845 timber made up for over 40 per cent of Canadian exports 
(with year peaks of 70 per cent, despite the importance of the import-export
51 Not only did Britain’s military power rely more on timber: her European rivals enjoyed 
a large domestic supply, and a safer access to North-Eastern European exports.
52The timber trade was of importance to farmers (who harvested it on the margin of their 
land, and supplied foodstuff to lumbering camps) lumberjacks, sawmill entrepreneurs and 
workers, and a large number of middlemen (Marr and Paterson, 1980, p. 64-65; Pomfret, 
1981, p. 25; Easterbrook and Aitken, 1956, p. 159).
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industry; Marr and Paterson, 1980, p. 61).
Turning to political developments, the first important event in Canadian 
political history is the concession by Britain of representative institutions in 
1790. In each colony, these consisted of an appointed executive and legislative 
council and an elective assembly. Just as in other settler colonies of the 
British Empire, these institutions did not represent a significant surrendering 
of de jure political power by the British. In fact, the governor retained the 
power to chose the members of the two councils, and had many legislative 
tools at his disposal to weaken the power of the assembly.
Initially, all appointed and elective seats were occupied by merchants, and 
the relations with Britain were good. After 1820, however, farmers, made 
more numerous by immigration, secured control of the two elective assem­
blies, and a sharp conflict over the destination of public revenues began. This 
grew particularly bitter in Quebec, were farmers (mainly of French origins) 
were an old and compact social group. There were several key issues at stake: 
first, farmers advocated the free import of US manufactures, whereas Britain 
defended the import tariff53 cherished by her manufacture producers and by 
both British and Canadian merchants. The same logic of commerce induced 
British officials to favour public investment in the improvement of the St. 
Lawrence canal system, while farmers pressed for investing in agricultural 
infrastructure. Finally, farmers wanted Crown land to be sold directly to 
them and at cheap prices, while the British government use to sell it to large 
British land speculators first. On all of these issues, the Canadian merchants
53Ever since the Huskisson Acts of 1825, colonies could import goods from all recip­
rocating foreign countries at an Empire-wide tariff. This went a long way towards the 
abolition of the Navigation Laws, which for centuries had forced the British colonies to 
trade with the rest of the world through Britain.
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were the natural ally of the British, and they were systematically chosen to  
fill in the seats of the executive and legislative council in the 1820s and 1830s.
In the 1830s, frictions increased together with the timber trade and public 
revenues. By the middle of the decade, a few radical leaders of the farmers 
were asking for the executive and legislative councils to be nominated by the 
assemblies, and responsible to them only. It was, in essence, the request for 
self-government. Faced with no consideration by the British, these leaders 
came to see independence from Britain as a necessary step to access power 
(Conrad, Finkel and Jaenen, 1993, pp. 412-424). Then, in 1837, the governor 
denied the long-established right of the Quebec assembly to authorise new 
revenues, and an additional slot of 2.1 million hectares of Crown land was 
sold to British speculators. At the news, violent riots erupted in Montreal, 
followed by similar protests in Ontario. But despite the fact that their mo­
tivations were shared by many, these riots did not succeed in appealing to 
the general population. Thus, the numbers involved were small (see Conrad, 
Finkel and Jaenen, 1993, p. 418-419), and the British could easily repress 
them. Soon after, the pre-riots status quo was re-established (Conrad, Finkel 
and Jaenen, 1993, p. 425; Creigthon, 1966, p. 250), and Canadian opposition 
returned quite for the next several years.
In the 1840s, things began moving again, but in a substantially differ­
ent way. On one hand, the moderate reformers of the two colonies who 
had not taken part in the riots joined forces in 1842 and formed a new, 
compact political movement which, from that moment onwards, would con­
duct a much more compact opposition to the authoritarian temptations of 
the governor. On the other hand, this opposition was corresponded by in­
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creasing concessions made by the three governors which succeeded to Lord 
Durham (1840-1846), and a large imperial loan was granted to the colonies. 
By the second half of the decade, the opinion that control of government in 
Canada was not worth making more concessions began to circulate within 
British official circles (Creighton, 1966, p. 258). This prefigured the turning 
point, the moment in which the British government first accepted Canadian 
self-government. This was on the belief tha t “. . .  it is neither possible nor 
desirable to carry on the government of any of the British provinces in North 
America in opposition to the opinion of the inhabitants” (the Colonial Sec­
retary, Earl Grey, as reported by Creighton, 1966, p. 259-260). Both Quebec 
and Ontario obtained self-government in 1849.
Analysis
Can this change in political climate be explained with a change in the eco­
nomic incentives to rebellion along the lines suggested in Section 3? Propo­
sition 6 claims that the likelihood of decolonization is non-decreasing in the 
attractiveness of the rest of the world (as opposed to the colonizer) for the 
colony’s trade. This is because as the factor endowments to which colonial 
trade is attracted become more concentrated outside of the empire, the capac­
ity of the colonizer to impose harmful trade sanctions decreases, increasing 
the capacity of the colony to stage a revolution.
In fact, there seems to have been a key discontinuity in the structure of 
Canadian international trade between the 1830s and the 1840s. In the 1830s, 
the distribution of the world’s endowments of timber and capital (the capital 
of the timber-based industries) was such that, despite the large Canadian
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supply, the British Empire was a net importer of timber from the rest of 
the world. In the 1840s, things changed in two important ways. First, the 
US became a major net importer of timber. Second, in a major and final 
step towards her conversion to free trade, Britain dismantled the preferential 
tariff system that had long protected domestic and colonial producers of 
agricultural commodities and raw materials.54
The US firstly turned into a net importer of timber at the end of the 1830s, 
as the onset of a long economic boom lead was accompanied by rapid urban­
ization in the East coast.55 Already in the early 1840s, substantial amounts 
of Canadian timber took their way South notwithstanding a still-high US 
import tariff on natural products. By 1849, export to the US represented 
24 per cent of Canadian timber exports, and this valued increased to 34 per 
cent in the second half of the 1850s and 50 per cent in the second half of the 
1860s (Lower, Carrothers and Saunders, 1938, p. 101 and 134).56
Britain began dismantling the old system of trade restrictions in the early 
1820s, and, by the second half of 19th century, she had fully converted to free 
trade. In the 1840s, a series of major reforms abolished the import tariffs 
on several agricultural commodities and raw materials. For decades, these 
tariffs had granted high profit for British producers to the detriment of con­
54 Britain began dismantling the old system of trade restrictions in the early 1820s: by 
the second half of XIX what was then the greatest economic power of the world had fully 
converted to free trade, and several other countries had followed suit.
55Up until the mid 1830s, domestic supply of Maine (the large reserves of the West 
and Midwest were still unexplored at that time) had been more than enough to cover 
domestic demand, to the point that timber used to be exported to Canada and from there 
to Britain.
56In fact, timber was the leading industry in determining the re-orientation of the Cana­
dian economy away from Britain and towards the US in the second half of XIX century 
(Easterbrook and Aitken, 1956, p. 204).
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sumers and employers of the manufacturing sectors. Often, their protection 
extended to colonial producers, who were granted at least a preferential tar­
iff on their exports. Their abolition was a severe blow to both. In the case 
of Canada, the strategic considerations that had warranted the introduction 
of the preferential tariff in 1802 had become increasingly outdated, and the 
tariff was dismantled without exception.
For the Canadians, the tariff was crucial to offset their disadvantage in 
terms of higher transport costs. Its abolition exposed them to the fiercest 
European competition, and, as a consequence, the share of Canadian timber 
in the British market fell dramatically over the following decades (Marr and 
Paterson, 1980, p. 70). From the Canadians’ point of view, this decreased 
the importance of Britain as a trading partner, and had therefore the same 
effect as a sudden relocation of relevant factor endowments outside the British 
Empire.
Thus, the model suggests that the new political climate which pervaded 
British-Canadian relations in the 1840s and culminated in the concession 
of self-government in 1849 could be attribute to the fact that the factor to 
which Canadian trade was attracted were becoming to relocate outside of 
the British Empire -  namely to the US. This undermined the capacity of 
Britain to impose effective trade sanctions against Canada, therefore making 
revolution relative more attractive. Faced with an increased local pressure, 
the British tried to stick to the old colonial system, only to realize that this 
would cost them more, in terms of concessions, that they were willing to pay. 
Self-government was thus conceded as a way for Britain to get free of the 
burden the Canadian colonies had come to represent.
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One possible alternative explanation for the change in British attitude 
towards Canadian independence is that rapid immigration and settlement 
increased the de facto political power of the Canadian masses, up to a point 
in the 1840s when de jure political power had to be surrendered. In fact, 
one major consequence of the timber trade was that immigration boomed 
in 1820-1860, for the high loading capacity of ships on their way back to 
America offered a cheap passage to many European emigrants. It is per­
fectly plausible that immigration may have played a role. Note however that 
there is no necessary correspondence between population growth and polit­
ical independence, as shown by the fact that the United States remained a 
trustful colony during many decades of rapid population growth in the first 
half of 18th century. Also, population growth in Canada was matched by 
high population growth in Britain in the first half of 19th century, so it is 
not clear which way the balance of power should have been altered. Finally, 
historians tend to acknowledge that there was a link between the evolution 
of Canada’s external trade and the coming of responsible government in the 
1840s, even though they have not formalized their intuition. For example, 
Creighton (1937, p. 364) argues that:
To contemporaries, who could best appreciate the interlocking mechanism 
of the old system, the action of Great Britain implied the most inevitable 
break-up of the empire; and they felt the old ties loosen around them with 
both regret and a kind of bitter impatience to be free” (Creighton, 1931, p. 
364).
For all these reasons, I believe that the model presented in Section 3 fits
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rather well the case of Canada. I will now turn to the case of another British 
settler colony, who received responsible government a few years later.
Australia
The colonies of Australia obtained self-government in 1855-1856. Relative 
to Canada, the political process that led to this result was more gradual 
and less traumatic; still, it was pushed by an equally stark contrast over 
the allocation of colonial public money. I argue that one economic factor 
that induced the British to make increasing concessions on these issues, and 
eventually concede self government, was the increased competitiveness of the 
wool textile industry of continental Europe in the 1840s and 1850s. At that 
time, wool was a fundamental source of prosperity for the Australian colonies. 
As the industrial revolution began spreading from Britain to  the continent 
(mainly France) in the 1840s, continental Europe consumed an increasing 
share of the world’s wool in its textile sector. In terms of the model, S 
increased relative to k .
Background and political developments
The most ancient of the British Australian colonies, New South Wales was 
firstly settled in 1787; originally a part of it, Victoria became an indepen­
dent colony in 1851.57 Initially, the two colonies were meant to accommodate 
British convicts; already at the end of 18th century, however, free settlers be­
57As for Canada, I will focus on the two most ancient and economically significant 
colonies.
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gan flowing numerously, and by 1810 they had become a majority of colonial 
society.
The economic history of Australia of the two colonies is easily sum­
marised. Initially, the colonies did not produce any significant export com­
modity; thus, while they were self-sufficient in food, they could only afford to 
import manufactures thanks to the financial help of the mother country. In 
the 1810s, however, the colonists discovered that Merino sheep could adapt 
very well to the Australian climate, and a small trade of wool developed. For 
a fortunate coincidence, this happened when the British demand for wool 
was about to explode.
For centuries, the wool textile industry in Britain had relied on home­
grown wool, supplemented by a little import of special-quality Merino wool 
from Spain. Given the abundance of wool supply in Europe, this pattern had 
required an active protectionist policy by the British government, and until 
early 19th century a high import tariff on raw wool was in place. W ith the 
development of the wool textile industry, however, the pressure to liberalize 
the wool trade intensified, and by the end of the 1810s the protectionist 
system was being dismantled. Given that no region in the empire seemed 
capable to supply enough wool at that time, a preferential system such as the 
one designed for Canada was not on an option; in 1824, therefore, imports 
from all sources were liberalized.58 Over the following year, the combination 
of free trade and industrialization triggered a boom in wool imports.
Where was this wool imported from? Soon after the elimination of the 
tariff, Germany replaced Spain as the main source of supply, and remained
58This was to become the first major step made by Britain towards free trade-in XIX 
century.
161
so throughout the 1830s. Ever since the mid 1820s, however, a significant 
share of supply came from Australia, and in the 1830s the colony became the 
second largest source of British imports.59 Then in the 1840s, the German 
supremacy was displaced: by 1850, the share of Australia was 52 per cent, 
that of Germany 12 per cent; in 1870 these figures were 66 per cent and 2 per 
cent.60 As a consequence, the 1830s and 1840s were years of great prosperity 
for the Australian colonies.
The early political history of Australia is also easy to tell. Between 1787 
and 1823, successive British governors ruled in a  fully autocratic manner. 
Then, in 1823, a type of representative institutions similar to those of many 
other British settler colonies was introduced. The extent to which these 
institutions represented colonial society was initially very limited, as their 
members were all appointed and mostly chosen among British officials. In 
1829, however, the number of seats reserved for locals was increased, and the 
prerogatives of the legislative council substantially widened. Still, far from 
configuring a substantial loss of de jure political power by the British, the 
institutions of 1823/1828 were essentially ’’...intended to legitimize, rather 
than restrict, the governor’s actions” (Me Minn, 1979, p. 21). Among the 
prerogatives retained by the governor, one, control of land revenues, would 
become the main reason for discontent over the following years.
Throughout the 1820s - a time in which the colony did not produce any 
significant wealth that the British could plan on extracting - most of the 
quarrelling in Australian politics was among local factions. Particularly hot
59There, the Merino sheep population grew exponentially after the 1810s: from 0.3 M 
units in 1821, to 2.8 M in 1838 and 13.2 M in 1849 (Shann, 1930).
60significant suppliers were South Africa (12 per cent in 1870) and South America (5 
per cent).
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was the debate on how to share the fiscal burden between the first colo­
nial elite (the so-called exclusivists) and the poorest part of the population 
(the emancipists, mainly former convicts). In the second half of the decade, 
the leaders of the emancipists came to ask for “taxation by representation” 
and “representation by election” as a way to decrease the influence of the 
exclusivists on the legislative council.
In the 1830s, however, the nature of the conflict changed. As the wool 
trade boomed and land revenues became the main source of government 
income, exclusivists and emancipists joined in protesting that Britain should 
surrender control of land revenues to the legislative council, and that the 
latter should be more representative of colonial society. From that moment 
and until the concession of self-government, Australian politics was more 
about this protesting against Britain than anything else. But what was 
exactly the object of discord? Basically, the colonists wanted land revenues 
- the provents of the sale of Crown land and grazing licences - to be not 
too high in the first place, and to be devolved on specific public goods like 
immigration.61 On the contrary, British governors and their superiors at 
the Colonial office considered land revenues as ’’...being held in trust by the 
Crown for the Empire as a whole” (Me Minn, 1979). In practice, throughout 
the 1830s their control was used to impose unwanted expenses upon the 
colonists. In 1834-1842, for example, the British Treasury transferred the 
full cost of jails (still hosting thousands of British convicts) on the colonial 
budget.
As time went by, however, protests became more vehement, and in 1842
61 The colonists wanted immigration as the pastoral boom had led to a labour shortage.
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imports were retained for domestic consumption. In the 1840s things became 
to change: by 1850, around 20 per cent of British imports were re-exported 
to continental Europe. After 1850, a boom in wool consumption by France 
and, later, Germany, increased re-export continuously to represent 40 per 
cent of the total by 1870.
As Britain exported an increasing share of its colonial wool imports to the 
world outside the Empire, the net wool exports from the world outside the 
Empire were falling dramatically. Figure 2 plots this series as a three-year 
moving average. It clearly shows that the world outside the British Empire 
turned from being a large net exporter of wool to being a large net importer 
in the mid 1850s.
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Figure 2.3: Net wool imports, world outside the British Empire, 1820-1870 
Source: Bernard (1958).
It would be nice to have data on national production and consumption
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the British conceded that 50 per cent of land revenues would be officially 
bound to be spent on immigration, and that the legislative council would 
become partially elective. As frictions went on, concessions were made again 
in 1846 and 1848. Eventually, in 1851 the legislative council issued a formal 
’’Declaration, Protest and Remonstrance” where it said that ’’the imperial 
Parliament should not continue to tax the people of the colony” , that all 
’’Offices of trust and emolument, except for the Governorship, should be 
under local patronage” and that ’’plenary power of legislation should be 
exercised by the Colonial Legislature” . Soon after that, ”a revolution in 
colonial office thinking” occurred as the new colonial secretary, Sir Pakington, 
seemed to ” ... have felt tha t resistance to growing colonial pressures might 
ultimately produce more mischief than the abandonment of this interest could 
cause” (McMinn, 1979, p. 50). At the end of 1852, land revenues were 
surrendered, and self-government followed shortly.
Analysis
It is interesting to study how the loss by Britain of de jure political 
power in Australia was matched by the evolution of the British and European 
market for wool.
As explained above, the export of wool from Australia increased rapidly in 
1830-1870. All of this wool was sent to London, where the main international 
market for raw wool was located.
But how much of this wool was retained for consumption in Britain, 
and how much was re-exported? Throughout the 1830s, the British market 
was the only market for the Australians: in 1840, 99 per cent of British wool
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of wool for the period 1830-1870. Unfortunately, these data can be obtained 
(indirectly, through trade data) only for colonial economies that exported 
almost all of their wool production. One major trend that seems to stand out 
in the existing data, however, is the increase in consumption by continental 
Europe and especially France relative to Britain. While Britain was, in the 
first half of the century, “by far the largest consumer of wool” , in 1860-1864 
total consumption of wool in France was 239 M lb against 251 M lb in Britain, 
and these numbers were 319 M lb and 251 M lb by the second half of the 
1860s.
These figures are consistent with one broad trend in the European wool 
textile industry: the catching up of a few countries of continental Europe (and 
especially France) vis-a-vis Britain. In the words of Barnard (1958), “from 
the middle of the century the growth of these Continental industries most 
probably implied an increase in the world demand for raw wool. [...] These 
Continental countries exerted, therefore, a growing force in the international 
raw wool markets” (p. 33). And referring to the catching up of the French 
worsted industry in particular, “the course of technological development [...] 
paralleled that of Britain, though the initial moves occurred a little later. In 
the forties most wool combing was done by hand. At the end of that decade 
machines [...] were beginning to displace handwork, and in the first half of 
the fifties the industry was revolutionized by their wide-scale adoption” (p. 
28).
These discussion points out that, in fact, the endowments to which the 
Australia trade was attracted (the capital of the wool textile industry) were 
relocating, in relative terms, outside of the British Empire. This is likely to
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have increased the bargaining power of the Australian colonists who knew 
that, had they decided to repudiate British authority and had Britain put 
some sort of sanction against them, they would have been able to obtain a 
better access to European markets than ever before. Just like in the case 
of Canada, this increased bargaining power was matched by increasing con­
cessions made by the British, until a point when it made no sense to insist. 
As Me Minn (1979) has pointed out, the decision to concede self-government 
can be seen ”as a corollary of the decision on land” (Me Minn, 1979, p. 50). 
Arguably, after land revenues were surrendered under the new political con­
ditions, controlling public policy in Australia had no economic return for the 
British.
2.5 Conclusions
I have studied how the sustainability of colonial power depends on the struc­
ture of trade between a colony, her colonizer and the rest of the world. Focus­
ing on factor endowments as the economic force which shapes the pattern of 
trade, I have developed a model which links the colonists’ private incentives 
to rebellion to the distribution of world factor endowments. In particular, as 
the factor endowments to which colonial trade is attracted become more con­
centrated outside of the empire, rebellion becomes more appealing. This, in 
turn, reduces the capacity of the colonizer to extract wealth from the colony, 
and increases the likelihood that independence has to be granted.
I have used my model to re-interpret the long-established link between 
the Seven Years War and the American Revolution of 1776: this can be
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better understood by looking at the Seven Years War as a large re-allocation 
of factor endowments (mainly land) from the French to the British Empire, 
making the former a better trading partner for the American colonies. I 
have then studied whether my model can help interpret two of the three big 
episodes of decolonization in modern history: the fall of the Spanish Empire, 
and the advancement of most British settler colonies to self-government in 
19th century. It is traditionally argued that the fall of the Spanish Empire 
was brought about by the invasion of Spain by Napoleon. My model suggests 
that one economic factor which underpinned this causality was the increasing 
concentration of manufacturing capital outside of the Spanish Empire, due to 
the industrial revolution. My model also helps understand the fluctuations in 
the strength of Spanish imperial authority over a much longer period of time 
(1550-1810). As for British settler colonies, I argue that one economic factor 
which induced Britain to concede self-government to Canada and Australia 
was, respectively, the accumulation of timber-processing capital in the United 
States and wool-processing capital in continental Europe.
These findings have important implications for the debate on the eco­
nomic legacy of colonialism. On one hand, my results suggest that some of 
the most successful European economies may have become so because of a 
virtuous circle between colonialism and factor accumulation. As Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2005) have pointed out, the opening of Atlantic trade 
in 16th century affected the countries involved in different ways: while coun­
tries such as Spain and Portugal depleted the wealth of colonial trade in 
public and private consumption, England used it to improve private incen­
tives to capital accumulation. My paper suggests that a more rapid capital
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accumulation in England was, in turn, at the base of her unmatched ca­
pacity as colonizer, and therefore her capacity to keep colonial trade highly 
profitable.
On the other hand, the paper suggests that to understand the actions 
that shaped the economic legacy of colonialism, one should keep in mind that 
colonial investment and capital accumulation may have an adverse effect on 
the profitability and sustainability of colonial power. In fact, by showing 
that a higher complementarity between colonial and imperial factor endow­
ments may boost extraction and make colonial power more persistent, this 
paper provides some new theoretical underpinnings to the argument made 
by dependency theorists (see, for example, Frank, 1971) according to which 
colonizers deliberately hindered capital accumulation in colonies.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to spell out the link 
between factor accumulation, trade, and institutional change in international 
relations. It does so by constructing a model that, because of its simplicity, 
can be generalized and extended. For example, one could write a general 
version of the model where the actual source of comparative advantage is 
not specified: this would broaden the scope for analysis of the sustainability 
of colonial power to changing technology, transport costs, etc. Also, one may 
want to use an extended version of the model to study how equilibrium trade 
policy is influenced by international relations. Finally, one could enrich the 
political model to account for either heterogeneous colonial agents (and the 
possibility that decolonization affects post-independence politics) or interna­
tional investors and their role in inducing governments to decolonize. These, 
and other interesting issues, remain for future research.
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2.6 Appendix
P ro p e r tie s  o f 5* ( k )  - Using equations 2.3 and 2.7, 5* ( k )  is found by solving:
5* (k) =  arg | K  ^ 1  +  0  =  vE K  ^ 1  +  |
1 i  _______________  2
=  - k  +  - V 1 6 k  - f  /c2 + 1 6  -  -
6  6  3
It is easy to see that > 0; let us now show that 5* (k ) < | .  Consider 
the properties of
^  f ;k; +  V k 2 +  1 6 k  +  1 6  — 4^
k  6 k  \  J
It is easy to check that =  \  when k  — 0; furthermore, it is possible to 
check that d ^ & j d K  is negative V/c > 0. ■
Proof of Proposition 1 - In order to keep the exposition simple and 
meaningful, I am only focusing on equilibria in which countries do not make 
unilateral trade attempts. The fact that T# =  0 implies that there are 
only three possible equilibria: {H, - ,E} ,  {H, F, E }  and one equilibrium of 
the type {H , F , E}  in which both H  and F  trade with E.  As both H  and 
F  see autarchy as the worst possible scenario, the equilibrium will depend 
entirely on the preferences of E.  Thus, the equilibrium will be { H, F , E }  
when 6 G (0, §) and {H, - , E}  when 5 G ( f , 2 k )  M
Proof of Proposition 3 - Begin by considering the case of independence. 
To see that {H, F, E}  can be an equilibrium, consider the case where all 
countries trade with all countries. In this case, no individual deviation can
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be profitable (as it can only lead the deviating country into autarchy), nor 
can a 3-country deviation be Pareto improving (one country is always at its 
first best at {H, F, E}).  To see that no 2-country deviation can be Pareto 
improving, notice that any such deviation would make F  worse off if 8 G 
(0, §), H  worse off if 5 G ( f , 2/c). But because p% < pfH}Ey < P{h,f,e} 
first case and pfHFEy < P{ f e }  < Pa in the second case, such deviation would 
also make either H  or E  worse off. To see that no other trade outcome can be 
an equilibrium, distinguish again between two cases. If 5 G ( 0 , «;), {., F, E}  
or {H , . ,E}  cannot be an equilibrium, as both H  and F  would benefit from 
beginning to trade with each other. Next, {H , F, •} cannot be an equilibrium 
either: this is because either F  (if 5 G (0, f ) )  or H  (if S G would
benefit from admitting E  into trade. If 5 G (/c, 2/c), {H, F , .} or { H , . , E}  
cannot be an equilibrium (H  and the excluded country would deviate) nor 
can {.,F, E }  be (either F  or E  and H  would deviate).
Next consider the case of colonialism. In this case, the trade policy game is 
a two-player game between F  and E , where F  maximises pF (T|k, 5) + A(C).  
From Proposition 3, it is clear that this is equivalent to maximising:
$  =  vF [pF (T |k, <5)] +  vH [pH (T|/c, <S)]
To prove that no trade outcome other than {H, F, E}  can be an equilib­
rium, notice, first, that { H , . , E}  and { . ,F,E}  are always dominated by a 
trade outcome that F  can achieve through a unilateral deviation. To see this, 
notice tha t the colonizer can unilaterally deviate from {H ,., E }  ({., F, E }) to 
the first best outcome of H  (F ) and thus increase both vH and vF. This estab­
lishes that { i / , ., E}  and {., F, E }  are always dominated by either {H, F , .} or
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{H,  F, E}  in the preferences of F . Next, {H,  F , .} cannot be an equilibrium 
outcome either. To see this, I show that this outcome is always dominated 
by {H,  F, E }  in the preferences of F.  When the starting point is {H,F, . } ,  
can be rewritten as:
The first derivative of ^  (p) is:
from which it is clear that (p) achieves a global minimum at p =  i f  ( l  +  §). 
Thus, opening up to E  increases whenever S ^  This also establishes that 
{H,  F, E }  is always F ’s first best.62 Finally, it is easy to see tha t {H , F, E}  
can realize in equilibrium. At such an outcome, F  is never willing to deviate 
(as it is at its first best), nor is E  (who, unilaterally, can only deviate to 
autarchy). ■
62If 5 >  2k ,  it may be the case that F ’s first best is { H , E }  (and this is also the trade 
equilibrium). This is because F  and H  are competing for selling the labour intensive good 
in this case, and restricting supply may increase their joint welfare by giving one of the 
two better terms of trade vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Thus, colonialism may be welfare 
improving in this case.
172
Bibliography
[1] Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2001a). ”A Theory of Political 
Transition” , American Economic Review, Vol. 91, 938-963.
[2] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2001b). “Colo­
nial Origins of Comparative Development: an Empirical Investigation” , 
American Economic Review, Vol. 91, pp. 1369-1401.
[3] Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2006). Economic Origins of Dic­
tatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press.
[4] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson (2005). “The 
Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic 
Growth” , in American Economic Review, Vol. 95, pp. 546-579.
[5] Baak, Ben (2004). “British Versus American Interests in Land and the 
War of American Independence” , Journal of European Economic His­
tory, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 519-555.
[6] Barnard, J. A. (1958). The Australian Wool Market 1840-1900, Mel­
bourne University Press.
173
[7] Bjork, Gordon C. (1964). “The Weaning of the American Economy: In­
dependence, Market Changes, and Economic Development” , The Jour­
nal of Economic History, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 541-560.
[8] Conrad, Finkel and Jaenen (1993). History of the Canadian Peoples -  
Beginnings to 1867, Toronto, Copp Clark Pitman Ltd.
[9] Creighton, D. G (1937). The Commercial Empire of the St Lawrence, 
1760-1850, Toronto, the Ryerson Press.
[10] Creighton, D. G (1966). Dominion of the North: a History of Canada, 
Toronto, the Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd.
[11] Davis, Ralph (1954) “English Foreign Trade, 1660-1700” , in Economic 
History Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 150-166.
[12] Davis, Ralph (1962) “English Foreign Trade, 1700-1774” , in Economic 
History Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 285-303.
[13] Davis, Ralph (1979). The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas 
Trade, Leicester University Press.
[14] Dixit, Avinash and Victor Norman (1980). Theory of International 
Trade, Cambridge University Press.
[15] Dos Santos, Theotonio (1970). “The Structure of Dependence” , Ameri­
can Economic Review, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 231-236.
[16] Easterbrook, W. T. and Hugh G. J. Aitken (1956). Canadian Economic 
History, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd.
174
[17] Eccles, William J. (1972). France in America, New York, Harper and 
Row.
[18] Eliott, John E. (1961). “The Decline of Spain” , in Past and Present, No. 
20, pp. 52-75.
[19] Fisher, John (1981). “Imperial Free Trade and the Spanish Economy, 
1778-1796” , in Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 
21-56.
[20] Fisher, John R. (1998). “Commerce and Imperial Decline: Spanish 
Trade with Spanish America, 1797-1820” , in Journal of Latin Ameri­
can Studies, Vol. 30, pp. 459-479.
[21] Flynn, Dennis O. (1982). “Fiscal Crisis and the Decline of Spain 
(Castile)” , in Journal of Economic History, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 139-147.
[22] Frank, Andre G. (1971). Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America -  Historical studies of Chile and Brazil, Penguin Books.
[23] Furtado, Celso (1976). Economic Development of Latin America, Cam­
bridge, Cambridge University Press.
[24] Garcia-Baquero Gonzales, Antonio (1976). Cadiz y el Atlantico, 1717- 
1778, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 2 vols.
[25] Gipson, Lawrence H. (1950). “The American Revolution as an After- 
math of the Great War for the Empire, 1754-1763” in Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 86-104.
175
[26] Gould, Clarence P. (1939). Trade Between the Windward Islands and the 
Continental Colonies of the French Empire, 1683-1763, The Missisippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 473-490.
[27] Grafe, Regina and Maria Alejandra Irigoin (2006). “The Spanish Em­
pire and its Legacy: Fiscal Redistribution and Political Conflict in Colo­
nial and Post-Colonial Spanish America” , in Journal of Global History 
(2006), No. 1, pp. 241-267.
[28] Grimal, Henri (1978). Decolonization: the British, French, Dutch and 
Belgian Empires, London, Routledge.
[29] Grossman, Herschel I. (1991). “A General Equilibrium Model of Insur­
rections” , American Economic Review, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 912-921.
[30] Grossman, Herschel I. and Murat F. Iyigun (1995). “Extralegal Appro­
priation and the Profitability of Colonial Investment” , Economics and 
Politics, Vol. 7, pp. 229-241.
[31] Grossman, Herschel I. and Murat Iyigun (1997). ’’Population Increase 
and the End of Colonialism,” Economica, Vol. 64 (3), pp. 483-493.
[32] Hamilton, Earl J. (1937). “The Decline of Spain” , in Economic History 
Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 168-179.
[33] Holland, Robert F. (1985). European Decolonization, 1918-1981: an In­
troductory Survey, London, Macmillan.
[34] Hutson, James H. (1980). John Adams and the Diplomacy of the Amer­
ican Revolution, Kentucky (US), University of Kentucky Press.
176
[35] Jack, William and Roger Lagunoff (2006). ’’Dynamic Enfranchisement” , 
forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics.
[36] ensen, Merrill (1969). “The American Revolution and American Agri­
culture” , in Agricultural History, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 107-124.
[37] Jillson, Calvin and R. K. Wilson (1994). Congressional Dynamics: 
Structure, Co-ordination and Choice in the First American Congress, 
1774-1789, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
[38] Kamen, Henry (1978). “The Decline of Spain: an Historical Myth?” in 
Past and Present, No. 81, p. 25.
[39] Kaufmann, William W. (1951). British Policy and the Independence of 
Latin America, 1804-1828, New Haven, Yale University Press.
[40] La Force, J. Clayburn (1964). “Technological Diffusion in the 18th Cen­
tury: the Spanish Textile Industry” in Technology and Culture, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, pp. 322-343.
[41] La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R.W. Vishny (1999) 
’’The Quality of Government” , Journal of Law, Economics and Organi­
zation, Vol. 15, pp. 222-279.
[42] Lower, A. R. M., W. A. Carrothers and S. A. Saunders (1938). The North 
American Assault on the Canadian Forest: a History of th Lumber trade 
between Canada and the United States, Toronto, the Ryerson Press.
[43] Lynch, John (1965-1969). Spain under the Habsburgs, 2 Vols., Blackwell.
177
[44] Lynch, John (1973). The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826, 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
[45] Lynch, John (1992). “The Institutional Framework of Colonial Spanish 
America” , in Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 69-81.
[46] Marr, William L. and Donald G. Paterson (1980). Canada: an Economic 
History, Gage Publishing Limited.
[47] MacKusker, John J. (1970). “The Rum Trade and the Balance of Pay­
ments of the Thirteen Continental Colonies, 1650-1775” , The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 244-247.
[48] McMinn, Winston G. (1979). A Constitutional History of Australia, Mel­
bourne, Oxford University Press.
[49] McIntyre, David (1977). Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Im ­
pact, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
[50] Mosley, Paul (1983). The Settlers Economies -  Studies in the economic 
history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia 1900-1963, Cambridge Univer­
sity Press.
[51] Nash, R. C. (1992). “South Carolina and the Atlantic Economy in the 
Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” , The Economic History 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 677-702.
[52] Ostrander, Gilman M. (1956). “The Colonial Molasses Trade” , Agricul­
tural History, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 77-84.
178
[53] Pitkin, Timothy (1835). A Statistical View of the Commerce of the 
United States of America, New Haven.
[54] Roemer, John E. (1985). ’’Rationalizing Revolutionary Ideology” , 
Econometrica, Vol. 53, pp. 85-108.
[55] Shann, Edward (1930). An Economic History of Australia, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
[56] Schlesinger, Arthus M. (1919). The Colonial Merchants and the Ameri­
can Revolution, 1763-1776, New York, Atheneum.
[57] Schuler, Robert L. (1945). The Fall of the Old Colonial System -  a Study 
in British Free Trade, 1770-1870, Oxford University Press.
[58] Schumpeter, Elisabeth (1960). English Overseas Trade Statistics, Ox­
ford, Clarendon Press.
[59] TePaske, John J. and Herbert S. Klein (1981). “The Seventeenth- 
Century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?” Past and Present, 
No. 90, pp. 116-135.
[60] TePaske, John J. (1983). “New World silver, Castile, and the Philip­
pines, 1590-1800” , in John F. Richards, Ed., Precious metals in the later 
medieval and early modem worlds, Durham (NC), Carolina Academic 
Press.
[61] Thomas, Robert Paul (1965). “A Quantitative Approach to the Study 
of the Effects of British Imperial Policy Upon Colonial Welfare: Some
179
Preliminary Findings” , The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 25, No. 
4, pp. 615-638.
[62] Walker, Geoffrey J. (1979). Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700- 
1789, Mac Millan Press.
[63] Wilson, Charles (1960). “Cloth Production and International Competi­
tion in the Seventeenth Century” , in Economic History Review, Vol. 13, 
No. 2, pp. 209-221.
180
181
Chapter 3 
Foreign Influence and the  
International Trade in Natural 
Resources
Anecdotal evidence suggests that diplomacy plays an important role in the 
allocation of oil and other exhaustible resource contracts in developing coun­
tries. I present an economic model of energy security that rationalizes the 
role of governments in facilitating the expansion of national resource FDIs. 
I begin by showing that the control of a large number of overseas contracts 
may allow a country to distort the terms of trade to its advantage, and that 
this may be optimal when prices are high, despite the fact that it depresses 
the value of the contracts themselves. Because the benefits of such distortion 
are not captured by overseas investors, there is a role for governments to 
facilitate the expansion of national oil companies to the nationally optimal 
level. I then argue that natural resource contracts are long-term in nature,
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making a myopic resource-rich government potentially willing to exchange 
current transfers for a clientelistic allocation of contracts. The combination 
of these two elements creates the scope for a natural resource diplomacy: this 
can be offensive (when it aims to make national resource hoarding possible) 
or simply defensive (when it is concerned with avoiding resource hoarding 
by other countries). I study the impact of diplomatic competition on the 
pattern of FDI, trade and welfare.
3.1 Introduction
It is commonly accepted in the security studies literature that governments 
of resource-scarce countries have a key responsibility in ensuring tha t the 
pattern of resource FDI and trade is favorable to the home country. For 
example, Klare (2008, p. 487) argues that ’’for the USA, as for other indus­
trialized states tha t rely on imported supplies of energy, energy security thus 
entails a conspicuous foreign policy dimension, in that a principal objective 
of its overseas diplomacy is to establish and sustain friendly ties with key 
providers of oil, gas and other fuels, thereby facilitating the procurement of 
these fuels by companies linked to the home country” . That diplomacy is 
at the heart of the natural resource trade is confirmed by the literature on 
the history of the oil industry. This is often described as having been shaped 
by competition between governments as much as by competition between 
companies (e.g. Turner, 1983; Venn, 1986). In recent years, this view has 
been corroborated by studies of the expansion of government-backed Chinese 
resource investments to Africa (e.g. Taylor, 2005), and of the implications of
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this for US energy security.
In economics, we do not have theories of how diplomacy - intended as 
inter-governmental lobbying - may affect the pattern of FDI and trade. For 
the specific case of natural resources, this prevents us from answering a num­
ber of important questions: 1) Is there an economic rationale for government 
intervention, and under what conditions? 2) Can this be linked to some 
specific concept of energy security? 3) How is diplomacy likely to affect the 
pattern of resource FDI and trade? 4) And what are the welfare consequences 
of this?
In this paper, I build a model of the international oil trade that gives a 
possible answer to these questions. The model is composed of three building 
blocks. The first is a simple three-country model of the oil trade, where two 
oil-scarce countries compete to obtain a discriminatory trade agreement with 
a oil-abundant country. Because the latter benefits from the highest possible 
price of oil, however, trade policy is always non discriminatory when it is set 
to maximise its national welfare.
The second building block is a model of the production of oil. I assume 
that for oil to become fully usable, an upfront investment is needed. In the oil 
abundant country, this investment can be outsourced to foreign companies, 
who are then also responsible for buying the oil. While enforceable contracts 
on future oil transactions cannot be written, buyers who have made the initial 
investment retain the power to destroy some share of production. Thus, 
the final price that they pay is the result of a bargaining between them 
and the sellers. The key element here is tha t buyers from a given country 
remain subject to their government’s trade policy, which may then be used
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to influence the result of the bargaining.
The third building block is a model of oil diplomacy, where the two oil­
scarce governments lobby the oil-abundant government to  obtain a preferen­
tial treatment in the initial allocation of oil contracts. Because oil contracts 
are long-term, a myopic oil-abundant government may be willing to exchange 
current transfers for a suboptimal allocation of contracts.
The main results of the paper are as follows. First, parent governments 
who “hold” enough many overseas resource contracts may find it optimal 
to impose trade restrictions on their overseas investors. This results in a 
reduction in the amount of resources available for general trade, creating 
a security issue for other consumer countries. Second, because investors 
bear only the cost of trade restrictions, their overseas expansion is less than 
socially optimal: this creates a rationale for a resource diplomacy. When 
contracts are long-term, myopic resource-rich governments may be willing 
to exchange current transfers for a favorable allocation of contracts. Thus, 
diplomacy may have two roles: it may be ’’offensive” (when it succeeds in 
distorting the allocation of contracts in favor of the country who exerts it) 
or ’’defensive” (when it purely avoids that the allocation is distorted in favor 
of some other country). I show that foreign influence has opposite welfare 
implications in the two cases, and that international co-ordination away from 
defensive diplomacy can be Pareto improving.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. The main tension 
in the trade model is related to the concepts of trade creation and trade 
diversion investigated by the literature on preferential trade agreement (see 
Baldwin and Venables, 2004, for an excellent review of this literature). The
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lobbying model uses the concept of truthful Nash equilibria, first developed 
by Bernheim and Whinston (1987) and commonly used in the literature on 
the political economy of trade policy since the seminal paper by Grossman 
and Helpman (1994). A subset of the latter literature has investigated the 
impact of foreign lobbying on trade patterns: see in particular Hillman and 
Ursprung (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1995), Endoh (2005), and Antras 
and Padro (2009). My main point of departure from this group of papers is 
that I consider lobbying by governments rather than by the private sector, 
that I allow for competition between lobbyists from different countries, and 
that I focus on the natural resource industry. Another related paper is Bueno 
de Mesquita and Smith (2008), who study how political institutions affect a 
generic aid-for-policy exchange between a donor and recipient government. 
My paper differs from this in that I focus on trade policy in particular, and I 
consider the interaction between two competing donors. Finally, the paper is 
related to a recent empirical literature on the impact of diplomacy on trade 
patterns (e.g. Gil-Pareja et Alii, 2005a, 2005b).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an introduction to 
the international oil industry and trade, laying the ground for my modeling 
choices. Subsections 3.1-3.3 introduce the three building blocks of the model. 
Section 4 derives the equilibrium, and outlines the results. Section 5 discusses 
the limitations of my approach, and proposes a few extensions. Section 6 
concludes.
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3.2 Structure of the international oil market 
and oil diplomacy
Most of the oil produced by developing countries is exported in the form of 
crude oil.1 For example, among the top ten net exporters of oil outside the 
OECD, the share of crude oil processed abroad in 2006 ranged from 59% in 
Venezuela to 96% in Angola.2 Crude oil is traded in two ways. First, a few 
varieties of crude are traded in the form of standardized contracts, and priced 
anonymously on centralized exchanges (Brent in London, West Texas Inter­
mediate in New York, and Dubai Crude in Dubai). Second, all other varieties 
(there are 161 overall) are traded in Over The Counter (OTC) transactions 
between specific buyers and sellers. While the price that is realized in OTC 
transactions is normally linked to one of the centralized prices, OTC prices 
are, in principle, specific to each transaction. OTC transactions accounts for 
most of the spot trade in crude oil. In fact, centralized exchanges are mostly 
used to hedge against fluctuations in the centralized spot price (and therefore 
in OTC prices).
OTC contracts between multinationals and oil-exporting countries fall 
into two broad categories. On one hand, some of them are pure sales con­
tracts, whereby a local oil company is solely responsible for extracting the 
crude. Often, these contracts are long-term, and require the installation of 
specific refining capacity in the country of destination. On the other hand, 
the multinationals are often involved in production as well. In this case,
1 While I talk about oil from now on, my argument could be extended to a number of 
other mineral and metal resources.
2Source: International Energy Agency’s website.
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the parties write more complicated contracts, whereby the buyer takes on 
responsibility for exploring, developing and managing the oil field, as well as 
for refining and marketing the crude.
Particularly in the second type of contract, buyers may be responsible for 
developing a factor that is needed for make the oil usable. To the extent that 
this factor essential, non appropriable and not promptly substitutable, this 
may give the buyer some bargaining power over the seller should this want 
to renegotiate the contract at a later stage. For example, it may be hard 
for a seller to find another counterpart with the installed refining capacity 
needed to market its full production. Or, once a foreign company develops 
a specific knowledge of an oil field or a specific know how, this may be 
costly to substitute. Thus, by entering into an oil contract where the buyer 
has responsibilities in the production of the final product, a seller is tying 
himself up to  some extent.
While many of the most successful multinational oil companies are pri­
vate or semi-private, the allocation of oil contracts in the developing world 
seems to be shaped no less by intergovernmental politics than by market 
competition. Many historical accounts of the evolution of the oil industry 
in the 20th century describe the first 65 years of this as a series of govern­
ment competition for securing rich concessions for their companies in Asia, 
the Middle East and Latin America (see, for example, Turner, 1983; Venn, 
1986). After a period where this inter-governmental competition was over­
shadowed by the creation of OPEC and the nationalization of most Western 
concessions in the 1970s, the 1990s and early 2000s have witnessed a renewed 
level of competition prompted by the rise of China and its attem pt to tap
188
old, as well as new (mostly in Africa and Central Asia), sources of oil (Taylor, 
2005).
3.3 M odel
3.3.1 A  three-country trade m odel
Consider a world where two tradable inputs, oil and another input (say ma­
chines), are used in the production of a final good. I denote oil by x , the 
other input by y, and the final good by 2 . The production function is:
All agents who populate this world have linear utility in the consumption 
of z. For simplicity, the two inputs are not produced but simply exist as 
endowments, and are fully tradable. The final good may be tradable as well, 
but trade is ruled out by the fact that technology is the same across countries.
The world is made up of three countries, H , A  and B. I choose endow­
ments so that H  is always a net oil exporter, while A  and B  are net importers. 
In particular, H  has a unit endowment of both inputs, while A  and B  have 
a unit endowment of oil but endowments of the other input (yA and yB) 
greater than unity and not too dissimilar from each other (I will soon clarify 
the exact conditions needed for both of these countries to be net importers 
of oil).
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Take y to  be the numeraire and denote the autarchy price of oil in country 
H  by 7r. At this country’s autarchy equilibrium, producers set their MRTS 
equal to the price ratio 7r. Because the MRTS is simply J , input market 
clearing then requires that:
7T =  1
That is, oil has unit cost in i / ’s autarchy equilibrium. It is also easy to 
work out i / ’s autarchy price of the final good at 7rz = 2(tt)^ =  2.
Denote by irA and irB the autarchy price of oil in A  and B.  Using the 
same logic as in the case of i / ,  it is straightforward to show that:
I consider three possible trade regimes: free trade between H  and A  (and 
B  in autarchy), free trade between H  and B  (and A  in autarchy), and free 
trade between all countries. Denote by pA (pB) the price of oil that is realized 
within H  and A  (B ) in the first (second) case, and by pAB the single world 
price in the third case. Within any of the possible free trade areas, producers 
face the same prices of inputs. Thus, the MRTS must be the same anywhere,
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and it must then equal the relative endowments within the specific free trade 
area. This implies that trade prices can be calculated similarly to autarchy 
prices:
a  1 + 2T 
p =  —
l + yB 
2
p A B  =
PB =
(3.1)
(3.2)
(3.3)
where Y  = yA +  yB- I now impose necessary and sufficient condition for 
A  and B  to be net oil importers whatever trade regime they belong to (if 
any). These are:
yA, yB > 1
yA,yB € [y{Y),y(Y)\
where y(Y)  = and y(Y)  = The first condition requires that
A  and B  are oil-scarce enough. This is necessary and sufficient for them to 
be net importers when they trade with H  alone, as they have then a higher 
autarchy price than H.  The second condition requires that A  and B  are
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y_00 y/2 yOO
yA -  yo
pA!
♦
Figure 3.1: Possible values of yA and yB
e A =
_
yA - y  
y - y  
yB - y  
y - y
Clearly, 6A +  6B =  1. At the same time, the higher is 0J the more 
important is country J  as a net importer, with 6J = 0, 1 capturing the three
special cases where J  is not a net importer, is a net importer as important 
as -J, and is the only net importer. My main comparative statics for what 
concerns the structure of the endowments will consist in moving Y  (and, 
therefore, the price of oil) and 0A.
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not too different from each other. Together with the first condition, this 
condition is necessary and sufficient for A  and B  to be both net importers 
when they both trade with H.  Notice that y(Y)  = pAB: thus, the condition 
is requiring that both A  and B  have an autarchy price that is higher than 
the trade price they face when they both trade with H. The upper bound 
y(Y)  then comes from the fact that, for Y  constant, an excessively high yJ 
would imply a y~J below the threshold y(Y)
How high is yA (yB) in the range [y(Y),y(Y)\  is a measure of how rela­
tively important is A  (B) as a net importer of oil. This is illustrated in Figure 
1. The case where yA =  yB is illustrated in the first line. In this case, A  and 
B  are identical, and are therfore also equally important as net oil importers. 
The second line considers the case where yA is a t the minimum threshold, 
while yB is at the maximum. In this case, A  is effectively self-sufficient in oil, 
while all oil imports in the world go to B.  To see this, notice that tta = pB 
(the latter is always halfway between 1 and yB, see above). In words, A  has 
the same price in autarchy as the other two countries do when they trade: 
not surprisingly, yl’s contribution to world trade will then be zero. Finally, 
the third line illustrates the case where yA is greater than yB. In this case, 
A  is more important as a net importer than B.  If yA was increased to reach 
y(Y) ,  then the situation in the second line would be reversed and A  would 
be the only net importer.
The relative importance of A  and B  as net importers of oil can be effec­
tively captured through a normalization. Define:
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The total utility of country J  (J  = H ,A ,B )  when faced with a trade 
price p can be measured as the value of its endowments, divided by the cost 
of the consumption good:
=  e + v
2 (p)i
from which we can derive autarchy utility at It is
shown in the Appendix that the function W J(p) reaches a global minimum 
at p = 7rJ (implying that there are gains from trade) and is monotonically 
increasing (decreasing) in p when p > irJ (p < ttj ). This is something that 
we would have expected, as it is always best for a net exporter (importer) to 
obtain the highest (lowest) possible price for its export (imports).
Because both A  and B  are net importers, it is always pA,pB < pAB. This, 
together with the properties of W J, establishes that the total welfare of H  
is maximum when it trades with both A  and B , while the total welfare of A  
(B) is maximum when it trades with H  alone.
3.3.2 Equilibrium  trade policy
Suppose that all countries are governed by utilitarian planners. These have
only one policy tool at this stage: they can choose whether their country
is open or not to trade with each of the other two countries.3 For trade to
3 One obvious limitation of this approach is that I am not considering the role of optimal 
tariffs. These would certainly play a role in this model where countries have market power. 
To model a continuous trade policy would greatly complicate the model, however, and not 
qualitatively affect the results of the paper. I thus keep this possible extension for future
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realize between any two countries, both governments must agree to be open 
to each other. Suppose that the first mover is the government of H  (from 
now on, simply H), followed by a simultaneous move by the government of 
A  and B  (from now on, simply A  and B ). First, notice that H  will never 
choose to close down to both A  and B, as then autarchy is the only possible 
outcome. But could it consider to closing down to one of the two only?
To answer this question, notice that whenever H  closes down to, say, B, 
A  finds it optimal to close down to B  (and to it only) as well. This follows 
promptly from our discussion, as the decision to close down to B  gives A  the 
price that maximizes its welfare. However it is useful to provide an intuition 
for why, once A’s agents are allowed to purchase the oil from H  at a price 
pA, they should not be allowed to resell it to B  at a price ttb > pA. The 
intuition for this is simple. Because of perfect competition in intermediation, 
any price spread would be closed and a single price pAB would immediately 
realize if A  did not close down to B. Thus, the only agents in A  who would 
benefit from this are the owners of A’s oil, but we know that this gain is 
more than outweighed by the loss to the owners of the other input.
Thus, because it can be expected that closing down to B  (A) results in 
H  trading with A  (B) only, and because H ’s favorite regime is to trade with 
both, it is always optimal for H  to remain open to both countries.
These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  1 I f  H  closes down trade to B  (A), for any 0A it is optimal 
for A  (B) to close down to B  (A). Thus, H  never closes down to either 
research.
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country.
So far I have assumed that the national endowments of oil are fully owned 
by national agents. While this is true in most parts of the world, oil com­
panies from industrialized countries often have an important role in making 
the oil of developing countries fully available for consumption. As discussed 
in Section 2, this may give oil companies control over some share of the oil, 
and at the same time link their profit to those of producers. In the next 
section, I model the oil industry more explicitly to take into account these 
two factors.
3.3.3 Long-term  contracts
I now assume that each country’s endowment of oil is divided into n  ’’oil 
fields” , each of which owned by a separate oil company. Thus, all fields 
have size J  wherever located. I assume that n > 2 and that oil companies 
compete on price. This is sufficient to ensure that the equilibrium remains 
competitive.
For any oil field to generate oil that is usable in production, an upfront 
investment is needed: on each field, this costs c units of the final good. While 
investments in A  and B  are made directly by the company who owns the oil, 
companies in H  may decide whether to do the investment by themselves or 
to outsource it to a company from A or B. Once the investment is made, 
the oil become fully usable at no additional cost.4 If the investment has been
4Thus, c includes the all fixed cost from transporting and refining the crude. After this 
investment is done, I assume (for simplicity) that the marginal cost of marketing this oil 
is zero.
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outsourced, the contractor is responsible for buying and marketing the oil5; 
otherwise, the oil is marketed directly by the company who owns it.
While it is not possible to write enforceable long-term contracts on the 
future price tha t a buyer will pay for the oil, the price that a contractor will 
pay is determined by a bargaining between it and the outsourcer after the 
investment is made. My key assumption here is that the investment made 
by the contractor (which is essential for production), is only imperfectly 
appropriable by the outsourcer, and costly to replace. I capture this by 
assuming that the contractor has the power to destroy a share £ of production.
Thus, before any international trade takes place, the oil industry develops 
as follows:
1. Oil companies in H  decide whether to do the initial investment in house 
or to outsource it;
2. Investments are made;
3. Where there has been no outsourcing, the oil is taken to the market by 
its owner. Otherwise, the outsourcer and the contractor bargain a la 
Nash over the price that the latter should pay. If there is agreement, the 
oil is taken to the market by the contractor. If there is no agreement, 
a share 1 — £ of the oil is taken to the market by the outsourcer.
Consider the case with outsourcing. In period 3, the two parties bargain 
a la Nash, and they have the same bargaining power. Then, assuming that 
the expected value of a barrel of oil is pAB,6 agreement is always reached and
51 could equivalently assume that the oil is sold to a third party.
Expectations will always be rational in equilibrium, please see below
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the price (per barrel) that the contractor ends up paying to the outsourcer 
is:
p A B  =  p A B { l  _
reflecting the fact that the market value of a barrel of oil is pAB, and that 
the contractor effectively owns |  of it.7
Thus, an oil contract is valuable to a potential contractor in that it gives 
some bargaining power vis-a-vis the outsourcer in period 3. This bargaining 
power is worth \p AB. Because the number of interested contractors (2n) 
always exceeds the number of available contracts (n at a maximum), the 
price that a contractor pays for entering into a contract is:
v a b  =  ± a b _ c  
2 n
which, depending on c, could be either positive or negative.8 Thus, the 
total value of an oil field is \ p AB — c, and this is the also the profit of the 
owner of the field independently on whether it outsources or not. However 
by outsourcing, the owner can anticipate ^ pAB of the value of the field to 
period 1 (there is no inter-temporal discounting for simplicity).
7I am also assuming (for simplicity) that there the contractor’s investment does not 
have a value outside the relationship.
8For simplicity I assume that c < n, so that no oil is ever left under the ground.
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Because of perfect competition, and because the same investment tech­
nology is available to all agents in all countries, the net value of entering into 
a long-term oil contract is zero both for the outsourcer and for the contrac­
tor. Thus, the equilibrium allocation of oil contracts is indeterminate in this 
world. In the next section, however, I show that the allocation of contracts 
may have significant consequences for equilibrium trade policy. This will 
motivate the governments of A  and B  into lobbying the government of H  to 
obtain a large enough number of oil contracts for their national companies.
3.3.4 Oil diplom acy
In this section, I add two final elements to the model. These add some addi­
tional asymmetry in the way in which I model the government of H, on one 
hand, and the government of A  and B,  on the other. First, I introduce new 
policy tools. In particular, I assume that H  may also force its companies to 
a given allocation of oil contracts, while A  and B  can offer conditional trans­
fers of the final good to H, to induce it to choosing their favorite allocation 
of contracts. Second, I assume that H  is always open to trade with both A  
and B , but as in my baseline trade model governments may decide whether 
their country is open or not to trade with each of the other two countries, 
but this decision is now made for a given allocation of oil contracts.
The timing of the overall game is:
1.1 A  and B  make transfer offers to H, conditional on the allocation of oil 
contracts;
1.2 H  chooses an allocation of contracts;
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1.3 Investments are made.
2.1 H  always lets its agents free to trade with both A  and B.  Instead, A  
(B ) decides whether its agents can trade with B  (A);
2.2 Bargaining between outsourcers and contractors takes place;
2.3 All usable oil is traded.
Notice that, by ruling that its agents cannot trade with B, A  creates a 
tension within each oil contract owned by its overseas oil company. This is 
because while the outsourcer is not constrained by any government restric­
tions (H  never closes down to either A  nor B), the contractor now is. The 
outcome of this tension for the bargaining is key to my results.
3.4 Equilibrium & Welfare
To find an equilibrium of this game implies answering to three key questions. 
First, when is it optimal for A  (B) to close down to B  (A), for a given allo­
cation of contracts and considering the consequence of such decision for the 
bargaining between outsourcers and contractors? Next, how is the allocation 
of contracts optimally chosen by H, and in exchange for which transfers? 
And finally, what are the welfare consequences of this? Sections 4.1, 4.2 and
4.3 address these questions in turn. To simplify the notation, I will develop 
my argument for country A, bearing in mind that the case of country B  is 
just symmetric.
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3.4.1 Oil contracts and optim al trade policy
We have seen in Section 3.1 that A  always prefers to trade with H  only, as 
this gives this oil importer a lower price of oil. In tha t section, however, 
A  had little hope to obtain this trade outcome, as H  would always let its 
companies free to trade with whoever they wanted and thus equalize the 
price in A  and B  to  pAB.
W ith a share of H ’s oil in the hands of A’s companies, A  may now hope 
to be able to affect the final trade outcome by imposing its companies not to 
trade with B. The welfare consequences of such a move are all to be worked 
out, however. On one hand, a trade restriction imposed on the companies 
will affect the outcome of their bargaining with the outsourcer: in some 
cases, this may well result in A’s company being all kicked out. On the other 
hand, A’s companies are now stakeholders in i f ’s oil: this makes any trade 
restriction more expensive for A, as such restriction would depress the value 
of both its domestic and overseas oil investments.
To illustrate the optimal decision by A, consider the case where all trade 
contracts have gone to contractors from A. For simplicity, I now assume that 
n is large enough, so that none of the companies can influence prices with its 
decision.
Imagine that A  forbids (subject to a large penalty) its companies to trade 
with B. Is it an equilibrium that all outsourcers accept this trade restriction, 
and H's oil goes to H  only? And if yes, what price do the outsourcers receive? 
To answer the first question, notice that the value of an oil field when all 
outsourcers accept the trade restriction is ^pA. This must be weighed against 
the value of the field when the outsourcer decides to break the contract, and
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market the oil by itself. Thus, it is an equilibrium that all outsourcers accept 
the trade restriction imposed by A  if and only if:
V>(l-oV (3.4)
n n
Whenever the above condition is satisfied, A  may obtain exclusive trade 
without having any of its companies kicked out. The price per barrel tha t 
outsourcers receive will then be:
A  A  P A  ~  (! “
P o = P ----------- 2----------
Having derived conditions such that A  can restrict trade, I now turn to 
considering when will this be the optimal thing to do. While we know that 
W A(pA) — W A(pAB) > 0 for all 6A, the condition that needs to be satisfied 
now is more stringent:
W A(pA) -  W A(pAB) -  -  PA~ \ -— B~ a )  >  0 (3-5)
Thus, while the exclusion of B  from trade was unambiguously optimal in the 
world with no long-term contracts, this is now only true under more stringent 
conditions. The intuition for this is simple. One one hand, A’s citizens now
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own some additional quantity of oil ( |  for each contracts they hold), making 
A’s preferences closer to that of a net exporter of oil. On the other hand, to 
exclude B  from trade increases the value of the outside option available to 
outsourcers for any £, therefore decreasing A’s companies bargaining power.
Before proceeding, I impose the following parametric restriction:
A ssum ption  1: £ =  1
Assumption 1 yields two strictly related simplifications. First, it washes 
out the just-mentioned effect of excluding B  on bargaining. Second, it rules 
out the possibility of disagreement (condition (3.4) is always satisfied). While 
these are clearly drastic simplifications, Assumption 1 is needed in order to 
obtain closed-form solutions. However, numerical simulations show that the 
main results of the model still go through if £ <  1, as long as £ is not too 
low.9
Under Assumption 1, it is shown in the Appendix that:
L em m a 1 Suppose that all oil contracts have gone to country J  = A, B. 
Then, there exist a threshold 0 G [ | , 1] such that, if  0J > 9, J  fs first best 
is achieved when — J  is excluded from trade. Such threshold is strictly lower 
than 1 iff Y  is high enough. In this case, it is also strictly decreasing in Y ,  
converging to |  as Y  goes to infinity.
9 Even a very low £ would leave scope for successfully imposing trade restrictions in a 
more general model with continuous, rather than discrete, trade policy. In such a model, 
A could choose from a continuum of prices in A and B  (say \pA,pB]) between the two 
extremes \pAB,pAB] and \pA, r B]. I keep this generalization for future research.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of Lemma l
Each panel represents W A(pA)—W A(pAB) (top line) and W A(pA) — W A(pAB)+-^xB- — ^ x
(bottom line) as a function of 0A. Panel (a): Y  =  3; Panel (b): Y  =  6; Panel (c): Y  =  9.
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According to Lemma 1, when A  is important enough as an importer of 
oil (9A > 9) it may still benefit from excluding B  from trade even if all of 
H ’s contracts are controlled by its companies. The condition 9A > 9 becomes 
less stringent as the total demand for oil imports increases (Y  increases), and 
boils down to the requirement that A  be more important as a net importer 
than B  (9 > \)  as demand becomes infinitely large. Figure 2 plots A’s gain 
from excluding B  (the LHS of condition 3.5) as a function of 0A. The top 
line represents the gain when A  controls none of the oil in H , that is the 
case we considered in section 3.1. When A  controls all the contracts in H  
and £ =  1, the gain from excluding B  is always negative if Y  is low; however 
it can be positive if Y  and 9A are high enough, and the critical threshold is 
decreasing in Y.
Lemma 1 has an intuitive explanation. In section 3.1, A’s demand for 
oil was larger than its oil endowment by construction: thus, its preferences 
were those of a net importer (preferring pA to pAB) for any possible value 
of 0A. Controlling one half of LTs oil makes A  relatively more oil abundant. 
When its demand for oil is low {9A < 0), this extended endowment will be 
more than enough for its own consumption, and its preferences will now be 
those of a net exporter (thus preferring pAB to pA). When its demand is 
high (9A ^  —) j however, 4^ may still wish to consume more than its extended 
endowment, therefore retaining the preferences of a net importer. Because 
demand in A  is an increasing function of total demand and the share of A , 
Lemma 1 finds that the minimum share for A  to retain the preferences of a 
net importer is decreasing in total demand.
But what happens when A  is allocated less than the totality of contracts?
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For simplicity, I now want to restrict the possible allocations to a few repre­
sentative ones. Beside the case where all contracts go to either A  and B, I 
allow for the case where A  (B) gets exactly 8A (8B) of the contracts.10 De­
note allocations by F  G f A, f B, f AB} where f J denotes the allocation where 
all contracts go to country J , and f AB the one where each J  receives exactly 
a share 8J. Then, it is shown in the Appendix that:
P ro p o sitio n  2 I f  F  = f AB or F  = f J and 8J < 8, the equilibrium price 
is pAB everywhere independently on any trade restriction imposed by A  and 
B  in period 2.1. I f  F  = f J and 8J > 8, instead, the equilibrium price is pA 
in A  and H, irB in B.
Following straight from our discussion, Proposition 2 finds that when all 
oil contracts go to country J  and this has relatively high oil imports, trade 
is restricted to J  and H, and — J  falls into autarchy. For all other cases, 
the proposition finds that the world is fully integrated, and all countries can 
buy the oil at the free trade price pAB. This latter result has an intuitive 
explanation. Clearly, when F  = f J and 6J < 8, the free trade price must 
realize, as J  imposes no restrictions on its agents. When F  = f AB, the two 
oil importing countries are awarded a number of contracts that is exactly 
proportional to their oil imports under free trade. Thus, even if trade re­
strictions are imposed in period 2.1, these cannot be successful in diverting 
any oil from its free trade pattern, and the free trade price must realize.
10To allow for all possible allocations (including the one where no oil contracts is 
awarded) does not affect the results of the model.
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Proposition 2 implies that, by choosing F  in period 1, the government of
H  is effectively choosing a trade outcome in period 2. Thus, the introduction
of long-term contracts provides a micro-foundation for the assumption (made
in section 3.2) that H  moves first in selecting trade policy.
It should now be clear what the role of oil diplomacy in this model will be.
Suppose that the proposed allocation of contracts is f AB. In this case, the 
± PABvalue of an oil field is > and companies from A  are not willing to outbid
their rivals from B  to  secure the additional (1—6A)n of contracts: if anything,
JL pA
their evaluation of an oil field falls to —r  when they obtain all contracts,
in expectation of future trade restrictions. For the government of A , however, 
to secure all contracts implies a welfare increase that more than compensates 
for the companies lower evaluation (when 6A > 6. Thus, the government and 
companies of A  may want to join effort to expand the country’s allocation of 
contracts beyond their “fair” share 6A. Two key questions then arise: when 
is H  willing to accommodate this joint effort by A 1 s (or B ’s) government 
and companies to obtain all contracts? When is this attem pt blocked by £?’s 
companies, or by a joint effort of jB’s companies and government? To answer 
these questions, I now move to considering how the choice of F in period 1 
is optimally determined by lobbying.
3.4.2 Oil diplom acy and the allocation o f oil contracts
In the previous section, I have shown that by appropriately selecting the 
allocation of contracts in period 1 H  can determine the trade outcome in 
period 2. If it is reasonable to assume that enough time elapses between the 
two periods (that is, if investment takes enough time to be completed), it
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is then worth considering the effect that government myopia may have on 
trade in this environment. In this section, I consider the possibility that H  
is myopic, that is it attaches a higher weight to transfers in period 1 than to 
gains from trade in period 2. I then study how this myopic H  is lobbied by 
(forward looking) A  and B  when allocating contracts in period l .11
There may be many reasons why the government of a developing coun­
try attaches a higher weigh to current transfers than to future oil revenues, 
not just in absolute terms but relative to the governments of industrialized 
countries. For example, the government may be credit constrained: this was 
clearly the case of Angola in 2004, when it accepted a US$ 2bn loan from 
China (to be repaid with long-term oil contracts) as a way to escape the 
stringent transparency conditions of IMF loans (Taylor, 2005; Alden, 2007). 
It could also capture the current situation of Brazil, whose need to finance 
the development of fabulous new oil discoveries has prompted it to seek low- 
cost government loans from China and the US.12 Alternatively, in weakly 
institutionalized country the government (or the elite it represents) may be 
afraid that its tenure in power is precarious, or that current transfers are 
needed in order to secure it. A mixture of these two motivations may well 
capture the cases of countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe, or Sudan.
The objective functions of governments in period 1 are:
11 Notice that to add a discount factor would not change any of the results, as long as it 
is the same for all governments.
12See The Wall Street Journal, May 18 and August 18 2009.
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Gh = T a {F) + T b (F) + nV (F ) -  nc + a[W H(F) -  nV{F)\ (3.6)
g a  =  _ T A ( F )  +  w a(F) -  nc (3.7)
Gb  = - T b (F ) + W b (F) -  nc (3.8)
Having constructed a complete mapping between the allocation of oil 
contracts and the equilibrium price, all functions have now F  as argument. 
The functions T J(.) are the transfer offers made by each J  to H , conditional 
on a the allocation of contracts. The parameter a  € [0,1] captures the degree 
of myopia of H. The function nV (F )  captures the upfront payments received
ST-PAB 2 nF___
2(pA B )2
1 j
by H  on each oil contract. It takes value V ( f AB) = 2 n i and:
V ( f j ) = 4
i f e J > e
2 (pJ)T
± vAB 2 nP
2(pA B ) 12
Otherwise
Notice that nV(F)  enters positively the payoff of H , while it cancels out in 
the payoffs of A  and B. Because competition between companies anticipates 
a share of tomorrow’s oil revenues to today, a myopic H  must attach a higher 
weight to that share than to the rest of oil revenues. For forward looking A  
and B , instead, any effect of F  on the future value of their oil holdings is 
perfectly offset by changes in price paid by their investors today.
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A Nash equilibrium of period 1 game consists of two transfer schedules 
[TA(.)]* and [TB(.)]* and an allocation Z* such tha t each player is at its best- 
response strategy given all other players’ strategies. Because Z* is chosen 
within a set of three alternatives, this is best modeled as a menu auction. 
In a seminal paper, Bernheim and Whinston (1987) have suggested that 
“truthful” Nash equilibria (TNE) are a particularly important subset of all 
the equilibria of these auctions.13 As is standard in the literature on lobbying 
and trade policy, I only consider this class of equilibria in what follows.
TNE of this game have two very desirable features. The first is that, in 
any TNE, [TJ(.)]* must differ from W (F)  just by a constant (subject to a 
non-negativity constraint). Given this, F* may be defined as:
F* =  argmax{ W *(F) +  W B(F) +  nV{F)  +  a[W H(F) -  nV{F)] +  k}  (3.9)
F
where k is a constant. Thus, H ’s problem boils down to choosing the 
allocation of contracts that maximizes the joint welfare of all players. Second, 
the transfers paid by A  and B  in equilibrium (and therefore the equilibrium 
payoffs of all players) are conveniently and uniquely determined as:14
13This is for two key reasons: first, TNE are essentially the only coalition-proof Nash 
equilibria of the game (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1987, footnote 12); and second, they 
are very easy to characterize (as further detailed below).
14This is not true in general of TNE, but it is true in this game: see Bernheim and 
Whinston (1987), and the Appendix.
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[T A(F .)], =  argm ax{iyB (^) +  nv (F }  + a[W H(F ) -  n K (F )]} -
F
-  {W b (F*) +  n V (F ‘) + a[WH(Fm) -  nK(F*)]} (3.10) 
[Tb (F*)]* =  argm ax { W A{F) + nV(F ) + a \W H{F) -  n ^ (F ) ]} -
F
-  { W a(F*) +  n V (F ')  + a[W H(F •) -  nV(F*)]} (3.11)
In words: in equilibrium, each importer must pay a transfer that com­
pensates the other importer and H  for the higher joint welfare they would 
have achieved had the allocation of contracts been set to maximize their joint 
welfare only.
The first question we may want to ask is whether foreign influence may 
ever lead to an ’’unbalanced” allocation of contracts. Because we have re­
stricted our possible allocations to just three, this boils down to asking 
whether H  may ever want to allocate all contracts to one country (F = f J). 
It is shown in the Appendix that:
Proposition 3 I f  a  < 1 and Y  is high enough, a sufficient condition for 
H  to allocate all oil contracts to J  is that 6J be close enough to 1. In this case, 
H  receives a positive transfer from J  only (offensive transfer). Furthermore, 
—J  is then excluded from trade, and the equilibrium price is pJ in J  and H, 
7r-J in — J.
Proposition 3 says that is H  is not perfectly forward looking and the total
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of Proposition 3
Each panel represents W A(pA) — W A(pAB) +  and [GH( f A)]* — [GH( f AB)]*
as a function of 0A, for Y  =  9. Panel (a): a  =  1; Panel (b): a  =  0.5; Panel (c): a  =  0.
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demand for oil is high enough, diplomatic competition results in H  allocating 
all oil contracts to A  when this is relatively important as an oil importer. 
Furthermore, this results in B  falling into autarchy. In this case, only A  
pays a positive transfer to H. Because it succeeds in distorting the pattern 
of trade to j4’s advantage, I call this type of diplomacy offensive diplomacy, 
and the associated transfer an offensive transfer.
Figure 3 illustrates the findings of Proposition 3 with an example. The 
figure plots the gain to the myopic government of H  from allocating all oil 
contracts to A  (G ? ( fA) — Gf*(fAB)) as a function of 9A, for the case where 
Y  = 9. I also report the gain to A  from excluding B, when it holds all oil 
contracts (this is the same as the bottom line in Figure 2.c). While for a  = 1 
the gain to H  is always negative, for all a  <  1 it is strictly positive if 9A is 
high enough. Notice that because 0 is strictly below 1 for Y  high enough, A  
receives all contracts and excludes B  from trade if 9A is close enough to 1.
On reflection, the fact that H  may choose a contract allocation that leads 
to a trade distortion may seem puzzling. Because A  and B  are both active 
lobbyists, their combined diplomatic effort could be expected not to distort 
the equilibrium allocation away from efficiency: after all, what diplomacy 
does is precisely to make sure that the joint welfare of A  and B  is taken 
into account when allocating contracts, as evident in (3.9). Notice however 
that a trade distortion has both a negative and a positive effect on period 
1 ’s players. On one hand, it creates an allocative inefficiency that decreases 
the joint welfare of all players. On the other hand, it is a tool for period l ’s 
players to extract welfare from period 2’s H. When period l ’s H  is myopic 
enough, the second effect may dominate. Obviously, the gain to period l ’s
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players is always very unequally distributed, as it always damages either A  
or B.
Proposition 3 suggests that when the outsourcing of resource extrac­
tion/processing has long-lasting consequences (because contractors develop 
factors of production that are not easily substitutable or appropriable) and 
resource-rich government are myopic, diplomacy may be the driver of an un­
balanced allocation of contracts. In such an allocation, companies from one 
or more countries obtain a disproportionate amount of contracts. This may 
be true even if no country has a diplomatic advantage (i.e., countries are all 
equally good at exerting diplomatic pressure) as it is driven by the desire of a 
myopic resource-rich government to “cash in” part of the future value of nat­
ural resources. In fact, because of the (at least partial) non appropriability 
of the initial investment, a clientelistic allocation of resource contracts may 
offer a commitment advantage over alternative tools usable to obtain foreign 
support.
We have seen that when J  obtains all contracts for itself H  receives 
transfers from J  only. Furthermore, we have identified sufficient conditions 
for J  to obtain all contracts. But is any positive transfer ever paid when H  
chooses a balanced allocation of contracts, that is F  = f ABl  Proposition 4 
clarifies this:
P ro p o sitio n  4 Suppose that H  chooses F* = f AB. Then, there exists a 
threshold 6 >  9 such that, if  0J > 6, — J  pays a positive transfer in equilibrium 
(defensive transfer). The threshold 9 is strictly lower than 1 iff Y  is high 
enough. In this case, it is strictly decreasing in Y , and converges to as
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Y  goes to infinity.
Proposition 4 identifies sufficient conditions for B  to have to pay posi­
tive transfers simply to keep the allocation of contracts balanced, tha t is to 
keep H  open to unrestricted trade. Specifically, it finds that B  must pay 
positive transfers whenever A  is important enough as an oil importer. The 
relevant threshold, 6, has the same properties as <9, but depends also an a  
and converges to (instead of | )  as total demand grows.
Proposition 4 has an intuitive explanation. Plugging in F* = f AB in 
(3.11), it is clear that B  has to pay a positive transfer iff the joint welfare of 
A  and H  is maximised by f A. Now consider the extreme case where a  = 0: 
in this case, the joint welfare of A  and H  boils down to W A +  V, which we 
know from Lemma 1 to be maximised by f A if 0A > 6: thus, 6 = 6 in this 
case. In words, B  must pay transfers when H  is very myopic and A  is very 
important as an oil importer, as not doing so would certainly lead A  and 
H  to agree on F* = f A. For higher as, the critical threshold for 6A above 
which B  must pay transfers increases. Notice that is perfectly possible that, 
while B  pays transfer to prevent H  from allocating all contracts to A, the 
latter pays no transfers at all: from (3.11), whether [TA(F*)]* is positive or 
not only depends on whether B  and H  would otherwise agree on F* = f B, 
which does not need to be the case.
Figure 4 looks again at our example for the case in which Y  = 9. From 
Figure 3, I report the gain to H  from allocating all contracts to A  and the 
gain to A  from excluding 5 ; the new line represents the gain to A  and H  
from excluding B. Notice that this (just as the gain to H  from allocating all
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of Proposition 4 
The figure reproduces the three panels of Figure 3. The dashed line represents the gain 
to A and H from excluding B.
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contracts to A)  shifts up as a  decreases, converging to  the gain to A  from 
excluding B  for a = 0.
The main insight from Proposition 4 is that not all observed diplomatic 
effort must result in a distortion in the allocation of contracts: in many 
cases, this may simply be aimed at keeping an exporting country open for 
national companies. Notice that this confirms the role played by governments 
over and above that of companies: when 6A > 9. While B ’s companies can 
prevent ^4’s companies from obtaining more than 6A of the contracts when 
6A < 9, they cannot possibly do so when 6A < 9, and the government of A  
joins effort with them.
I conclude by illustrating in Figure 5 the transfers paid as a function of 
6A. The figure reports the two inferior lines in Figure 4 for the case where 
a = 0, alongside their counterparts for country B.  The thick line represents 
[TA(F*)]* (top panel) and [TB(F*)]* (bottom panel). Country A  pays a 
positive offensive transfer when 6A is very high, obtaining all contracts in 
return. In this case, B  is excluded from trade and pays no transfer. For 
intermediate levels of 9A, the allocation of contracts is balanced, but B  has 
to pay a positive defensive transfer when 9A is still high enough. When 9A is 
low, the opposite happens: it is now A  that has to pay a defensive transfer 
to keep the allocation of contracts balanced, unless 6A is very low - in which 
case B  pays an offensive transfer and gets all of the contracts.
But what are the effects of offensive and defensive diplomacy on the 
welfare of all countries? I answer this question in the next section.
216
oo -1
o
-Io <£»)
o
1o
Figure 3.4: Illustration of Proposition 4 
The figure reproduces the three panels of Figure 3. The dashed line represents the gain 
to A and H from excluding B.
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Figure 3.5: Aid paid
The figure reproduces Figure 4.c (but I have removed the top continuous line), adding as 
a thick line [TA(F*)\* (Panel a) and [Ts (F*)j* (Panel b).
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3.4.3 W elfare
I now study the impact of foreign influence on welfare. To do that, I compare 
the welfare of all countries in the equilibrium with transfers (section 4.2) and 
in the equilibrium without transfers (section 3.1). As a measure of a country’s 
welfare, I use the utilitarian planner’s welfare function. This corresponds to 
GA and GB for A  and B , to GH with a = 1 for H  (equations 3.7-3.8).
Three different cases need to be considered. First, despite the fact that 
A  and B  have a diplomatic capacity, they may optimally choose not to use 
it. This is the case when no government is able to induce H  to a clientelistic 
allocation of contracts - not even if its competitor doesn’t do anything to 
contrast this. From our previous discussion, this is the case when the resource 
rich government is perfectly forward looking (a =  1 ), but may also be the 
case when A  and B  are similarly important as oil importers. Clearly, foreign 
influence has no welfare effect in this case.
Second, it is possible that A  and/or B  use their diplomatic capacity 
in a purely defensive way, that is without leading to any distortion in the 
allocation of oil contracts. This must be welfare-decreasing for any country 
who pays positive transfers (in that it bears an extra cost for no extra benefit), 
while it is always welfare-increasing for H , who receives positive transfers at 
no cost.15
Finally, there is the case where either A  or B  prevails, obtains all contracts 
and excludes the other country from trade. In this case foreign influence is 
clearly welfare-decreasing for the excluded country, but what happens to the
15 This does not consider the effect that foreign transfers to the government may have 
on the domestic political economy.
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Figure 3.6: Welfare implications 
The figure reproduces Figure 4.c (but I have removed the top continuous line), adding as 
a thick line the welfare gain to A (Panel a), B (Panel b) and H (Panel c).
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country who prevails and to H I  This is clarified in the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  5 Defensive diplomacy is always welfare decreasing for any 
country who pays positive transfers, welfare increasing for H. Offensive 
diplomacy by country J  is , always welfare decreasing for  —J ; it is welfare- 
decreasing for H  and welfare-increasing for J  i f  the neoct best alternative to 
f J is f AB.
The intuition for the last part of Proposition 5 goes as follows. When 
the next best alternative to f J is f AB, A  must compensate H  for the welfare 
increase that it and B  would obtain by choosing f AB. But because f A 
maximises the joint welfare of all countries, this compensation must be lower 
than the welfare gain to A  from having f A rather than f AB. As for H , that 
this type of diplomacy is welfare-decreasing for this country follows from the 
fact that it is welfare-increasing for A , as it is jointly optimal for H  and 
A  to open up to B  when a = 1 . In other words, offensive diplomacy is 
unambiguously good for the country that exerts it when competition is not 
too strong, as offensive diplomacy by the other country is not feasible. In 
this case, offensive diplomacy is also unambiguously bad for H.
Figure 6  uses our usual example to illustrate (notice that this case happens 
to satisfy the sufficient conditions indicated in Proposition 5):
Panel a (b) shows that A (B) looses out when it pays defensive transfers, 
or when its competitor obtains all contracts. On the contrary, it reports a 
net gain when it pays an offensive transfer. Panel c shows that that H  always 
gains from defensive transfers, while it looses out from offensive transfers.
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Figure 3.6: Welfare implications 
The figure reproduces Figure 4.c (but I have removed the top continuous line), adding as 
a thick line the welfare gain to A (Panel a), B (Panel b) and H (Panel c).
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3.5 Discussion
It is now worth discussing a number of issues about my modeling choices, 
and discuss some of the possible alternatives.
One first point is that I am assuming that all countries are large enough to 
affect the international price of oil. While this may be realistic for the most 
influential oil importing countries (think of China, or the US) and some large 
oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Russia), it certainly does not capture the case 
of many oil-exporting countries where oil diplomacy seems to be important 
(e.g. Angola, Sudan, Kazakhistan). My one-exporter model would seem 
not to apply to the case of these countries: even if one of them accepted to 
trade with China only (say), this would not affect the price at which China 
and the US import oil. However the model presented above can be easily 
modified to account for this fact, by assuming that H  is actually made up 
of n independent parts, each of which controlling one oil field, and A  and B  
simultaneously lobby the n governments of these countries. While I do not 
present this here, it is possible to show that most of the results presented 
above remained unchanged: most notably, J  still gets all of the oil contracts 
when a  < 1 , Y  high enough and 6J close enough to 1 . W ith this extension, 
the model becomes more complicated but also allows for studying the effect 
of different £ and a  across countries.
Two additional issues regards the way in which I have structured the oil 
industry. First, the technology displays constant returns to scale across oil 
fields.16 In reality, companies, gradually build up their proprietary technology
16There are instead increasing returns to scale within each field, as a fixed investment 
is needed to begin production. The fact that such investments does not affect extraction 
costs in other oil fields ensures that returns to scale across oil fields are constant.
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3.5 Discussion
It is now worth discussing a number of issues about my modeling choices, 
and discuss some of the possible alternatives.
One first point is that I am assuming that all countries are large enough to 
affect the international price of oil. While this may be realistic for the most 
influential oil importing countries (think of China, or the US) and some large 
oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Russia), it certainly does not capture the case 
of many oil-exporting countries where oil diplomacy seems to be important 
(e.g. Angola, Sudan, Kazakhistan). My one-exporter model would seem 
not to apply to the case of these countries: even if one of them accepted to 
trade with China only (say), this would not affect the price at which China 
and the US import oil. However the model presented above can be easily 
modified to account for this fact, by assuming that H  is actually made up 
of n independent parts, each of which controlling one oil field, and A  and B  
simultaneously lobby the n governments of these countries. While I do not 
present this here, it is possible to show that most of the results presented 
above remained unchanged: most notably, J  still gets all of the oil contracts 
when a  < 1 , Y  high enough and 6J close enough to 1 . W ith this extension, 
the model becomes more complicated but also allows for studying the effect 
of different £ and a  across countries.
Two additional issues regards the way in which I have structured the oil 
industry. First, the technology displays constant returns to scale across oil 
fields.16 In reality, companies, gradually build up their proprietary technology
16There are instead increasing returns to scale within each field, as a fixed investment 
is needed to begin production. The fact that such investments does not affect extraction 
costs in other oil fields ensures that returns to scale across oil fields are constant.
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and know-how. Second, all oil companies are private in the model, and there 
is a number of them engaging in price-competition within the boundary of 
each country. This structure is hardly observable in oil exporting countries, 
where the oil is normally in the hand of a single, state-owned company. As for 
oil importing countries, it probably suits the case of the US 17 but not that 
of China, were a few oil companies are all controlled by the government.18
Some of these issues may be addressed more easily than others. If increas­
ing returns to scale resulted in larger contractors being able to create more 
disruption to production (a higher £), then there would be an additional ra­
tionale for governments to intervene and help companies grow bigger. The 
main issue with companies market power in oil importing countries is that 
this could undermine the rationale for government intervention, as a cartel 
of national companies would be able to exercise the same market power on 
exporting countries as its parent government. Notice however that, as long 
as these companies are private, their objective would not coincide with that 
of the governments, in that they would not capture the positive effect of 
restricted trade on consumers. Thus, if these companies were left alone in 
their bidding, they would suffer from a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis 
their government-supported competitors. This point may also be true for 
public companies whose incentives are not perfectly aligned with those of 
the government, as could be the case of China.
As for the market structure of exporting countries, I have already men­
tioned the fact that the model could be extended to have n small countries,
17Notice however that the worry of collusion among the major national companies has 
been felt by US policy very frequently during 20th century, see Venn (1983).
18This is despite the fact that some of them are partially private.
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each of which containing one oil company. Formally, none of the results 
would change if this company was government-owned, as this would have the 
same profit maximizing objective it has in the current model. However the 
fact that the national government would then be involved in bargaining takes 
me to another key issue that needs to be addressed.
In the current model, when all oil contracts have been allocated to com­
panies from A  (say), the government of A  may be able to set trade policy and 
so affect the bargaining between private companies. In principle, one could 
allow for the possibility that the A  and H  bargain over the trade policy they 
both set: after all, just as A  prohibits its companies to trade with B  could H  
prohibit its companies to trade with A! By how the game is structured (with 
H  moving first) I am effectively removing this possibility and giving all the 
bargaining power in this inter-government game to A. Thus, the model is 
more a model of competition between A  and B  than a model of the relative 
bargaining power of A  and B , on one hand, and H  on the other. It could 
be very interesting to endogeneize the latter element as well: in the model 
with n small producers, for example, the superior bargaining power from A  
and B  could come from their relative size, but could be decreasing in the 
extent to which the many small Hs  can form a bargaining coalition. This 
could help explain why the pattern of consumer competition underwent a 
structural break in the 1970s and 1980s, when OPEC became so important.
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3.6 Conclusion
Historical evidence suggests that the diplomatic effort of oil importing coun­
tries matters for the allocation of oil contracts in developing countries. In 
this paper, I have presented an economic theory of energy security that ratio­
nalizes this role of governments, and studies its likely impact on the pattern 
of FDI, trade and welfare.
The model shows that it may be optimal for a country whose companies 
control enough overseas oil contracts to “hoard” oil. In particular, the model 
predicts that this will happen when the country involved has a high relative 
need for imported oil, and the international price of oil is high enough. This 
optimal oil hoarding behavior provides for an important role of diplomacy 
in shaping the allocation of oil contracts: because private companies do not 
capture this benefit of controlling a large number of oil contracts, their bid 
may effectively be complemented by the lobbying activity of their parent 
government.
I have studied the allocation of oil contracts in an oil-exporting country 
when companies and governments from two oil-importing countries compete 
among themselves. When oil contracts entrust buyers with developing an im­
portant factor for the production of oil, and this factor is hardly appropriable 
and substitutable, the allocation of contracts has long-lasting consequences 
for the capacity of the oil- exporting country to set its trade policy. I inter­
act this long-term decision with the possibility that the government of the 
oil-exporting country is myopic, and study the consequences of lobbying for 
the allocation of oil contracts.
The model suggests that when oil-exporting governments are very myopic,
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oil diplomacy may lead to distortions in the allocation of contracts and in the 
pattern of trade even if no country has a better diplomatic capacity than any 
others. This is because long-term contracts allow exporting governments to 
commit to the future trade policy preferred by importing governments, and 
a myopic government may want to “cash in” on this by exchanging contracts 
for current transfers. I have studied the welfare implication of this “offensive 
diplomacy” , and found sufficient conditions such that it is welfare-increasing 
for the country who exerts it, welfare-decreasing for the exporting country.
The model also highlights that when it does not succeed in shaping the 
allocation of contracts, diplomacy may still be needed to keep the exporting 
country open to international competition. This “defensive” diplomacy is a 
waist from in the oil-importing countries’ point of view, as it is costly and 
yields nothing more than the competitive equilibrium. Not surprisingly, de­
fensive diplomacy is always welfare decreasing for them, while it is welfare 
increasing for the oil exporting country. The latter result suggests that there 
is room for international co-ordination to discourage diplomatic transfers. 
This could be Pareto-improving if transfers have undesirable consequences 
for the domestic politics of the exporting country (e.g. they keep in power 
a corrupt government). Even if transfers have a positive impact on H  (e.g. 
development assistance), international co-ordination may be desirable if de­
fensive diplomacy distort the allocation of aid away from countries who are 
more in need.
Overall, these results suggest that whenever oil-exporting governments 
attach a disproportionate weigh to current transfers - for example because 
they are credit constrained, or with a fragile political systems - oil diplomacy
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may flourish and have real consequences on the pattern of FDI and trade. 
This may be both an opportunity and a cost to countries that exert it. Insofar 
as recipient governments can use diplomatic support to remain in power, this 
may also have important consequences for the political economy of resource 
rich countries.
3.7 A ppendix
P ro p e r tie s  o f W J(p)
By inspecting the first and second derivatives of a more generic function 
W J(a,p) (where a indicates tha t J  has a units of the natural resource):
d W J (a,p) ap — y J 
dp 4pi
d2W J (a,p) _  3yJ — ap 
dp2 8pi
it is clear that this reaches a global minimum at p = and is monotonically 
increasing (decreasing) in p when p > ^  (p < ^ ).■
P ro o f o f L em m a 1
With £ =  1, (3.5) boils down to:
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1.5pA +  yA 1.5 pAB + yA
2  (pA)^ 2  (pAB)%
(3.12)
Because pA < pAB, by the properties of W A(1.5,p) (see above) a suffi­
cient condition for (3.12) to be satisfied is ^  >  pAB. Plugging in (3.3) and 
rearranging:
von -  y(Y)
1 + Y  
2Y  — 4
We can now define 6 as:
Clearly, 6 is strictly lower than 1 and strictly decreasing in Y  iff Y  > 5 ; 
furthermore, it converges to |  as Y  goes to infinity.■
Proof of Proposition 2
. To simplify the notation, denote y(Y)  and y(Y)  by simply y and y. In 
the free trade equilibrium, country J  receives a share 6J of i / ’s exports:
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m i  =  —
AB
2p
+  y J
AB - 1
y J - y
= e
2y
j V - y
2 y
where:
y - y  =  v  + 1
2  y 2y
=  - m ?
We can now show that, if F* =  f AB, the equilibrium price must be p"4-6  
everywhere, and independently on the actions of A  and B.  First, this must 
clearly be the case if neither A  nor B  impose restrictions on their companies, 
as all agents are exactly as unconstrained as under free trade. Next, suppose 
that both A  and B  impose restrictions. This means that 6A of the oil in H  
is earmarked to be used only in A  or H , while 6B = 1 — 9A is earmarked 
to be used only in B  or in H.  Clearly, the two types of oil cannot have 
different prices, as users in H  can arbitrate between the two and there is 
enough of the two type to satisfy the demand of the respective importer at 
the only possible equilibrium single price (pAB). Finally, suppose only J  
imposes restrictions. Thus, 6J of the oil is earmarked to be consumed only in 
J  or in H , while 6~J = 1 — 6J can be used everywhere. Again, the two types
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cannot have different prices because H  can arbitrate and there is enough oil 
that is allowed to flow to — J.
Next, I show that if F* =  f J and 6 >  0J , country — J  is excluded from 
trade. Clearly, because 6 > 6J J  imposes to its agents not to trade with — J , 
and this results in none of the oil of J  or H  being sold to — J  (remember that 
the constraint in (3.4) is never binding for £ =  1). But can any y be imported 
from — J  to H I  Clearly not: while users of y in H  would like to import y 
from — J  (as it is cheaper there) they cannot do so because the oil that they 
would need for the exchange cannot be sold to — J. This shows that no trade 
can take place between — J  and either of the other two countries.■
Uniqueness of payoffs and transfers
• Denote by G the vector of payoffs of A  and B  (GA and GB). Using 
Theorem 2 in Bernheim and Whinston (1987), I find tha t the equilibrium G 
must belong to the set:
E r (F) = (G  | G 6  n r (F) and J g '  e  I lr (F ) , G' ^  g }
where Tlr(F) is defined as:
n r (F) =  < g  | <
g a  < w ABH(F) -  m axf W BII(F) 
q b  < w a b h ( F }  _  maXF w AH{F) 
GA + GB < W ABH(Z) -  m axf W H(F))
(3.13)
and W H(F) =  V(F) + a[WH(F) -  V(.F)], W j a (F) = W J{F) + W H(F) 
and W a b h (F) = W A{F) +  W B{F) + W H{F).
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We begin by showing that argmaxj? W H(F) = f AB. We can write:
W h (F) = V(F)  +  a[WH(F) -  V(F)] 
_  (0.5 +  0.5a)p +  a
2 (p)%
But because pAB > pA,pB, from the properties of a generic W(a,p)  we 
then know that a sufficient condition for W H( f AB) > W H( f A), W H( f B) is:
a
0.5 +  0.5a < p A,pB
which is always satisfied for Y  >  2 , as the LHS is never greater than 1 .
Next, we show that for all possible F*t the set Er(F*) is a singleton. 
My strategy is to show that if the first two constraints in (3.13) holds with 
equality, then the third constraint holds. Because Er(F*) is the Pareto 
frontier of (3.13), this is sufficient to prove that Er(F*) is a singleton and 
the equilibrium payoffs of A  and B  are indicated by the first two constraints 
in (3.13) when they hold with equality.
1 . F* = f AB. There are then three possible subcases:
• argm axf W a h (F) =  argm ax f W b h ^  = f AB. In this case, it is 
immediately evident that if the first two constraints in (3.13) hold, 
the third constraint holds as well;
•  argmaxi? W AH(F) = f A, argmax^r W BH =  f AB(F). In this case, 
if the first two constraints in (3.13) holds we can write:
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GA + GB = W A( f AB) + W ABH( f AB) -  W AH{ f A) 
<  W A( f AB) + W ABH(JAB) -  W AH( f AB) 
= W A{ fAB) + W B( f AB)
implying that the third constraint is satisfied as well;
•  argm ax p W AH(F) =  f AB, argmaxj? W BH(F) = f B. Proof sym­
metric to the previous subcase;
•  argm ax p W AH(F) = f A,a igmaxF\VBH(F) = f B. In this case: 
Ga +  Gb =  W ABH( f AB) -  W BH( f B) +  W ABH( f AB) -  W AH( f A) 
<  w ABH( f AB) — W BH( f AB) +  W ABH( f AB) — W AH( f AB) 
= W A{ f AB) + W B( f AB)
2. F* = f A. In this case there are two subcases:
•  argm ax^ W BH(F) = f AB. If the first two constraints in (3.13) 
hold:
GA + GB = W ABH( f A) -  W BH( f AB) +  W B( f A) 
< W ABH{ fA) -  W BH( f AB) +  W B( f AB) 
= W ABH{ fA) -  W H{ f AB)
Implying that the third constraint holds as well.
• argm ax p W BH(F) = f B. Again, if the two constraints in (3.13)
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hold:
Ga + Gb = W ABH{ f A) -  W BH{ f B) +  W B( f A)
< -  W BH( f AB) + W B( f A)
<  W ABH( f A) -  W BH( f AB) +  W B( f AB) 
= W ABH{ f A) -  W H{ f AB)
and the third constraints again holds.
3. F* = f B: proof symmetric to the previous case.B
Proof of Proposition 3
We want to show that, if 6A is close enough to 1, it is optimal for H  to 
choose f A over f AB (a symmetric argument holds for 6B close enough to 1 ). 
Suppose that Y  > 5. Then, we know from the proof of Lemma 1 and from 
Proposition 2 that for 6A close enough to 1, f A results in B  being excluded 
from trade. Thus, what we want to show is that (rearranging from (3.9)):
W A(1.5,pA) -  W A(1.5,pAB) + W B( 1,t tb) -  W B{l,pAB)+
+a[WH(0.5,pA) -  W H(0.5,pAB)} > 0
If 6A = 1 , the LHS of the above inequality is exactly zero, as pA = pAB = 
7rB. I proceed to show that, for a < 1 , the derivative of the LHS with respect
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to yA evaluated at 6A =  1 is negative: because of continuity, this establishes 
that the LHS must be strictly positive for some values of 6A immediately to 
the left of 1 .
Because pAB does not change as we move 6A (for a given Y),  our task 
simplifies to having to show that:
d[WA(l.b,pA) +  W b (1,ttb ) +  a W H(0.5,pA)] 
dyA
d (1.5+o:0.5)p'A+a;+y''t , (  B \ -  
2(p
d
dyA
(1 .5 + a 0 .5 )± ^ + a + j/A + ( Y - y A ) 12
2 ( ^ ) 2
dyA
> 0
Working out the derivative and plugging in yA = y = —3 -- we find that 
a condition for the above inequality to hold is:
F(1 — a) > 5(1 — a)
Which is true whenever a  < !.■
Proof of Proposition 4
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Take 6A > 0 (a symmetric proof can be constructed for QB > 0), and 
suppose F* = f AB. In this case, we know from the proof of uniqueness of 
B 1 s payoff (see above also for a description of the notation) that:
T B( f AB) =  W AH( f A) — W AH( f AB)
Re-arranging the RHS of the above condition, we now want to find suffi­
cient conditions such that:
(1 .5+  0.5a)pA + yA + a  (1.5 +  0.5a)pAB + yA + a  ^  ^ (3 14)
2(pA)z 2(pAB)z
Prom this point onwards, the proof follow closely tha t of Lemma 1. Be­
cause pA < pAB, a sufficient condition for (3.14) is pAB < ~ • Plugging
in (3.3), and rearranging, we find:
+ ( l -5  +  0 . 5 a ) - a - y
------------ —  <  U
y - y
Which simplifies to:
1 1 — 5 a  +  y ( l  — g) 
2 Y - 2
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Now defining:
9 =  min
1 1 -  5a +  Y(1 -  a )  
’ 2 Y - 2
It is easy to see that 9 is strictly decreasing in Y  and strictly below 1 
for Y  > 5 .  Furthermore, it is strictly greater than 9 whenever Y  > 5, and 
converging to as Y  that goes to infinity. ■
Proof of Proposition 5
That defensive diplomacy is always welfare decreasing for any country 
who pays positive transfers is clear from the fact that transfers are paid in 
exchange for nothing, as the price remains the same as in the world without 
diplomacy. As for offensive diplomacy by country A  (say), this must be 
welfare decreasing for country B,  who ends up facing a higher equilibrium 
price than in the world without diplomacy (irB > pAB). To see that it must 
be welfare increasing for A  when the choice that maximises the joint welfare 
of H  and B  is f AB, just look at the unique payoff of A:
Ga = W ABH( f A) -  W BH( f AB)
> w ABH{ fAB) -  W BH( f AB)
= W A( f AB)
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Where the inequality comes from the fact that, by assumption, f A max­
imises W ABH. Finally, offensive diplomacy by A  must decrease W H in this 
case, as it decreases W A +  W H. To see this latter point, notice that:
w A( p ) + w H(p) =  2p + y A + 1
2  (p)i
reaches a global minimum at p = = pA.
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